Survey of United States Practice' (Vanderbilt Law Review 43 [1990]: 1259, 1275 n.99), Sandi R. Murphy gives a full history of the laws passed relevant to paraquat; see also 'A Cure Worse Than the Disease?,' Time, August 29, 1983, 20.
Roe v. Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 US 173 (1991).
Maher v. Roe, 432 US 464 (1977).
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 US 417 (1990).
This distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' regulation, of course, has a long and troubled history in philosophy as well as in law. Judith J. Thomson describes this difference in her distinction between the trolley driver who must run over one person to save five and the surgeon who may not harvest the organs from one healthy person to save five dying people; see 'The Trolley Problem,' Yale Law Journal 94 (1985): 1395, 1395–96. This difference is also known as the 'double effect doctrine,' discussed in Philippa Foot, 'The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect,' in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 19. See also Thomas J. Bole III, 'The Doctrine of Double Effect: Its Philosophical Viability,' Southwest Philosophy Review 7 (1991): 91; Frances M. Kamm, 'The Doctrine of Double Effect: Reflections on Theoretical and Practical Issues,' Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16 (1991): 571; Warren Quinn, 'Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect,' Philosophy and Public Affairs 18 (1989): 334. The trouble in these cases comes when a line between them must be drawn; here I do not need to draw any such line.
Richard Craswell suggests other examples making the same point: The government could (a) regulate product quality or safety directly or (b) disclose information about different products' quality or safety ratings, in the hope that manufacturers would then have an incentive to compete to improve those ratings; the government could (a) allow an industry to remain monopolized and attempt directly to regulate the price the monopolist charged or (b) break up the monopolist into several competing firms, in the hope that competition would then force each to a more competitive price; the government could (a) pass regulations directly requiring corporations to do various things that would benefit the public interest or (b) pass regulations requiring that corporate boards of directors include a certain number of 'independent' representatives, in the hope that the boards would then decide for themselves to act more consistently with the public interest.
See New York v. United States, 505 US 144 (1992).
Lee Tien identifies other important problems with architectural regulation in 'Archi tectural Regulation and the Evolution of Social Norms,' International Journal of Communications Law and Policy 9 (2004): 1.
Aida Torres, 'The Effects of Federal Funding Cuts on Family Planning Services, 1980–1983,' Family Planning Perspectives 16 (1984): 134, 135, 136.
Rust v. Sullivan, USNY (1990) WL 505726, reply brief, *7: 'The doctor cannot explain the medical safety of the procedure, its legal availability, or its pressing importance to the patient's health.'
See Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 US 753, 785 (1994) (Justice Antonin Scalia concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part: Today's decision . . . makes it painfully clear that no legal rule or doctrine is safe from ad hoc nullification by this Court when an occasion for its application arises in a case involving state regulation of abortion [quoting _Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,_ 476 US 747, 814 (1986) (Justice Sandra Day O'Connor dissenting)]).
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 US 1 (1948).
See Herman H. Long and Charles S. Johnson, People Versus Property: Race- Restrictive Covenants in Housing (Nashville: Fisk University Press, 1947), 32–33. Douglas S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton point out that the National Association of Real Estate Brokers
