I have already discussed the case of my native Korea in some detail in the Prologue, but other ‘miracle’ economies of East Asia have also succeeded through a strategic approach to integration with the global economy. Taiwan used a strategy that is very similar to that of Korea, although it used state-owned enterprises more extensively while being somewhat friendlier to foreign investors than Korea was. Singapore has had free trade and relied heavily on foreign investment, but, even so, it does not conform in other respects to the neo-liberal ideal. Though it welcomed foreign investors, it used considerable subsidies in order to attract transnational corporations in industries it considered strategic, especially in the form of government investment in infrastructure and education targeted at particular industries. Moreover, it has one of the largest state-owned enterprise sectors in the world, including the Housing Development Board, which supplies 85% of all housing (almost all land is owned by the government).
Hong Kong is the exception that proves the rule. It became rich despite having free trade and a
The more recent economic success stories of China, and increasingly India, are also examples that show the importance of strategic, rather than unconditional, integration with the global economy based on a nationalistic vision. Like the US in the mid-19th century, or Japan and Korea in the mid-20th century, China used high tariffs to build up its industrial base. Right up to the 1990s, China’s average tariff was over 30%. Admittedly, it has been more welcoming to foreign investment than Japan or Korea were. But it still imposed foreign ownership ceilings and local contents requirements (the requirements that the foreign firms buy at least a certain proportion of their inputs from local suppliers).
India’s recent economic success is often attributed by the pro-globalizers to its trade and financial liberalization in the early 1990s. As some recent research reveals, however, India’s growth acceleration really began in the 1980s, discrediting the simple ‘greater openness accelerates growth’ story.[23] Moreover, even after the early 1990s trade liberalization, India’s average manufacturing tariffs remained at above 30% (it is still 25% today). India’s protectionism before the 1990s was certainly over-done in some sectors. But this is not to say that India would have been even more successful had it adopted free trade at independence in 1947. India has also imposed severe restrictions on foreign direct investment – entry restrictions, ownership restrictions and various performance requirements (e.g., local contents requirements).
The one country that seems to have succeeded in the postwar globalization period by using the neo-liberal strategy is Chile. Indeed, Chile adopted the strategy before anyone else, including the US and Britain, following the
Chile’s early experiment with neo-liberalism, led by the so-called Chicago Boys (a group of Chilean economists trained at the University of Chicago, one of the centres of neo-liberal economics), was a disaster. It ended in a terrible financial crash in 1982, which had to be resolved by the nationalization of the whole banking sector. Thanks to this crash, the country recovered the pre-Pinochet level of income only in the late 1980s.[25] It was only when Chile’s neo-liberalism got more pragmatic after the crash that the country started doing well. For example, the government provided exporters with a lot of help in overseas marketing and R&D.[26] It also used capital controls in the 1990s to successfully reduce the inflow of short-term speculative funds, although its recent free trade agreement with the US has forced it to promise never to use them again.More importantly, there is a lot of doubt about the sustainability of Chile’s development. Over the past three decades, the country has lost a lot of manufacturing industries and become excessively dependent on natural-resources-based exports. Not having the technological capabilities to move into higher-productivity activities, Chile faces a clear limit to the level of prosperity it can attain in the long run.
To sum up, the truth of post-1945 globalization is almost the polar opposite of the official history. During the period of controlled globalization underpinned by nationalistic policies between the 1950s and the 1970s, the world economy, especially in the developing world, was growing faster, was more stable and had more equitable income distribution than in the past two and a half decades of rapid and uncontrolled neo-liberal globalization. Nevertheless, this period is portrayed in the official history as a one of unmitigated disaster of nationalistic policies, especially in developing countries. This distortion of the historical record is peddled in order to mask the failure of neo-liberal policies.
Much of what happens in the global economy is determined by the rich countries, without even trying. They account for 80% of world output, conduct 70% of international trade and make 70–90% (depending on the year) of all foreign direct investments.[27] This means that their national policies can strongly influence the world economy.
But more important than their sheer weight is the rich countries’ willingness to throw that very weight about in shaping the rules of the global economy. For example, developed countries induce poorer countries to adopt particular policies by making them a condition for their foreign aid or by offering them preferential trade agreements in return for ‘good behaviour’ (adoption of neo-liberal policies). Even more important in shaping options for developing countries, however, are the actions ofmultilateral organizations such as the ‘Unholy Trinity’ – namely the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO (World Trade Organisation). Though they are not merely puppets of the rich countries, the Unholy Trinity are largely controlled by the rich countries, so they devise and implement Bad Samaritan policies that those countries want.
The IMF and the World Bank were originally set up in 1944 at a conference between the Allied forces (essentially the US and Britain), which worked out the shape of postwar international economic governance. This conference was held in the New Hampshire resort of Bretton Woods, so these agencies are sometimes collectively called the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWIs). The IMF was set up to lend money to countries in balance of payments crises so that they can reduce their balance of payments deficits without having to resort to deflation. The World Bank was set up to help the reconstruction of war-torn countries in Europe and the economic development of the post-colonial societies that were about to emerge – which is why it is officially called the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. This was supposed to be done by financing projects in infrastructure development (e.g., roads, bridges, dams).
Following the Third World debt crisis of 1982, the roles of both the IMF and the World Bank changed dramatically. They started to exert a much stronger policy influence on developing countries through their joint operation of so-called structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). These programmes covered a much wider range of policies than what the Bretton Woods Institutions had originally been mandated to do. The BWIs now got deeply involved in virtually all areas of economic policy in the developing world. They branched out into areas like government budgets, industrial regulation, agricultural pricing, labour market regulation, privatization and so on. In the 1990s, there was a further advance in this ‘mission creep’ as they started attaching so-called governance conditionalities to their loans. These involved intervention in hitherto unthinkable areas, like democracy, government decentralization, central bank independence and corporate governance.
This mission creep raises a serious issue. The World Bank and the IMF initially started with rather limited mandates. Subsequently, they argued that they have to intervene in new areas outside their original mandates, as they, too, affect economic performance, a failure in which has driven countries to borrow money from them. However, on this reasoning, there is no area of our life in which the BWIs cannot intervene. Everything that goes on in a country has implications for its economic performance. By this logic, the IMF and the World Bank should be able to impose conditionalities on everything from fertility decisions, ethnic integration and gender equality, to cultural values.
Don’t get me wrong. I am not one of those people who are against loan conditionalities on principle. It is