the declassification of the “Inspector General’s Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro” (see Document, p.57), which had been commissioned by President Johnson in 1967. So controversial, incriminating—and maybe embarrassing—was the report that the CIA refused its declassification for thirty-six years. Even presidents were refused access to the full document.
On the recommendation of the Church Committee, President Gerald Ford issued Executive Order 11905, which ruled that “no employee of the US government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination”. Jimmy Carter strengthened this proscription with Executive Order 12036, as did Reagan, through Executive Order 12333. Because no subsequent executive order or piece of legislation has repealed the prohibition, it remains in effect.
Only a smooth White House lawyer, however, was able to reconcile EO 12333 with the Reagan administration dropping bombs on Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi’s home in 1986, or President Bush’s instruction to the CIA and US military to engage in “lethal covert operations” against Osama bin Laden, or indeed Obama’s green light for the eventual offing of the al-Qaeda leader. According to the White House, the ban on political assassination does not apply to wartime or counter-terrorist operations.
Meanwhile, back in Cuba jokes about Castro’s apparent indestructibility ran rife. One told of him being given a present of a Galapagos turtle. He declined after learning that it was only likely to live for a hundred years, saying, “That’s the problem with pets. You get attached to them and then they die on you.”
Fabian Escalante,
DOCUMENT: CIA INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT ON PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE FIDEL CASTRO [EXTRACTS]
The report was drawn up in 1967 at the insistence of President Johnson—who was not allowed by the Agency to see the full version. Neither was President Nixon. Indeed, the CIA regarded their own report as so incriminating that all but one copy was destroyed. The report was only approved for release in 1993.
23 May 1967: MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Report on Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro
This report was prepared at the request of the Director of Central Intelligence. He assigned the task to the Inspector General on 23 March 1967. The report was delivered to the Director, personally, in installments, beginning on 24 April 1967. The Director returned this copy to the Inspector General on 22 May 1967 with instructions that the Inspector General:
Retain it in personal, EYES ONLY safekeeping
[…]
This ribbon copy is the only text of the report now in existence, either in whole or in part. Its text has been read only by:
Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence
J. S. Earman, Inspector General
K. E. Greer, Inspector (one of the authors)
S. E. Beckinridge (one of the authors)
All typing of drafts and of final text was done by the authors.
[…]
It became clear very early in our investigation that the vigor with which schemes were pursued within the Agency to eliminate Castro personally varied with the intensity of the U.S. Government’s efforts to overthrow the Castro regime. We can identify five separate phases in Agency assassination planning, although the transitions from one to another are not always sharply defined. Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing Government attitude toward the Cuban regime.
a. Prior to August 1960: All of the identifiable schemes prior to about August 1960, with one possible exception, were aimed only at discrediting Castro personally by influencing his behavior or by altering his appearance.
b. August 1960 to April 1961: The plots that were hatched in late 1960 and early 1961 were aggressively pursued and were viewed by at least some of the participants as being merely one aspect of the over-all active effort to overthrow the regime that culminated in the Bay of Pigs.
c. April 1961 to late 1961: A major scheme that was begun in August 1960 was called off after the Bay of Pigs and remained dormant for several months, as did most other Agency operational activity related to Cuba.
d. Late 1961 to late 1962: That particular scheme was reactivated in early 1962 and was again pushed vigorously in the era of Project MONGOOSE and in the climate of intense administration pressure on CIA to do something about Castro and his Cuba.
e. Late 1962 until well into 1963: After the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 and the collapse of Project MONGOOSE, the aggressive scheme that was begun in August 1960 and revived in April 1962 was finally terminated in early 1963. Two other plots were originated in 1963, but both were impracticable and nothing ever came of them.
We cannot overemphasize the extent to which responsible Agency officers felt themselves subject to the Kennedy administration’s severe pressures to do something about Castro and his regime. The fruitless and, in retrospect, often unrealistic plotting should be viewed in that light.
Many of those we interviewed stressed two points that are so obvious that recording them here may be superfluous. We believe, though, that they are pertinent to the story. Elimination of the dominant figure in a government, even when loyalties are held to him personally rather than to the government as a body, will not necessarily cause the downfall of the government. This point was stressed with respect to Castro and Cuba in an internal CIA draft paper of October 1961, which was initiated in response to General Maxwell Taylor’s desire for a contingency plan. The paper took the position that the demise of Fidel Castro, from whatever cause, would offer little opportunity for the liberation of Cuba from Communist and Soviet Bloc control. The second point, which is more specifically relevant to our investigation, is that bringing about the downfall of a government necessarily requires the removal of its leaders from positions of power, and there is always the risk that the participants will resort to assassination. Such removals from power as the house arrest of a [?] or the flight of a [?] could not cause one to overlook the killings of a Diem or of a Trujillo by forces encouraged but not controlled by the U.S. government.
There is a third point, which was not directly made by any of those we interviewed, but which emerges clearly from the interviews and from review of files. The point is that of frequent resort to synecdoche—the mention of a part when the whole is to be understood, or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated references to phrases such as “disposing of Castro,” which may be read in the narrow, literal sense of assassinating him, when it is intended that it be read in the broader, figurative sense of dislodging the Castro regime. Reversing this coin, we find people speaking vaguely of “doing something about Castro” when it is clear that what they have specifically in mind is killing him. In a situation wherein those speaking may not have actually meant what they seemed to say or may not have said what they actually meant, they should not be surprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted differently than was intended.
The suggestion was made that operations aimed at the assassination of Castro may have been generated in an atmosphere of stress in intelligence publications on the possibility of Castro’s demise and on the reordering of the political structure that would follow. We reviewed intelligence publications from 1960 through 1966, including National Intelligence Estimates, Special National Intelligence Estimates, Intelligence Memorandums, and Memorandums for the Director. The NTE’s on “The Situation and Prospects in Cuba” for 1960, 1963, and 1964 have brief paragraphs on likely successor governments if Castro were to depart the scene. We also find similar short references in a SNIE of March 1960 and in an Intelligence Memorandum of May 1965. In each case the treatment is no more nor less than one would expect to find in comprehensive round-ups such as these. We conclude that there is no reason to believe that the operators were unduly influenced by the content of intelligence publications.
Drew Pearson’s column of 7 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Cuba’s Fidel Castro. Pearson also has information, as yet unpublished, to the effect that there was a meeting at the State
