Kindleberger 1984, p. 196.
66
Rozenberg and Birdzell 1986, p. 200.
67
Dechesne 1932, pp. 381-401 (for Belgium); Tilly 1994; Millward and Saul 1979, 416 (for Germany); Bury 1964, p. 57 (for France); Volts 1979, pp. 32-5, 46 (for Spain); Mata and Valerio 1994, p. 149 (for Portugal).
68
Garraty and Carnes 2000, pp. 231-2, 244, 362.
69
See Carruthers and Halliday 1998, and Carruthers 2000, on the current state of the debate, especially in relation to the USA, the UK and East Asia.
70
Duffy 1985, pp. 7-9.
71
Duffy 1985, pp. 10-12.
72
Duffy 1985, pp. 16-17; Hoppit 1987, pp. 32-7.
73
Duffy 1985, pp. 52-3; Marriner 1980.
74
Coleman 1974, pp. 6-16, 19-20,23-6.
75
For more details, see Chang 2000.
76
Amsler et al. 1981.
77
Edwards 1981.
78
Kennedy 1987, cited in Crafts 2000.
79
Crafts 2000, p. 5.
80
Tilly 1994 (for Germany); Norwegian Government Website: http://www.lovdata.no (for Norway); Atack and Passell 1994; Garraty and Carnes 2000, p. 750; Newton and Donaghy 1997, p. 251 (for Spain).
81
See Singh and Dhumale 1999, for a criticism of this orthodox view.
82
Cornish 1979; Gerber 1998, p. 36.
83
Brogan 1985, pp. 458, 464; Garraty and Carnes 2000, pp. 518, 613-14, 622.
84
Cornish 1979; Mercer 1995, pp. 44-6, 49-50, 99-105, 125-6; Hannah 1979.
85
Bruck 1962, pp. 93, 96; 196-7,222; Hannah 1979; Gerber 1998, pp. 115,129-31, 134,147. It is well known that after the Second World War, Germany, together with Japan, was made to adopt a stringent US-style competition law by the American Occupation Authority. However, subsequent modifications of the law, especially in 1953, made collusive arrangements easier, especially among small firms, when they are related to aims like ‘rationalisation’, ‘specialisation’ (i.e., negotiated market segmentation), joint export activities, and structural adjustments (Shin 1994, pp. 343-355).
86
Hodne 1981, pp. 514-15 (for Norway); Dahl 1982, p. 298 (for Denmark).
87
Details in the following paragraph are from Kindleberger 1984, unless otherwise specified.
