The Bin Ladens

August 27, 1998. Interspace, September 9, 1998.

28. Only fifty-five thousand subscribers, write-offs of more than $2.5 billion: New York Times, April 11, 2000.

29. Department of Defense transcript, news briefing, December 8, 2000.

34. LAWYERS, GUNS, AND MONEY

1. Interview with Daniel Coleman, August 31, 2005.

2. That the Sudan files were very detailed: Interviews with two U.S. officials who read the files later. Two defectors in 1996, first introduction of the term “Al Qaeda”: Interview with Coleman, ibid.

3. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission), “Monograph on Terrorist Financing,” Staff Report to the Commission by John Roth, Douglas Greenburg, Serena Wille, August 2004, p. 35.

4. Scheuer’s skepticism about money investigations: “Monograph on Terrorist Financing,” ibid., p. 36. Also, interview with Michael Scheuer, July 5, 2005, and interview with Coleman, op. cit.

5. Interview with Coleman, op. cit. Griffin declined to comment.

6. “proper conversation…talking about”: Interview with Coleman, op. cit.

7. All quotations from interview with Coleman. Urowsky declined to comment.

8. “at the senior…kind of trouble”: All quotations from interview with Scheuer. Freeh declined to comment.

9. “They said…economic system”: Ibid.

10. “Okay…establishments”: Ibid.

11. Interviews with Wyche Fowler Jr., June 1, 2005, and John Brennan, September 13, 2006.

12. Ibid.

13. Investigators for the 9/11 Commission, after a thorough review of classified U.S. records, reported that neither the White House nor the intelligence community understood the details of Osama’s inheritance until 1999 or 2000. It is possible, however, that some of this information surfaced earlier, at least in outline form; for instance, as part of Dan Coleman’s early interviews with Osama’s half-brothers. If so, the information never reached the National Security Council.

14. Interview with Brennan, op. cit.

15. “a decided reluctance…his brothers”: Interview with Scheuer, op. cit.

16. Interviews with Fowler and Brennan, op. cit. Fowler also said, “One will recall that all the members of the Bin Laden family in the U.S. were allowed to return to Saudi Arabia in the days after September 11, which is because the FBI and the White House had cleared them of any terroristic activities, and because of the complete cooperation of the Bin Laden family in the three or four years preceding 9/11.”

17. Inventory of CIA concerns: Interviews with four former U.S. officials familiar with the CIA’s investigations, including Scheuer, op. cit. Khalfa used M.B.C. travel office: Affidavit of M.B.C. employee Eulalio Dela Pat. December 1, 2005, In Re Terrorist Attacks.

18. “Monograph on Terrorist Financing,” op. cit., p. 39.

19. Interviews with three former U.S. officials involved in the discussions.

20. That Abdullah Bin Awadh of WAMY is a nephew of Osama: Affidavit of Omar M. Bin Laden, In Re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, United States District Court, Southern District of New York, 03 MDL 1570, January 25, 2006. The same information is also cited in “Supplemental Declaration In Support of Pre-Trial Detention,” an affidavit by Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement Senior Special Agent David Kane, filed in U.S. v. Soliman S. Biheiri, September 11, 2003; Kane attributes the information to an interview with Biheiri, who said he managed investments from Abdullah. None of these documents identifies which of Osama’s half-brothers or half-sisters is Abdullah’s parent, however. Two of Osama’s half-sisters, Iman and Nur, are identified by Biheiri as investors in the same projects as Abdullah, according to Kane.

21. More than fifty offices, five continents: Kane affidavit, ibid. Abdullah’s account of his activities, including all quotations from “the deliberate…” through “good word” are from “Saudi Arabia: Paper on Efforts to Promote Islam in U.S.,” Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, October 19, 1997, FBIS translation. The quotations appear to be the journalist’s paraphrase of Abdullah’s remarks.

22. Kane affidavit, op. cit.

23. Interview with Coleman, op. cit.

24. Kane affidavit, op. cit. Also, notes from a Biheiri interrogation by Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents in June 2003, filed in Alexandria federal court: Notes from the transcript taken by Washington Post reporter Mary Beth Sheridan and generously shared with the author by her.

25. “has long acted”: “Declaration in Support of Pre-Trial Detention,” affidavit of David Kane, United States of America v. Soliman S. Biheiri, United States District Court, Eastern District of Virginia, 03-365-A. August 14, 2003. “indirect investment…on request”: Letter from George B. Wolfe, Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Treasury Department, to Claude Nicati, Office of the Swiss Prosecutor General, January 4, 2002. Ghalib’s account history and lawsuit: Documents submitted in In Re Terrorist Attacks, op. cit. “seeking to put the bank out of business”: “Defendant Saudi Bin Ladin Group’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Objections…Dated July 26, 2007,” ibid.

26. An offshore entity controlled by Saudi Bin Laden Group: Declaration of Johann DeVilliers, Global Diamond chairman, Mood v. Global Diamond Resources, United States District Court, Southern District of California, 99cv01565. DeVilliers referred to the controlling entity as “The Bin Laden Group.” He described Al-Qadi as a “principal of one of the Middle Eastern investors.” Al-Qadi designation: http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/sdnlist.txt. Examined and typed, July 16, 2007. “front”: Citation quoted in Chicago Tribune, October 28, 2001. Al-Qadi denied, met Osama in 1980s: Chicago Tribune, ibid.; “Saudi Businessman on U.S. List…Dismisses Charge,” Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, October 14, 2001, FBIS translation.

27. Scheuer, as “Anonymous,” Through Our Enemies’ Eyes, p. 34.

28. “lots of talk…been named”: Interview with Dominic Simpson, May 17, 2002.

29. “always got…for him”: Ibid. “generally turned away”: “Monograph on Terrorist Financing,” op. cit., pp. 17–18.

30. November 1998 CIA report, “reasonable estimate”: “Monograph on Terrorist Financing,” op. cit., p. 20. DIA report: Redacted and released, Judicial Watch, Inc.

31. “This is insane…from daddy”: Clarke, Against All Enemies, p. 191.

32. Interviews with former U.S. officials.

33. The account of the meeting in Saudi Arabia is from several former U.S. officials. See also Clarke, op. cit., pp. 191–95, and “Monograph on Terrorist Financing,” op. cit., which provide similar accounts.

34. Interviews with three U.S. officials and former officials familiar with the discussions.

35. For the details of what the Bin Ladens finally disclosed to Treasury, see also “Monograph on Terrorist Financing,” op. cit., p. 20. This otherwise admirable study, in seeking to debunk the $300 million myth publicly, contains one dubious assertion, referring to Osama’s forced sales of shares in 1994: “The Saudi freeze had the effect of divesting Bin Laden of what would otherwise have been a $300 million fortune.” This is a considerable overstatement: even today, after inflation and growth in the Bin Laden empire, ownership of between 1 and 2 percent of the Bin Laden companies, as Osama seems to have possessed in 1994, would almost certainly be worth much less.

36. Interview with Coleman, op. cit.

37. “We presently…his cause”: “Monograph on Terrorist Financing,” op. cit., p. 18.

38. Interviews with two individuals who reviewed the FBI’s pre-9/11 files on Bin Laden finances.

39. Interview with Coleman, op. cit., and a second senior former FBI official.

40. “hampered…disruption”: “Monograph on Terrorist Financing,” op. cit., p. 6. Africa $10,000, 9/11 about $400,000: Ibid., pp. 27–28.