Bad Samaritans: The Myth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism

19

S. Huntington (2000), ‘Foreword: Cultures Count’ in L. Harrison & S. Huntington (eds.), Culture Matters – How Values Shape Human Progress (Basic Books, New York), p. xi. In fact, Korea’s per capita income in the early 1960s was less than half that of Ghana, as I point out in the Prologue to this book.

20

Representative works include the following. F. Fukuyama (1995), Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (Hamish Hamilton, London); Landes (1998); L. Harrison & S. Huntington (eds.) (2000), Culture Matters – How Values Shape Human Progress (Basic Books, New York); the articles in the ‘Symposium on “Cultural Economics”’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring 2006, vol. 20, no. 2.

21

Landes (1998), p. 516.

22

M. Morishima (1982), Why Has Japan Succeeded? – Western Technology and the Japanese Ethos (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge). This argument has been popularized by Fukuyama (1995).

23

Based on their analysis of the World Value Survey data, Rachel McCleary and Robert Barro argue that Muslims (together with ‘other Christians’, that is, Christians that do not belong to the Catholic, the Orthodox or the mainstream Protestant churches) have exceptionally strong beliefs in hell and after life. See their article, ‘Religion and Economy’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Spring 2006, vol. 20, no. 2.

24

It is said that, of the nine names of Allah, two mean the ‘just one’. I thank Elias Khalil for relaying this point to me.

25

Gulick (1903), p. 117.

26

Landes (2000), ‘Culture Makes Almost All the Difference’ in L. Harrison & S. Huntington (2000), p. 8.

27

Fukuyama (1995), p. 183.

28

This is the position taken by a number of authors in Harrison & Huntington (2000), especially the concluding chapters by Fairbanks, Lindsay and Harrison.

29

This term refers to the fact that the Indian economic growth rate was stuck at a relatively low 3.5% (around 1% in per capita terms) during 1950–80. It is supposed to have been coined by the Indian economist, Raj Krishna, and was popularized by Robert McNamara, the former president of the World Bank.

30

L. Harrison, ‘Promoting Progressive Cultural Change’ in L. Harrison &S. Huntington (eds.) (2000), p. 303.

31

Authorities on Japan, like the American political scientist Chalmers Johnson and the British sociologist Ronald Dore, also provide evidence showing that the Japanese were much more individualistic and ‘independent- minded’ than they are today. See C. Johnson (1982), The MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford University Press, Stanford) and R. Dore (1987), Taking Japan Seriously (Athlone Press, London).

32

K. Koike (1987), ‘Human Resource Development’ in K. Yamamura & Y. Tasuba (eds.), The Political Economy of Japan, vol. 1 (Stanford University Press, Stanford).

33

J. You & H-J. Chang (1993), ‘The Myth of Free Labour Market in Korea’, Contributions to Political Economy, vol. 12.

*

Confucianism is named after Confucius, the Latinized name of the great Chinese political philosopher, Kong Zi, who lived in the 6th century BC. Confucianism is not a religion, as it does not have gods or heaven and hell. It is mainly about politics and ethics, but it also has a bearing on the organization of family life, social ceremonies and etiquette. Although it has had its ups and downs, Confucianism has remained the basis of Chinese culture since it became the official state ideology during the Han Dynasty (206 BC to AD 220). It spread to other East Asian countries, like Korea, Japan and Vietnam, over the next several hundred years.

*

Of course, culture, with economic stagnation, can also change for the worse (at least from the point of view of economic development). The Muslim world used to be rational and tolerant, but, following centuries of economic stagnation, many Muslim countries have turned ultra-religious and intolerant. These ‘negative’ elements have become stronger because of economic stagnation and lack of future prospects. The fact that such forms of