One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War

'You can't drive it': Lt. Col. George V. Leffler quoted in Saturday Evening Post, February 9, 1963.

'If I don't get a light': Andrus reminiscences.

'have had warheads installed': Eugene Zuckert letter to JFK, October 26, 1962, Curtis LeMay records, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress. Alpha Six was placed on strategic alert at 1816Z (2:16 p.m. Washington time) on October 26, 1962 (November history, 341st Strategic Missile Wing, Sagan Collection, NSAW).

'required many workarounds': October history, 341st Strategic Missile Wing, Sagan Collection, NSAW; Sagan, 82–90.

Having encouraged Andrus: SAC Historical Study No. 90, Vol. 1, 72-3, 121; SAC message 1827Z, October 27, 1962.

and 'run like hell': Andrew interview in Time.

Two B-52 Stratofortresses: SAC Historical Study No. 90, Vol. 1, 43. During the missile crisis, B-52s generally carried either four Mark-28s or two Mark-15s.

'ready to go to war': 'A Full Retaliatory Response,' Air and Space (November

2005); author's interviews with former SAC pilots Ron Wink and Don Aldridge, September 2005.

to deliver the 'full retaliatory response': Sagan, 66.

'Ocean Station Bravo': SAC Historical Study No. 90, Vol. 1, 90. For jamming, see Air Force messages AF IN 1500 and 1838, October 27 and 28, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

six 'target complexes': Kaplan, 268.

the 'dead man's switch': Sagan, 186-8.

The special storage facilities: CIA, Supplement 8, Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat, October 28, 1962, LBJ Library; Yesin interview.

Soviet missiles could not hit: My source for the targeting of New York from Calabazar is retired Col. Gen. Viktor Yesin, who served under Sidorov as a lieutenant engineer and had the opportunity to review archival documents closed to other researchers as chief of staff of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces.

'Don't worry': Malakhov notes, MAVI; Yesin interview.

The regiment was formally: Yesin interview.

Communications links with division headquarters: CIA, Supplement 8, Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat, LBJ Library.

'You have to understand': Yesin interview.

The CIA had long suspected: CIA telegram on Communist plans for Central America in the event of an invasion of Cuba, October 10, 1962, National Security Files, JFKL; CIA memo on Cuban subversion, February 18, 1963, JFKARC.

On Saturday afternoon: Undated CIA memo obtained through CREST, RDP80B01676R001800010029-3; CIA memoranda, The Crisis: USSR/Cuba, October 29 and November 1, 1962; October 27, 1962, intercept, JFKARC.

'It is the duty of every revolutionary': Blight et al., Cuba on the Brink, 18.

A secret plan known as Operation Boomerang: Blight and Welch, eds., Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 99.

'The United States will not be able': Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 141.

At the Mongoose meeting on Friday: CIA memo, 'Operation Mongoose, Main Points to Consider,' October 26, 1962, and McCone memo on Mongoose meeting, October 26, 1962, JFKARC.

It did not take long: NYT, October 29, 1962.

a 'Communist sabotage ring': NYT, October 30, 1962.

Operation Bugle Call: Memos on CINCLANT psychological leaflet program, OSD. After initially supporting the operation, the Joint Chiefs described it as 'militarily unsound' in an October 27 memorandum (OSD). The chiefs feared that the delivery aircraft might be shot down, providing the Cubans with a propaganda victory.

The six Navy Crusaders: OPNAV 24-hour resume, 270000 to 280000, CNO Cuba, USNHC; flight record sheet supplied to the author by Lt. Cdr. James A. Kauflin.

'Move it out!': Author's interview with Capt. Edgar Love, October 2005; flight track in NPIC report on Blue Moon missions, October 27, 1962, CREST; Raw intelligence film, NARA.

The president turned his attention: The State Department draft was prepared by George Ball and his deputy, Alexis Johnson ? Johnson OH, JFKL. A copy of the preliminary draft is in Maxwell Taylor Papers, NDU.

McNamara erroneously reported: According to pilot debriefs, no planes were hit. It is unclear how many planes took part in the afternoon mission. Gen. Taylor told the ExComm that two planes turned back with engine trouble and six others overflew Cuba. According to other reports, only six flights were scheduled for the afternoon of October 27 ? see, e.g., Pentagon war room journal for October 27, NSAW.

'This is a stinking double-cross': Scali's memos to Rusk were published in Salinger, With Kennedy, 274-80. See also ABC News program on John Scali, August 13, 1964, transcript available through NSAW.

The deputy chief of intelligence: Author's interview with Thomas Hughes, March 2006. Scali and Hughes entered the White House together at 5:40 p.m. ? WH gate logs, JFKL.

'twelve pages of fluff': JFK3, 462.

He proposed new, more conciliatory language: Rusk read the text of the Stevenson draft to the ExComm. I found the original State Department draft among Maxwell Taylor's Papers at NDU. See also Alexis Johnson OH, JFKL.

He suggested his brother tell Khrushchev: This later became known as the 'Trollope ploy,' discussed in the Afterword (pp. 344-5). Numerous writers, e.g., Graham Allison in Essence of Decision, claim that, on Bobby's advice, JFK decided to respond to the first Khrushchev letter and ignore the second. This is a gross oversimplification of what took place. JFK did not ignore the second letter. The following chapter gives the details of how he addressed the Turkey-Cuba issue.

'the noose was tightening': RFK, 97.

and went looking for Marlene Powell: Author's interview with Marlene Powell, September 2003. See WP Magazine, October 26, 2003. According to the History of the 4080th Strategic Wing, Jane Anderson was notified that her husband was missing at 5:50 p.m. on October 27.

Around 1:00 a.m., Khrushchev got: Troyanovsky, 250; Sergei Khrushchev, 363.

a 'signal of extreme alarm': Khrushchev letter to Castro, October 30, 1962, NSAW Cuba.

'a young horse that hasn't': Shevchenko, 106.

'We are not struggling': Khrushchev letter to Castro, October 30, 1962, NSAW Cuba; Sergei Khrushchev, 364.

to 'stomach the humiliation': NK1, 499.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: CAT AND MOUSE

By the afternoon: The U.S. Navy labeled the Soviet submarines in chronological order, based on time of sighting. The first to be positively identified was C-18 (Soviet designation B- 130, commanded by Nikolai Shumkov) at 241504Z. The others were C-19 (B-59, Valentin Savitsky) at 252211Z; C-20, later identified as C-26 (B-36, Aleksei Dubivko), at 261219Z; and C- 23 (B-4, Ryurik Ketov) at 271910Z.

'Submarine to starboard': Carrier Division Sixteen, Cuban missile crisis documentation, NSAW.

'Dropped five hand grenades': Logbooks of Beale and Cony, NARA, also available through NSAW.

'Submerged submarines': Secretary of Defense message to Secretary of State 240054Z, NSAW Cuba.

'The president has been seized': JCS Poole notes.