law cf. Plat. 'Crito.'
Then Hippias: Nay, upon my soul, Socrates, I am not aware of holding any contrary opinion to what you have uttered on the theme of justice.[32]
[32] Lit. 'the just and upright,' {tou dikaiou}.
Soc. But now, are you aware, Hippias, of certain unwritten laws?[33]
[33] See Soph. 'Antig.' 'Oed. T.' 865, and Prof. Jebb ad loc.; Dem. 'de Cor.' 317, 23; Aristot. 'Rhet.' I. xiii.
Yes (he answered), those held in every part of the world, and in the same sense.
Can you then assert (asked Socrates) of these unwritten laws that men made them?
Nay, how (he answered) should that be, for how could they all have come together from the ends of the earth? and even if they had so done, men are not all of one speech?[34]
[34] Or, 'there would be difficulty of understanding each other, and a babel of tongues.'
Soc. Whom then do you believe to have been the makers of these laws.
Hipp. For my part, I think that the gods must have made these laws for men, and I take it as proof that first and foremost it is a law and custom everywhere to worship and reverence the gods.
Soc. And, I presume, to honour parents is also customary everywhere?
Yes, that too (he answered).
Soc. And, I presume, also the prohibition of intermarriage between parents and children?
Hipp. No; at that point I stop, Socrates. That does not seem to me to be a law of God.
Now, why? (he asked).
Because I perceive it is not infrequently transgressed (he answered).[35]
[35] Or, 'as I perceive, it is not of universal application, some transgress it.'
Soc. Well, but there are a good many other things which people do contrary to law; only the penalty, I take it, affixed to the transgression of the divine code is certain; there is no escape for the offender after the manner in which a man may transgress the laws of man with impunity, slipping through the fingers of justice by stealth, or avoiding it by violence.
Hipp. And what is the inevitable penalty paid by those who, being related as parents and children, intermingle in marriage?
Soc. The greatest of all penalties; for what worse calamity can human beings suffer in the production of offspring than to misbeget?[36]
[36] Or, 'in the propagation of the species than to produce misbegotten children.'
Hipp. But how or why should they breed them ill where nothing hinders them, being of a good stock themselves and producing from stock as good?
Soc. Because, forsooth, in order to produce good children, it is not simply necessary that the parents should be good and of a good stock, but that both should be equally in the prime and vigour of their bodies.[37] Do you suppose that the seed of those who are at their prime is like theirs who either have not yet reached their prime, or whose prime has passed?
[37] Cf. Plat. 'Laws,' viii. 839 A; Herbst, etc., cf. Grotius, 'de Jure,' ii. 5, xii. 4.
Hipp. No, it is reasonable to expect that the seed will differ.
Soc. And for the better--which?
Hipp. Theirs clearly who are at their prime.
Soc. It would seem that the seed of those who are not yet in their prime or have passed their prime is not good?
Hipp. It seems most improbable it should be.
Soc. Then the right way to produce children is not that way?
Hipp. No, that is not the right way.
Soc. Then children who are so produced are produced not as they ought to be?
Hipp. So it appears to me.
What offspring then (he asked) will be ill produced, ill begotten, and ill born, if not these?
I subscribe to that opinion also (replied Hippias).
Soc. Well, it is a custom universally respected, is it not, to return good for good, and kindness with kindness?
Hipp. Yes, a custom, but one which again is apt to be transgressed.
Soc. Then he that so transgresses it pays penalty in finding himself isolated; bereft of friends who are good, and driven to seek after those who love him not. Or is it not so that he who does me kindness in my intercourse with him is my good friend, but if I requite not this kindness to my benefactor, I am hated by him for my ingratitude, and yet I must needs pursue after him and cling to him because of the great gain to me of his society?
Hipp. Yes, Socrates. In all these cases, I admit, there is an implication of divine authority;[38] that a law should in itself be loaded with the penalty of its transgression does suggest to my mind a higher than human type of legistlator.
[38] Lit. 'Yes, upon my word, Socrates, all these cases look very like (would seem to point to) the gods.'
Soc. And in your opinion, Hippias, is the legislation of the gods just and righteous, or the reverse of what is just and righteous?
Hipp. Not the reverse of what is just and righteous, Socrates, God forbid! for scarcely could any other legislate aright, of not God himself.
Soc. It would seem then, Hippias, the gods themselves are well pleased that 'the lawful' and 'the just' should be synonymous?[39]
[39] Or, 'it is well pleasing also to the gods that what is lawful is just and what is just is lawful.'
By such language and by such conduct, through example and precept alike, he helped to make those who approached him more upright and more just.
V
And now I propose to show in what way he made those who were with him more vigorous in action.[1] In the first place, as befitted one whose creed was that a basis of self-command is indispensable to any noble performance, he manifested himself to his companions as one who had pre-eminently disciplined himself;[2] and in the next place by conversation and discussion he encouraged them to a like self- restraint beyond all others.[3] Thus it was that he continued ever mindful himself, and was continually reminding all whom he encountered, of matters conducive to virtue; as the following discussion with Euthydemus, which has come to my knowledge,[4] will serve to illustrate--the topic of the discussion being self-command.
[1] Lit. 'more practical,' i.e. more energetic and effective.
[2] 'If any one might claim to be a prince of ascetics, it was Socrates; such was the ineffaceable impression left on the minds of his associates.'
[3] Or, 'he stimulated in these same companions a spirit of self- restraint beyond all else.'
[4] Or, 'which I can vouch for.'
Tell me, Euthydemus (he began), do you believe freedom to be a noble and magnificent acquisition, whether for a man or for a state?
I cannot conceive a nobler or more magnificent (he answered).
Soc. Then do you believe him to be a free man who is ruled by the pleasures of the body, and thereby cannot perform what is best?
Certainly not (he answered).
Soc. No! for possibly to perform what is best appears to you to savour of freedom? And, again, to have some one over you who will prevent you doing the like seems a loss of freedom?
Most decidedly (he answered).
Soc. It would seem you are decidedly of opinion that the incontinent are the reverse of free?[5]
[5] Or, 'incontinency is illiberal.'
Euth. Upon my word, I much suspect so.
Soc. And does it appear to you that the incontinent man is merely hindered from doing what is noblest, or that further he is impelled to do what is most shameful?
Euth. I think he is as much driven to the one as he is hindered from the other.
Soc. And what sort of lords and masters are those, think you, who at once put a stop to what is best and
