Broadcast facilities could be designed so that, in case of emergency, a special signal indicating a hostile takeover was transmitted along with the picture. Special tapes could be produced — dealing with methods of nonviolence, ways to undermine control of television by aggressors, etc. — and stored safely for transmission in case of emergency.
Heavy consumption of broadcast television makes a society more vulnerable to takeover. For long-term security based on nonviolent techniques, the role of television should be reduced. If most people are active transmitters rather than just receivers of messages, then there is less possibility for manipulation and central control.
Occasionally, television broadcasts inadvertently aid nonviolent struggle, as in East Germany. From 1945, East Germany was ruled by a communist dictatorship. Secret police monitored activity in all spheres of life. However, West German radio and television broadcasts were readily received throughout East Germany, giving an attractive — indeed perhaps unrealistically attractive — picture of life under capitalism. In 1961, the border with West Germany was walled off to prevent emigration.
Under the Soviet Union’s new policies in the late 1980s, there was no longer a guarantee of armed intervention to support client states in Eastern Europe. On 11 September 1989, Hungary opened its borders with Austria. East Germans, by going “on holiday” to Hungary, could escape to the west. As word spread, including via news on West German radio and television, the initial trickle of emigration became a torrent. At the same time, there were public rallies against the regime in East German cities. Initially attracting only a few people, in the space of weeks the rallies were attended by hundreds of thousands. News of the growing open dissent was again provided by West German mass media. In the face of massive emigration and enormous protests, East German leaders resigned. The regime collapsed in the face of nonviolent expression of opposition.[3]
If television is produced locally for small audiences, its vulnerability to takeover is reduced, especially if there are numerous independent channels. For the purposes of nonviolent resistance, a multitude of locally controlled broadcasts is the direction to go.[4] But the technical skills and costs to produce high quality programmes are significant obstacles to such a goal.
Radio
In an examination of nonviolent struggle, large and powerful radio stations with many listeners are similar to television stations. They are prime targets for an aggressor, since they can be controlled by a few people and have an enormous influence. A long-term goal in developing a social defence system should be to replace such radio stations by interactive communication media. In the meantime, preparations should be made to be able to broadcast resistance messages or, if necessary, shut down big stations in the event of a threat.
Looking over some of the historical instances of nonviolent struggle suggests a more positive role for radio. One case is the collapse of the Algerian generals’ revolt in 1961. In Algeria, an armed struggle for independence from France was waged from the mid 1950s. It was met by severe repression by French troops. French president Charles de Gaulle, seeing that independence for Algeria was inevitable, began negotiations with the independence movement. French generals in Algeria, bitterly opposed to this course of action, staged a coup on the night of 21-22 April 1961. There was even the possibility that they might lead an invasion of France.
Opposition to the coup was quickly demonstrated in France. There was a national one-hour strike and massive rallies. After vacillating a few days, de Gaulle made a passionate plea for troops to refuse to join the rebels. Meanwhile, in Algeria the rebelling generals failed to gain the support of the troops, many of whom were conscripts. Troops heard de Gaulle’s broadcast on transistor radios that they had refused to turn in as instructed. Many soldiers just stayed in their barracks. Others reported for duty but purposely failed to do it. About one-third of the fighter aircraft were flown out of the country, never to return. The coup collapsed after four days without a shot being fired against it.[5]
The most prominent example showing the power of radio for nonviolent struggle is the Czechoslovak resistance to the Soviet-led invasion in 1968. During 1967 and 1968, communist rule in Czechoslovakia was rapidly liberalised, a process supported throughout the country. This was a severe threat to the Soviet rulers, who organised an invasion of the country in August. Military resistance would have been futile and there was no help from the West. Instead, there was a spontaneous nonviolent resistance to the invasion. People poured out onto the streets. They talked to the invading soldiers and quickly convinced many of them that the Czechoslovak cause was just.
The Czechoslovak military had set up a sophisticated radio network to be used in the event of a NATO invasion. It was used instead by citizens to broadcast messages of resistance, to warn about impending arrests, to counsel the use of nonviolent methods, to tell where troops were headed, and to call a meeting of the Czechoslovak communist party. It took a week before the radio resisters could be shut down. But the Soviets did not obtain their initial objective — setting up a puppet government — until April 1969.[6]
The Czechoslovak radio network had been set up by the Czechoslovak military to survive an invasion from Western Europe; this network was put at the service of the people’s nonviolent resistance, with spectacular results, especially given that the full story of the struggle could be heard on the airwaves in nearby countries. How is it that a technological system designed by the military for centralised control turned out to be so useful for nonviolent struggle?
The answer to this question is that a centralised communication system such as radio, television or the press can be useful to a nonviolent resistance when there is virtually complete support for the resistance and, of course, the system is controlled by the resistance. The Czechoslovak people were united, from workers to top party officials, against the Soviet invasion. Therefore, the radio system, in the hands of the resistance, was a powerful tool. It didn’t matter too much which particular Czechoslovaks were making the broadcasts, because there was such widespread agreement about the aims and methods of resistance. For example, when the Soviets brought in jamming equipment by rail, this information was passed to the radio stations, which then broadcast an appeal to halt the rail shipment. Rail workers shunted the equipment onto a siding. It is obvious that if even a single person listening to the broadcasts had alerted the Soviets, they could have avoided this delay. Eventually they brought in jamming equipment by helicopter.
Although a centralised communication medium such as radio can be useful to a nonviolent resistance in these special circumstances, the technology of electronic broadcast remains a vulnerability for the resistance. Once the Soviets took over the Czechoslovak radio network, this brought the active, public phase of the nonviolent resistance to a rapid end. The occasional value of central radio broadcasts to a resistance can be misleading about the general value of radio, which is likely to be of more value to an aggressor.
The strengths and limitations of radio are also suggested by the long history of clandestine radio.[7] In countries where governments control all mass communication, it is commonplace for dissident groups to set up their own radio stations, sometimes broadcasting from a nearby country or sometimes from secret — and moveable — locations within the country. Clandestine radio of this sort is an indication of the lack of free communication. But there are many more clandestine radio stations run by governments, usually by spy agencies. Many of these are “black” stations, pretending to be from a resistance movement and aiming to destabilise a government. This means that a large proportion of clandestine broadcasting is disinformation. Much more can be said about clandestine radio, and there are some fascinating stories. The important point here concerns radio stations: sometimes they can be useful for a nonviolent resistance, but often they seem of greater use to powerful groups seeking to manipulate public opinion rather than respond to it.
Big radio — large, powerful stations with many listeners — is only one sort of radio. There are also a number of other possibilities. Community radio, in which a station is run with a great deal of participation from local people, and in which the power and range of the broadcast is limited, is much more suited to a resistance.[8] If a city has thousands of community radio stations rather than a dozen dominant stations, it is much better situated to resist a takeover. The greater the diversity of stations, the more likelihood that some of them will be willing to take a stand.
Even more valuable for nonviolent struggle are radio systems that are cheaper and that transmit to only a
