Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism

34

The second Bank of USA, set up in 1816 under a 20-year charter, was 20% owned by the government and federal tax revenue was deposited there, but it did not have note issue monopoly, so it could not be considered a proper central bank.

35

As cited in Wilkins (1989), p. 84.

36

Even until as late as 1914, when it had become as rich as the UK, the US was one of the largest net borrowers in the international capital market. The authoritative estimate by the US historian Mira Wilkins puts the level of US foreign debt at that time at $7.1 billion, with Russia ($3.8 billion) and Canada ($3.7 billion) trailing far behind (p. 145, Table, 5.3). Of course, at that point, the US, with its estimated lending at $3.5 billion, was also the fourth largest lending country, after the UK ($18 billion), France ($9 billion) and Germany ($7.3 billion). However, even after subtracting its lending, the US still had a net borrowing position of $3.6 billion, which was basically the same as the Russian and the Canadian figures. See Wilkins (1989).

37

Wilkins (1989), p. 563

38

Cited in Wilkins (1989), p. 85.

39

Wilkins (1989), p. 583.

40

Wilkins (1989), p. 83, and p. 583

41

At the time, the territories were North Dakota, South Dakota, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, Utah, Washington, Wyoming, Oklahoma and Alaska. The Dakotas, Montana and Washington in 1889, Idaho and Wyoming in 1890, and Utah in 1896 became states, and thus were no longer subject to this Act. See Wilkins (1989), p. 241.

42

Wilkins (1989), p. 579.

43

Wilkins (1989), p. 580.

44

Wilkins (1989), p. 456.

45

For further details, see M. Yoshino (1970), ‘Japan as Host to the International Corporation’ in C. Kindleberger (ed.), The International Corporation – A Symposium (The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).

46

Between 1971 and 1990, FDI accounted for less than 0.1% of total fixed capital formation (physical investment) of Japan, as opposed to 3.4% average for the developed countries as a whole (for 1981–1990). The data are from UNCTAD, World Investment Report (various years).

47

Government of Japan (2002), ‘Communication to the Working Group on Trade and Investment’, 27 June 2002, WT/WGTI/W/125.

48

Between 1971–95, FDI accounted for less than 1% of total fixed capital formation in Korea, while the developing country average for the 1981–95 period (pre-1980 figures are not available) was 4.3%. Data from UNCTAD (various years).

49

In Taiwan, between 1971–95, FDI accounted around 2.5% of total fixed capital formation, as against the developing country average of 4.3% (for 1981–95). Data from UNCTAD (various years).

50

S. Young, N. Hood, and J. Hamill (1988), Foreign Multinationals and the British Economy – Impact and Policy (Croom Helm, London), p. 223.

51

Young et al. (1988), p. 225

52

According to the US Department of Commerce 1981 survey, The Use of Investment Incentives and Performance Requirements by Foreign Governments, 20% of US TNC affiliates operating in Ireland reported the imposition of performance requirements, in contrast to the 2–7% in other advanced countries – 8% in Australia and Japan, 7% in Belgium, Canada, France and Switzerland, 6% in Italy, 3% in the UK and 2% in Germany and the Netherlands. See Young et al. (1988), pp. 199–200. For further discussions on the Irish FDI strategy, see H-J. Chang & D. Green (2003), The Northern WTO Agenda on Investment: Do as we