See, e.g., People v. Network Associates, Inc., 195 Misc. 2d 384 (N.Y. Misc. 2003).
See William W. Fisher III, 'Compulsory Terms in Internet-Related Contracts,' Chicago- Kent Law Review 73 (1998). Fisher catalogs public policy restrictions on freedom of contract, which he characterizes as 'ubiquitous.'
Stefik, The Internet Edge, 91–7.
See Lessig, Free Culture: The Nature and Future of Creativity , xiv–xvi.
Yochai Benkler, 'Net Regulation: Taking Stock and Looking Forward,' University of Colorado Law Review 71 (2000): 1203, 1254.
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Publishing, 510 U.S. 569 (1994). Gordon ('Fair Use as Mar ket Failure') argues that the courts should employ fair use to permit uncompensated transfers that the market is incapable of effectuating; see also Wendy J. Gordon, 'On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and Restitutionary Impulse,' Virginia Law Review 78 (1992): 149. In 'Reality as Artifact: From Feist to Fair Use' (Law and Contemporary Problems 55 5PG [1992]: 93, 96), Gordon observes that, while imaginative works are creative, they may also comprise facts, which need to be widely available for public dissemination. Gordon's 'Toward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the Problem of Private Censorship' (University of Chicago Law Review 57 [1990]: 1009) is a discussion of the ability of copyright holders to deny access to critics and others; see also Wendy Gordon, 'An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory,' Stanford Law Review 41 (1989): 1343.
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 US 1 (1824) (striking down New York's grant of a monopoly of steamboat navigation on the Hudson River as inconsistent with the federal Coasting Act of 1793); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 US 316 (1819) (pronouncing that Congress has the power to do what is 'necessary and proper' to achieve a legitimate end, like the regulation of interstate commerce).
See Bernard C. Gavit, The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (Bloom ington, Ind.: Principia Press, 1932), 84.
See Pensacola Telegraph Company v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 96 US 1, 9 (1877).
As one commentator put it near the turn of the century: 'If the power of Congress has a wider incidence in 1918 than it could have had in 1789, this is merely because production is more dependent now than then on extra- state markets. No state liveth to itself alone to any such extent as was true a century ago. What is changing is not our system of government, but our economic organization'; Thomas Reed Powell, 'The Child Labor Law, the Tenth Amendment, and the Commerce Clause,' Southern Law Quarterly 3 (1918): 175, 200– 201.
See Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 1 (New York: Vintage, 1990), 158–70, on the idea that the framers' design pushed states to legislate in a broad domain and keep the local government active.
See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 US 183, 201 (1968) (Justice William O. Douglas dissenting: The majority's bringing of employees of state-owned enterprises within the reach of the commerce clause was 'such a serious invasion of state sovereignty protected by the Tenth Amendment that it . . . [was] not consistent with our constitutional federalism'); State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corporation, 370 US 451, 456 (1962) (holding that 'the power of Congress to grant protection to interstate commerce against state regulation or taxation or to withhold it is so complete that its ideas of policy should prevail') (citations omitted).
See Michael G. Frey, 'Unfairly Applying the Fair Use Doctrine: Princeton University Press v Michigan Document Services, 99 F3d 1381 (6th Cir 1996),' University of Cincinnati Law Review 66 (1998): 959, 1001; Frey asserts that 'copyright protection exists primarily for the benefit of the public, not the benefit of individual authors. Copyright law does give authors a considerable benefit in terms of the monopolistic right to control their creations, but that right exists only to ensure the creation of new works. The fair use doctrine
