1st sess., October 17, 1985.
——. Senate. Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.
Utilization of Refugees from the Soviet Union in U.S. National Interest. PPS 22/1, March 11, 1948.
Vakar, Nicholas P.
Winks, Robin W.
Zaprudnik, Jan.
314 “The Nazi Connection.”
315 “Mr. Loftus persistently made”: Feigin, 361.
316 “Totally inadequate”: 1985 AAO Report/Hearing. 316 “The action of U.S. Intelligence”: Ibid., 56.
316 “No one had the faintest idea”: Loftus,
316 The declassification process of 400 million pages: Peter Finn, “Archives’ Major Task: Declassification,”
317 “Defense material NOT cleared”: Loftus,
318 “Mayors, governors and other officials”: Loftus,
318 Loftus’s OSI reports are still classified. As a result, it is not known how many Belorussian quislings he investigated and who they were. It is known that he asked the CIA for files on Emanuel Jasiuk, Jan Avdzej, Radoslaw Ostrowsky, Frank Kushel, George Sabolewski, John Kosiak, and Dr. Nicholas Scors. Ruffner, chap. 18, 2.
318 OSI was about to file a denaturalization action against Jan Avdzej (John Awsziej), a regional mayor in Belorussia, when he voluntarily left the United States in 1984 for Germany. He admitted that he “carried out the orders of Nazi occupation authorities.” OSI flipped Basil Artischenko. He agreed to help investigate fellow Belorussian quislings if OSI dropped charges against him. From Feigin, who lists OSI investigations and outcomes in her appendix.
320 “Of a highly confidential nature”: Ibid., 117. According to a 1951 FBI report on Jasiuk, the two State Department representatives were C. E. Collier and Arndt Wagner. “These men were aware of his background in the Byelorussian Central Council during the war years.” Stanley A. Lewczyk memo to Internal Security, #100–34393 MHM, September 14, 1951, NA, RG 65, Box 62.
321 “Not to arrest”: According to the FBI memo cited above, the FBI knew Jasiuk was a war criminal: “Subject became well known for his cruelty and persecution of the Polish populace in the area and was responsible for sending many persons to forced labor in Germany. In 1942, during the liquidation of the Polish intelligentsia, subject submitted a list… to the [SD] and, as a result, a number of these persons were shot.”
322 Description of CIA’s response to Loftus is from Ruffner, chap. 18, 6–9.
322 It had 3,500 separate files: Ibid., 11.
323 “It’s bad history”: Feigin, 362.
325 “The policemen were sitting on top”: Dean, 48.
325 “A prominent role in the persecution”: Rein, 138.
326 “The Germans made it clear”: Ibid., 132. 326 “In most cases”: Ibid., 402.
328 “Over the next two years”: Gaddis,
328 For background on Wisner see: Thomas, Hersh, Powers, Miscamble, Mickelson, and “Frank Gardiner Wisner Dead; Former Top Official of C.I.A.”
328 “Secretive, insular, elitist”: Thomas, 17. The description of Wisner draws heavily on the work of Thomas.
330 “To initiate and conduct”: NSC 4A, #2.
330 “Promptly begin in Free Europe”: SANAAC 395, March 17, 1948, recommendation two.
331 “Fifty aliens”: PPS 22/1, March 4, 1948, recommendation two.
331 “Conducting espionage and counter espionage”: NSC 10/2, June 18, C1948, #2.
331 For a discussion of the power struggle over OPC, see Darling’s internal history of the CIA, “OPC,” 55– 69; also Gaddis and Miscamble.
331 “An instrument of U.S. Policy”: Miscamble, 109.
331 “Operate independently”: NSC 10/2, 3c.
332 Guerilla Warfare School: “Proposal for the Establishment of a Guerilla Warfare School,” J.C.S. 1807/1, August 17, 1948.
332 Authorize the FBI and CIA to work together: NSCID No. 14, number one, March 3, 1950.
332 “In the case of those who are
333 “Extralegal character”: Miscamble, 110.
333 “Membership in the SS”: Sher et al., 387.
333 “We would have slept:” l985 GAO report, 15.
333 “Who had a new idea every ten minutes”: Powers, 93.
333 OPC was managing seventeen: Hersh, 319. Also Ruffner, chap. 10, 4.
333 “Wisner pragmatically overloaded the books”: Ibid., 5.
334 “Was so influential that the government”: Ibid., 287.
334 The Organization was a secret intelligence group established by the War Department and run by John V. Grumbach, an army officer. The State Department took it over in September 1947 and the CIA took it over in April 1951. The organization folded in 1954.
334 Project Solarium: See memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State…Subject: Project Solarium, May 20, 1953. Top Secret. The memo is reproduced in
335 An initial 250 Nazi collaborators: Simpson, 100–1.
335 “They were the cream of Nazi collaborators”: Ibid., 150.
335 Poppe and Hilger are based on Simpson, Ruffner (chap. 7), and their CIA files in NA, RG 263, CIA Name Files.
335 “Played leading roles in Nazi Germany”: Ruffner, 7.
337 To wave its required examination: Ibid., 17.
337 “The fact that the Office of Policy Coordination”: Ibid., 24.
338 “Special consideration”:
338 The army estimated its Guerilla Army requirements as: AG 553, no. 4, p. 1.
338 Provided the following estimates: SWNCC 222, p. 2.
338 The description of the role of the guerilla-army-in-waiting is from Simpson, chap. 10, “Guerillas for World War Three.”
339 He asked for authorization to bring 15,000: This and other Bloodstone descriptions are from Simpson, chap. 8, “Bloodstone.”
340 “Organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei”: Proposal for the Establishment of a Guerilla Warfare School, J.C.S. 1807/1, “Enclosure B,” # 2.
340 “The entry for Liber Pokorny, for example”:
340 The National War College, and the State Department: Proposal for the Establishment of a Guerilla Warfare School, J.C.S. 1807/1, “Enclosure A,” 16.
340 “The primary interest in guerilla warfare”: Proposal for the Establishment of a Guerilla Warfare School, J.C.S. 1807/1, “Enclosure A,” 15.
341 A series of classified, top secret records of Camp Kilmer:
