Submarine: A Guided Tour Inside a Nuclear Warship

The key question here was whether or not the Argentine forces would attempt to penetrate the 200-mile- radius total exclusion zone (TEZ) from Port Stanley in the Falklands. Clearly if they tried to penetrate it, there would be no question but to attack with the nuclear boats. But the ships did not come on directly and seemed to rally just outside the zone, though quite close enough to dash in at a moment's notice. The northern group was trying to find some wind to launch her strike of A-4s at the British task group, though (amazingly for the weather in the South Atlantic) it was calm and windless.

The choke point in that area was, ironically, not a strait but the extremely shallow water. The Argentinean southern group was operating over a shallow rise in the ocean called the Burdwood Bank, which made difficult operating conditions for HMS Conqueror (S-48), the southern boat in the British barrier. This hydrographic choke point was a major problem for the British SSN, and became a factor in the decision coming from 10 Downing Street. Already the Conqueror and another boat were tracking their assigned target groups, and a decision was needed from on high.

^{TA periscope shot of a Royal Navy frigate on the receiving end of a Perisher student's three- torpedo practice spread during an approach. A spread of Mark-8 torpedoes just like this sank the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE}

Late on May 2, 1982, the message was sent from Northwood authorizing the sinking of the Belgrano, and any of her escorts that attempted to intervene. Even though it was still some distance outside the TEZ, the Conqueror was the first to strike. Her captain, Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, set up a classic Perisher approach on the General Belgrano. Loaded in his five torpedo tubes were three World War II-vintage Mark 8 torpedoes and a pair of Tigerfish Mod 1s. The plan was to use the Mk 8s first because of their larger warheads (800 lb/363 kg versus 200 lb/91 kg for the Tigerfish), and save the Tigerfish for a second shot if required. If the Mk 8s worked on the first try, the Tigerfish would be available for a shot or two at the escorting destroyers if necessary.

In the plotting area of Conqueror, Lieutenant John T. Powis, the boat's navigator, carefully plotted the intercept from ranges and bearings called by the commander on the periscope, and inputs from the sound room. It was a totally normal approach, which later would be judged considerably easier than most of the approaches made during a Perisher course. Wreford-Brown maneuvered the Conqueror just 1,200 yards off the projected track of the General Belgrano and patiently waited. The Argentine ships continued blindly along their track, completely oblivious of the coming danger. And then it was time.

Just before 1600 hours on May 2, 1982, the only combat torpedo shots ever fired by a nuclear submarine were launched from Conqueror. The three Mk 8s were angled in a way designed to ensure that at least two of them would hit the General Belgrano. And that is exactly what happened. The first Mk 8 hit forward near the bow, tearing it from the ship. The second one struck in the engineering spaces, causing a complete loss of power and massive flooding. The General Belgrano immediately took on a heavy list to port, and within minutes it was sinking. Her captain had no choice but to abandon ship and have his crew take to the life rafts. (Ironically, the exact same type of hits in the same places had sunk her sister ship, the USS Helena, during the Battle of Kula Gulf in 1943.) Some 400 of the Belgrano's crew of over 1,000 perished in the sinking and while waiting to be rescued.

In addition to the two hits on the cruiser, the third Mk 8 appears to have hit one of the escorting destroyers, though it failed to detonate. Unfortunately for the crew of the General Belgrano, the escorting destroyers did not even know what had happened until they looked and noticed that the cruiser was no longer in formation. It would be almost forty-eight hours until all the survivors of the sunken cruiser were finally rescued.

^{HMS Conqueror returns home after sinking the Argentine cruiser General Belgrano during the 1982 Falklands War. Note the 'Jolly Roger' flag hanging from the mast. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE}

^{A local resident of the Falkland Islands personally greets and thanks the crew of a Royal Navy submarine following the 1982 war. U.K. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE}

Aboard the Conqueror, there was the satisfaction of hearing the sounds of two solid hits and the breaking-up noises from the cruiser. In addition, the sub reported the dropping of a few depth charges, though this has never been confirmed by the Argentines. Since the escorting destroyers had just continued blindly on, there had been no opportunity to immediately follow up the first attack. And when they moved away from the TEZ, it is likely that the prevailing rules of engagement prevented further action. The Conqueror continued on station, as assigned.

As for the Argentine Navy, the effects were rapid and enormous. One story, told at the bars where submarine officers go after hours, says that as soon as the carrier group to the north of the Falklands got word on the sinking, they immediately reversed course and headed back to port. The story goes on to say that apparently this spoiled the opportunity of another Royal Navy submarine commander, who allegedly was watching the oncoming carrier group through his periscope. Royal Navy gossip has it that he watched the carrier and her escorts turn for home less than thirty minutes before he himself would have gotten in his shots at the Veinticinco de Mayo. The Argentine surface forces never again ventured out of port during the war, and the British had, in essence, reduced the conflict to a set-piece battle against the air and land forces of Argentina. All for the expenditure of three World War II-vintage torpedoes, perhaps the most cost-effective naval victory in history.

Tactical Example — Maritime Interdiction (Attack of a Convoy/Amphibious Group)

This is a high-risk situation for everyone. A convoy by definition is a large group of valuable ships protected by a force of warships. If your enemy has a convoy, he is transporting something important to his war effort, something that you don't want to let arrive. An amphibious warfare group is a little different; in this case the cargo is the most precious of all for the enemy and the most dangerous of all for you: fully equipped combat troops who have a job to do. You've got to try to stop the enemy in either case, while he must guard a moving asset. In fact, that asset will be moving as rapidly as possible to minimize the risk-the faster they move, the less time you have to attack. But unlike a carrier group, in which every ship has the ability to defend itself, most of the flock in a convoy is relatively helpless. For the amphibious group, there is one other difficulty. While a convoy probably wants to go from one friendly port to another, the amphibs by definition are heading into harm's way-they want to go where you and your allies live. That means the submarines will have to hunt their enemy on the enemy's ground.

Let's suppose that the government of the Ukraine has decided to support some of their former allies in the Balkans, the Serbians perhaps, with an amphibious expedition from the Black Sea to the Adriatic. It might be composed of some six to eight ex-Soviet Ropucha- or Polnocny-class landing ships with a regiment of landing troops aboard. The landing ships probably have an escort of four to six frigates (like Krivaks or Grishas) and/or corvettes (like Pauks or Tarantuls), though nothing like the kind of escort that the old Soviet Navy used to be able to put together. In any case, this is the very kind of intervention that the UN is desperately trying to avoid in a festering part of the world. While NATO air and surface forces could certainly deal with such a group, it would be messy. And there would be repercussions: further confrontations between east and west might develop. Or, someone could just deal with it. Someone who has something that can just make things disappear.

Word of the expedition would not be difficult to find out. States like the Ukraine are filled with opposition groups, and the national intelligence assets of the United States clearly notice the gathering of the ships and the movements of the troops and vehicles to the port. Thus the United States would have several days to coordinate the necessary assets and move a 688I into the Aegean or Adriatic to intercept the amphibious group.

When it comes out, the amphib group has the landing ships (say eight of them) in two columns, with a circle of ASW escorts (say four of these) surrounding them at the flanks. The key problem for the U.S. skipper is to