The company was here divided; the one half answered, 'Yes, of course, the largest number,' whilst the others still maintained, 'Without a doubt.'
And Socrates, remarking, 'That proposition is agreed to also,' thus proceeded: And if further he were able to make them pleasing to the whole community, should we not have found in this accomplished person an arch-go- between?
Clearly so (they answered with one voice).
Soc. If then a man had power to make his clients altogether pleasing; that man, I say, might justly pride himself upon his art, and should by rights receive a large reward?[96]
[96] Or, 'he deserves to do a rattling business,' 'to take handsome fees.' Cf. Sheridan's Mrs. Coupler, in 'A Trip to Scarborough.'
And when these propositions were agreed to also, he turned about and said: Just such a man, I take it, is before you in the person of Antisthenes![97]
[97] See Diog. Laert. 'Antisth.' VI. i. 8; Plut. 'Symp.' ii. 1. 503.
Whereupon Antisthenes exclaimed: What! are you going to pass on the business? will you devolve this art of yours on me as your successor, Socrates?[98]
[98] Or, 'going to give up business, and hand on the trade to me as your successor?'
I will, upon my word, I will (he answered): since I see that you have practised to some purpose, nay elaborated, an art which is the handmaid to this other.
And what may that be? asked Antisthenes.
Soc. The art of the procurer.[99]
[99] Cf. Plat. 'Theaet.' 150 A; Aristot. 'Eth. N.' v. 2, 13; Aeschin. 3, 7; Plut. 'Solon,' 23.
The other (in a tone of deep vexation): Pray, what thing of the sort are you aware I ever perpetrated?
Soc. I am aware that it was you who introduced our host here, Callias, to that wise man Prodicus;[100] they were a match, you saw, the one enamoured of philosophy, and the other in need of money. It was you again, I am well enough aware, who introduced him once again to Hippias[101] of Elis, from whom he learnt his 'art of memory';[102] since which time he has become a very ardent lover,[103] from inability to forget each lovely thing he sets his eyes on. And quite lately, if I am not mistaken, it was you who sounded in my ears such praise of our visitor from Heraclea,[104] that first you made me thirst for his society, and then united us.[105] For which indeed I am your debtor, since I find him a fine handsome fellow and true gentleman.[106] And did you not, moreover, sing the praises of Aeschylus of Phlius[107] in my ears and mine in his?--in fact, affected us so much by what you said, we fell in love and took to coursing wildly in pursuit of one another like two dogs upon a trail.[108]
[100] Or, 'the sage,' 'the sophist.' See 'Mem.' I. vi. 13; II. i. 21.
[101] See 'Mem.' IV. iv. 5; and for his art of memory cf. Plat. 'Hipp. min.' 368 D; 'Hipp. maj.' 285 E.
[102] The 'memoria technica' (see Aristot. 'de An.' iii. 3, 6), said to have been invented by Simonides of Ceos. Cic. 'de Or.' ii. 86; 'de Fin.' ii. 32; Quinct. xi. 2. 559.
[103] Or, 'has grown amorous to a degree' [al. 'an adept in love's lore himself.' Cf. Plat. 'Rep.' 474 D, 'an authority in love.'-- Jowett] 'for the simple reason he can't forget each lovely thing he once has seen.' Through the 'ars memoriae' of Hippias, it becomes an 'idee fixe' of the mind.
[104] Perhaps Zeuxippus. See Plat. 'Prot.' 318 B. Al. Zeuxis, also a native of Heraclea. See 'Mem.' I. iv. 3; 'Econ.' x. 1.
[105] Or, 'introduced him to me.' Cf. 'Econ.' iii. 14; Plat. 'Lach.' 200 D.
[106] 'An out-and-out {kalos te kagathos}.'
[107] Who this Phliasian is, no one knows.
[108] Al. 'like two hounds chevying after one another.'
With such examples of your wonder-working skill before my eyes, I must suppose you are a first-rate matchmaker. For consider, a man with insight to discern two natures made to be of service to each other, and with power to make these same two people mutually enamoured! That is the sort of man, I take it, who should weld together states in friendship; cement alliances with gain to the contracting parties;[109] and, in general, be found an acquisition to those several states; to friends and intimates, and partisans in war, a treasure worth possessing. [110] But you, my friend, you got quite angry. One would suppose I had given you an evil name in calling you a first-rate matchmaker.
[109] Al. 'and cement desirable matrimonial connections.' Cf. Aristot. 'Pol.' iii. 9, 13. 1280 B; v. 4, 5-8. 1303 B.
[110] See the conversation with Critobulus, so often referred to, {peri philias}, in 'Mem.' II. vi.
Yes (he answered meekly), but now I am calm. It is clear enough, if I possess these powers I shall find myself surcharged with spiritual riches.
In this fashion the cycle of the speeches was completed.[111]
[111] See Hug, 'Einleitung,' xxxi. 'Quellen des Platonischen Symposion.'
V
Then Callias: Our eyes are on you, Critobulus. Yours to enter the lists[1] against the champion Socrates, who claims the prize of beauty. Do you hesitate?
[1] Soph. 'Fr.' 234; Thuc. i. 93.
Soc. Likely enough he does, for possibly he sees Sir Pandarus stands high in their esteem who are the judges of the contest.
In spite of which (retorted Critobulus), I am not for drawing back.[2] I am ready; so come on, and if you have any subtle argument to prove that you are handsomer than I am, now's your time, instruct us. But just stop one minute; have the goodness, please, to bring the lamp a little closer.
[2] Or, 'I do; but all the same, I am not for shirking.' Cf. Aristoph. 'Frogs,' 860, {etiomos eum egoge, kouk anaduomai, daknein}: 'I'm up to it; I am resolved' (Frere); Dem. 'de F. Leg.' 406 20: 'His resolution never reached that point, but shrank back, for his conscience checked it' (Kennedy).
Soc. Well then, I call upon you first of all, as party to this suit, to undergo the preliminary examination.[3] Attend to what I say, and please be good enough to answer.
[3] The {anakrisis}, or 'previous inquiry' (before one of the archons) of parties concerned in a suit, to see whether the action lay. Cf. Plat. 'Charm.' 176 C. See Gow, 'Companion,' xiv. 74.
Crit. Do you be good enough yourself to put your questions.
Soc. Do you consider that the quality of beauty is confined to man, or is it to be found in other objects also? What is your belief on this point?
Crit. For my part, I consider it belongs alike to animals--the horse, the ox--and to many things inanimate: that is to say, a shield, a sword, a spear are often beautiful.
Soc. How is it possible that things, in no respect resembling one another, should each and all be beautiful?[4]
[4] See 'Mem.' III. viii. 5, quoted by Galen, 'de Usu Part.' i. 370.
Crit. Of course it is, God bless me! if well constructed by the hand of man to suit the sort of work for which we got them, or if naturally adapted to satisfy some want, the things in either case are beautiful.
Soc. Can you tell me, then, what need is satisfied by our eyes?
Crit. Clearly, the need of vision.
Soc. If so, my eyes are proved at once to be more beautiful than yours.
Crit. How so?
Soc. Because yours can only see just straight in front of them, whereas mine are prominent and so projecting, they can see aslant.[5]
[5] Or, 'squint sideways and command the flanks.'
Crit. And amongst all animals, you will tell us that the crab has loveliest eyes?[6] Is that your statement?
[6] Or, 'is best provided in respect of eyeballs.'
Soc. Decidedly, the creature has. And all the more so, since for strength and toughness its eyes by nature are the best constructed.
Crit. Well, let that pass. To come to our two noses, which is the more handsome, yours or mine?
Soc. Mine, I imagine, if, that is, the gods presented us with noses for the sake of smelling. Your nostrils point to
