4. The operations in the campaign of 537, and still more plainly the formation of the highway from Arretium to Bononia in 567, show that the road from Rome to Arretium had already been rendered serviceable before that time. But it cannot at that period have been a Roman military road, because, judging from its later appellation of the 'Cassian way,' it cannot have been constructed as a
CHAPTER VII
Struggle between Pyrrhus and Rome, and Union of Italy
1. The story that the Romans also sent envoys to Alexander at Babylon on the testimony of Clitarchus (Plin. Hist. Nat. iii. 5, 57), from whom the other authorities who mention this fact (Aristus and Asclepiades, ap. Arrian, vii. 15, 5; Memnon, c. 25) doubtless derived it. Clitarchus certainly was contemporary with these events; nevertheless, his Life of Alexander was decidedly a historical romance rather than a history; and, looking to the silence of the trustworthy biographers (Arrian, l. c.; Liv. ix. 18) and the utterly romantic details of the account - which represents the Romans, for instance, as delivering to Alexander a chaplet of gold, and the latter as prophesying the future greatness of Rome - we cannot but set down this story as one of the many embellishments which Clitarchus introduced into the history.
2. II. VI. Last Struggles of Samnium.
3. Near the modern Anglona; not to be confounded with the better known town of the same name in the district of Cosenza.
4. These numbers appear credible. The Roman account assigns, probably in dead and wounded, 15,000 to each side; a later one even specifies 5000 as dead on the Roman, and 20,000 on the Greek side. These accounts may be mentioned here for the purpose of exhibiting, in one of the few instances where it is possible to check the statement, the untrustworthiness - almost without exception - of the reports of numbers, which are swelled by the unscrupulous invention of the annalists with avalanche-like rapidity.
5. The later Romans, and the moderns following them, give a version of the league, as if the Romans had designedly avoided accepting the Carthaginian help in Italy. This would have been irrational, and the facts pronounce against it. The circumstance that Mago did not land at Ostia is to be explained not by any such foresight, but simply by the fact that Latium was not at all threatened by Pyrrhus and so did not need Carthaginian aid; and the Carthaginians certainly fought for Rome in front of Rhegium.
6. II. IV. Victories of Salamis and Himera, and Their Effects.
7. II. IV. Fruitlessness of the Celtic Victory.
8. The grounds for assigning the document given in Polybius (iii. 22) not to 245, but to 406, are set forth in my Rom. Chronologie, p. 320 f. [translated in the Appendix to this volume].
9. II. V. Domination of the Romans; Exasperation of the Latins.
10. II. VII. Breach between Rome and Tarentum.
11. II. V. Colonization of the Volsci.
12. II. V. Colonization of the Volsci.
13. II. VI. New Fortresses in Apulia and Campania.
14. II. VI. Last Struggles of Samnium.
15. II. VII. Construction of New Fortresses and Roads.
16. II. VII. The Boii.
17. II. VII. Construction of New Fortresses and Roads.
18. These were Pyrgi, Ostia, Antium, Tarracina, Minturnae, Sinuessa Sena Gallica, and Castrum Novum.
19. This statement is quite as distinct (Liv. viii. 14;