Despite their key role in promoting ‘free’ trade in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, colonialism and unequal treaties hardly get any mention in the hordes of pro-globalisation books. [9] Even when they are explicitly discussed, their role is seen as positive on the whole. For example, in his acclaimed book,
While they were imposing free trade on weaker nations through colonialism and unequal treaties, rich countries maintained rather high tariffs, especially industrial tariffs, for themselves, as we will see in greater detail in the next chapter.To begin with, Britain, the supposed home of free trade, was one of the most protectionist countries until it converted to free trade in the mid-19th century. There was a brief period during the 1860s and the 1870s when something approaching free trade did exist in Europe, especially with zero tariffs in Britain. However, this proved short-lived. From the 1880s, most European countries raised protective barriers again, partly to protect their farmers from cheap food imported from the New World and partly to promote their newly emerging heavy industries, such as steel, chemicals and machinery.[14] Finally, even Britain, as I have noted, the chief architect of the first wave of globalization, abandoned free trade and re- introduced tariffs in 1932. The official history describes this event as Britain ‘succumbing to the temptation’ of protectionism. But it typically fails to mention that this was due to the decline in British economic supremacy, which in turn was the result of the success of protectionism on the part of competitor countries, especially the USA, in developing their own new industries.
Thus, the history of the first globalization in the late 19th and early 20th centuries has been rewritten today in order to fit the current neo-liberal orthodoxy. The history of protectionism in today’s rich countries is vastly underplayed, while the imperialist origin of the high degree of global integration on the part of today’s developing countries is hardly ever mentioned. The final curtain coming down on the episode – that is, Britain’s abandonment of free trade – is also presented in a biased way. It is rarely mentioned that what really made Britain abandon free trade was precisely the successful use of protectionism by its competitors.
In the official history of globalization, the early post-Second-World-War period is portrayed as a period of incomplete globalization.While there was a significant increase in integration among the rich countries, accelerating their growth, it is said, most developing countries refused to fully participate in the global economy until the 1980s, thus holding themselves back from economic progress.
This story misrepresents the process of globalization among the rich countries during this period. These countries did significantly lower their tariff barriers between the 1950s and the 1970s. But during this period, they also used many other nationalistic policies to promote their own economic development – subsidies (especially for research and development, or R&D), state-owned enterprises, government direction of banking credits, capital controls and so on. When they started implementing neo-liberal programmes, their growth decelerated. In the 1960s and the 1970s,
But more misleading is the portrayal of the experiences of developing countries. The postwar period is described by the official historians of globalization as an era of economic disasters in these countries. This was because, they argue, these countries believed in ‘wrong’ economic theories that made them think they could defy market logic. As a result, they suppressed activities which they were good at (agriculture, mineral extraction and labour-intensive manufacturing) and promoted ‘white elephant’ projects that made them feel proud but were economic nonsense – the most notorious example of this is Indonesia producing heavily subsidized jet aeroplanes.
The right to ‘asymmetric protection’ that the developing countries secured in 1964 at the GATT is portrayed as ‘the proverbial rope on which to hang one’s own economy!’, in a well-known article by Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner.[16] Gustavo Franco, a former president of the Brazilian central bank (1997–99), made the same point more succinctly, if more crudely, when he said his policy objective was ‘to undo forty years of stupidity’ and that the only choice was ‘to be neo-liberal or neo-idiotic’.[17]
The problem with this interpretation is that the ‘bad old days’ in the developing countries weren’t so bad at all. During the 1960s and the 1970s, when they were pursuing the ‘wrong’ policies of protectionism and state intervention,
Growth failure has been particularly noticeable in Latin America and Africa, where neo-liberal programmes were implemented more thoroughly than in Asia. In the 1960s and the 1970s,
The poor
Moreover, economic instability has markedly increased during the period of neo-liberal dominance. The world, especially the developing world, has seen more frequent and larger-scale financial crises since the 1980s. In other words, neo-liberal globalization has failed to deliver on all fronts of economic life – growth, equality and stability. Despite this, we are constantly told how neo-liberal globalization has brought unprecedented benefits.
The distortion of facts in the official history of globalization is also evident at country level. Contrary to what the orthodoxy would have us believe, virtually all the successful developing countries since the Second World War initially succeeded through nationalistic policies, using protection, subsidies and other forms of government intervention.