questions. Such as: How much influence does our country want to have in the world? What kind? How much do we want to affect the actions and behavior of other countries? And so on.
Sure, it's not hard to equate the role of CVBGs with 'gunboat diplomacy' policies of the 19th century. But doing that trivializes the true value of the carriers to America and her allies. Among the lessons the last few years have taught us is one that's inescapable: The United States has global responsibilities. These go far beyond simply maintaining freedom of maritime lines of communications and supporting our allies in times of crisis. Whether we like it or not, most of the world's nations look to America as a leader. And these same nations (whether they want to say so officially or not) see us as the world's policeman. When trouble breaks out somewhere, who're you going to call? China? Russia? Japan? Not in this decade.
Sure, it's not always in the best interest of the United States to give a positive answer to every request for support and aid. But when the answer is positive, there is the problem of how to deliver the needed response. Once upon a time, our network of overseas bases allowed us to project a forward presence. No longer. Over the last half century, a poorly conceived and ill-executed American foreign policy has allowed us to be evicted from something over 75 % of these bases. Add to this the limited resources available following the recent military drawdowns, and the National Command Authorities are left with very few options. Most of these are resident in the CVBGs and ARGs that make up the forward-deployed forces of the United States Navy.
At any given time, there are usually two or three CVBGs out there on six-month cruises, doing their day-in, day-out job of looking out for the interests of America and our allies, with adventure and danger only a satellite transmission away. Thanks to the support of service forces (fuel tankers, supply ships, etc.), a well-handled CVBG's only limitations are the durability of machinery and the morale of the people aboard. Given the will of a strong nation to back it, CVBGs can be parked off any coast in the world, and sit out there like a bird of prey.
That is the true meaning of 'presence.'
Rationale: Why Aircraft Carriers?
So why does America
Aircraft Carriers: An Open Architecture
In less than a hundred years, we've passed from the first heavier-than-air test flights to deep-space probes. During that same time, after over five centuries of preeminence, we have seen the demise of gunnery as the measure of Naval power. The decline of naval guns and the rise of airpower were not instantly obvious. In fact, in the early 1900's, to suggest it would have invited a straitjacket. The first flying machines were toys for rich adventurers and stuntmen, their payload and range were extremely limited, and their worth in military operations was insignificant. The technology of early manned flight was derived from kites, bicycles, and automobiles. Structures were flimsy and heavy, and the engines bulky and inefficient.
Though the First World War did much to improve aircraft technologies, and made many military leaders believers in the value of airpower, the world powers had just made a staggering investment in big-gun dreadnought-type battleships that Naval leaders had no appetite to replace. Thus, Naval airpower wound up being limited by arms treaties or shuffled to the bottom of the funding priorities. Even so, though few saw this then, the future of Naval airpower was already a given. There are two reasons for this:
First-Aircraft soon proved they could carry weapons loads farther than guns could shoot, and with greater flexibility.
Second-An aircraft carrier can more easily accommodate upgrades and improvements than an armored ship with fixed-bore guns.
In order to retrofit a larger gun to deliver a larger shell, you have to replace the turrets and barbettes. And to do that, you have to completely rebuild a battleship or cruiser. By comparison, for an aircraft carrier to operate a new kind of aircraft, bomb, or missile, you only need to make sure that the new system fits inside the hangars and elevators. You also need to make sure that it's not too heavy for the flight deck, and (if it's an aircraft) that it can take off and land on the deck. Simply put, as long as an aircraft or weapons fits aboard a carrier, it can probably be employed successfully. In modern systems terminology, the carrier is an 'open architecture' weapons system, with well-understood interfaces and parameters. Much like a computer with built-in capabilities for expansion cards and networking, aircraft carriers have a vast capability to accept new weapons and systems. Thus, some battleships built at the beginning of the First World War were scrapped after less than five years service, while modern supercarriers have planned lives measured in decades.
Sure, gun-armed warships can still hurt aircraft carriers. And in fact, during World War II, several flattops found themselves on the losing end of duels with surface ships. Today, missile-armed ships and submarines pose an even greater hazard to flattops, as they do to all vessels. However, all things being equal, the range of their aircraft is going to give carriers a critical edge in any combat. Carrier aircraft can hold an enemy ship or target at a safe distance, and then either neutralize or destroy it. The word for this advantage is 'standoff.' By 'standing off' from an enemy and attacking him from over the horizon, you greatly reduce his ability to counterattack the carrier force, making defense much easier. In fact, just finding a CVBG is harder than you might think, as the Soviet Union discovered to its great chagrin on more than one occasion during the Cold War. If-as now seems likely-the next generation of American flattops incorporates stealth technology, then you can plan on aircraft carriers serving well into the next century.
Some Propositions about Sea-Based Airpower
The 'real-world' effects of 'sea-based' naval aviation (that is, aircraft based aboard ships at sea) and the principles by which battle group commanders ply their intricate and difficult trade are many, varied, and complex; and learning these takes years. What follows is no substitute for those years. Still, knowledge of some of the basic propositions about sea-based airpower that guide the plans and actions of our Naval leaders can't help but be useful:
• Control of the Total Littoral Battlespace Is Impossible without Airpower — While it cannot realistically win a battle, campaign, or war by itself, no victory is possible without airpower. Broadly defined as the effective military use of the skies-airpower is vital to controlling the 'battlespace' of the littoral regions. One only need look back at British operations in the Falklands in 1982 to see how much can go wrong when a fleet operates within range of enemy land-based aircraft without proper air cover. As a result, their victory in that war was 'a very near thing'.
• Sea-Based Airpower Involves a Variety of Systems-Naval forces bring a variety of systems and sensors to the littoral battlespace. To name a few: fighter jets and transport helicopters; submarine- hunting helicopters and aircraft; surface-to-air (SAM) missiles defending against aircraft and ballistic missiles; and cruise missiles. This functional diversity means that a CVBG commander can bring any number of systems and employment options to bear, greatly compounding the defensive problem of an adversary. Properly utilized and supported, sea-based airpower can provide enabling force and muscle for any number and type of military