All twenty-four Soviet SAM: JCS Scabbards message 270922Z, JFKARC.
Half a dozen Soviet cargo: Khrushchev message to U Thant, October 26, 1962, NSAW.
In fact, the consensus at the CIA: See, e.g., CIA memorandum,
'there are damned few trains': ExComm debate, October 25, 1962, JFK3, 254.
Three more reconnaissance planes: History of 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing, October 1962, AFHRA.
A subsequent investigation: USAF accident report, October 27, 1962, AFSC; author's interviews with John E. Johnson, navigator on the RB-47 that aborted, and Gene Murphy, electronic warfare officer on backup plane, December 2005.
Carney spotted the Soviet ship: History of 55th Strategic Reconnaissance Wing; Sanders A. Laubenthal, 'The Missiles in Cuba, 1962: The Role of SAC Intelligence,' FOIA;
'weary and discouraged': Andrew St. George 'Hit and Run to Cuba with Alpha 66,'
'A hell of a fine piece': Letter from William R. Hearst, Jr., to Clare Boothe Luce, Clare Boothe Luce Papers, Library of Congress.
By her own account: Telephone conversation between William Colby and Clare Boothe Luce, October 25, 1975, CIA files, CREST. A good account of Luce's dealings with Keating appears in Max Holland, 'A Luce Connection: Senator Keating, William Pawley, and the Cuban Missile Crisis,'
The CIA suspected him: CIA memo, July 25, 1975, CREST.
an 'honorary member': CIA memorandum on Alpha 66, November 30, 1962, JFKARC.
The two Cuban exiles: Vera interview, January 2006.
'Hands off Cuba':
To counter such skepticism: JFK was also 'disturbed' by the release of the photos, and demanded an explanation. Bruce told the White House that the CIA had given approval for their release ? Bruce message to Michael Forrestal, October 24, 1962, National Security Files, JFKL. A CIA representative in London, Chester Cooper, said he called Washington but 'couldn't get anybody,' and sent a wire 'just saying I was going to do it unless I got a Washington veto' ? Chester Cooper OH, JFKL.
'a slight oscillation': Bruce message to Secretary of State No. 1705, October 28, 1962, JFKL and SDX.
to 'get close to Jack': Reeves, 291.
In the meantime, Macmillan quietly: Record of conversation between British service chiefs, October 27, 1962, DEFE 32/7, Public Records Office. For discussion of British military moves in crisis, see Stephen Twigge and Len Scott, 'The Thor IRBMs and the Cuban Missile Crisis,'
'the most dangerous spot': Beschloss, 217; Reeves, 68.
'soldiers and weapons': Reeves, 250.
The answer was thirty-five hours: JCS memorandum, October 6, 1962, NARA.
The CIA reported on October 23: CIA Office of National Estimates memo, October 23, 1962, JFKL.
East Germans were still fleeing: Reports from Berlin, UPI and
In the afternoon: CIA memorandum,
'We will give': See Taubman, 538-40; Fursenko and Naftali,
'We are just beginning': Troyanovsky, 247.
'who took every mission': Author's interview with former U-2 pilot Robert Powell, June 2003.
Anderson was engaged: History of 4080th Strategic Wing, appendix on special operations, October 1962, FOIA.
Initially, Anderson's name: SAC message CNO 262215Z to CONAD, October 26, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.
Eager to rack up more: Heyser and McIlmoyle interviews.
One pilot, Captain Charles Kern: Unpublished Kern memoir;
The flight plan: SAC reported various incorrect times for Anderson's takeoff. I have used the time in the original execution order, outlined in SAC message 262215Z, copied to U.S. air defenses, on file at USNHC. This flight plan coincides exactly with the time Anderson entered Cuban airspace, as logged by the Soviets. A map of Anderson's flight route is contained in
It was a CIA bird: Anderson's aircraft was the third U-2 to roll off Lockheed's Skunk Works assembly line in Burbank, California, in 1955. It was a U-2A upgraded to a U-2F. Heyser, the pilot who first photographed the Soviet missile sites on October 14, flew in model no. 56-6675, the second U-2 ever produced. The U-2 flown by Maultsby during his overflight of the Soviet Union was 56-6715. All three planes were destroyed in crashes, a fate shared by most of the early U-2s ? History of 4080th Strategic Wing, October 1962, FOIA.
'looking for fault': McIlmoyle interview.
He carried photographs: State Department telegram 1633 from New York to Secretary of State, November 5, 1962, SDX.
He was still feeling: Author's interview with Anderson's daughter Robyn Lorys, September 2003; Anderson medical report, October 11, 1962.
'Aren't I doing': Col. John Des Portes OH interview, NSAW Cuba.
'Okay, Rudy': Herman interview; see also
'Lost Cause': Bruce Bailey,
'noise of silence': Author's interview with RB-47 pilot Don Griffin, December 2005. Griffin flew a mission to Cuba on October 27.
'fire to destroy':
Hunched over their monitors: See McNamara and Taylor comments to ExComm, JFK3, 446, 451. Taylor mistakenly refers to the Fruit Set radar as a 'fruitcake' radar. According to McNamara, the Fruit Set signals were picked up by the intel plane 'at the same time' the U-2 was overhead.
The senior raven: History of the 55th SRW, October 1962, FOIA. Willson detected three 'Big Cigar' radars on October 27. He reported a total of fourteen miscellaneous 'missile intercepts,' i.e., radars associated with different Soviet missile systems.
'whip anybody else': Martin Caidin,
gone 'terribly wrong': Maultsby memoir. All passages describing Maultsby's personal thoughts and actions are taken from this unpublished memoir; they have been checked against other sources, including contemporaneous astronomical charts, and a State Department chart of his flight route.
seemed 'highly suspect': Ibid.
'especially important': Letter to Adm. George Burkley, October 24, 1962, Kraus files, JFKL.
'personal effects': Memo from Burkley, October 25, 1962, JFK medical file, JFKL.
'to live every day': Dallek, 154.
'addicted to excitement': Reeves, 19.
'capacity for projecting': Dallek, 72.
'This war here': Quoted in Stern, 39–40.
