Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis

stay in Berlin. In 8 days Austria will be ours.’ He discussed the propaganda arrangements with Hitler, then returned to his Ministry to work on them until 4a.m. No one was now allowed to leave the Ministry till the ‘action’ began. The activity was feverish. ‘Again a great time. With a great historical task… It’s wonderful,’ he wrote.⁷⁵

After three hours’ sleep, Goebbels was back with Hitler by 8a.m. dictating leaflets for distribution in Austria.⁷⁶ An hour later, when Papen arrived post-haste from Vienna, he found the Reich Chancellery in a frenzy of activity. Apart from Goebbels and his propaganda team, Neurath, Frick (with several officials from the Ministry of the Interior), Himmler (‘surrounded by a dozen giant SS officers’), Brauchitsch, Keitel, and their adjutants were all in attendance. Ribbentrop was missing — sidelined in London, where he was making his official farewells as former ambassador, his recall to Berlin now hindered by Goring.⁷⁷

Prominent in Hitler’s mind that morning was Mussolini’s likely reaction. Around midday, he sent a handwritten letter, via his emissary Prince Philipp of Hessen, telling the Duce that as a ‘son of this [Austrian] soil’ he could no longer stand back but felt compelled to intervene to restore order in his homeland, assuring Mussolini of his undiminished sympathy, and stressed that nothing would alter his agreement to uphold the Brenner border.⁷⁸ But whatever the Duce’s reaction, Hitler had by then already put out his directive for ‘Case Otto’, expressing his intention, should other measures — the demands put by Sey?-Inquart to Schuschnigg — fail, of marching into Austria. The action, under his command, was to take place ‘without use of force in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the people’.⁷⁹

Hitler, when Papen was ushered in to see him that morning, was ‘in a state bordering on hysteria’.⁸⁰ During the course of the day, Goring (so he claimed), rather than Hitler, made most of the running. ‘It was not the Fuhrer so much as I, myself, who set the pace and, even overruling the Fuhrer’s misgivings, brought everything to its final development,’ he proudly insisted at his Nuremberg trial, anxious to establish his own ‘Goring myth’ for posterity.⁸¹ ‘Without actually discussing it with the Fuhrer,’ he recalled, ‘I demanded spontaneously the immediate resignation of Chancellor Schuschnigg. When this was approved, I put the next demand, so that now the entire business was ready for the Anschlu?.’⁸² This was something of an over-simplification.

Hitler had put the first ultimatum around 10a.m., demanding Schuschnigg call off the referendum for two weeks to allow a plebiscite similar to that in the Saarland in 1935 to be arranged — the idea that Goebbels had raised the previous day. Schuschnigg was to resign as Chancellor to make way for Sey?-Inquart. All restrictions on the National Socialists were to be lifted.⁸³ It was when Schuschnigg, around 2.45p.m., accepted the postponement of the plebiscite but rejected the demand to resign that Goring acted on his own initiative in repeating the ultimatum for the Chancellor’s resignation and replacement by Sey?. Goring reported back to the Reich Chancellery: Sey? had to be named Chancellor by 5.30p.m., the other conditions of the original ultimatum accepted by 7.30p.m.⁸⁴ He had simply overridden the objections of Sey? himself, who was still hoping to avoid a German invasion and preserve some shreds of Austrian independence.⁸⁵ Looking harassed and tense, Sey? put the ultimatum to the Austrian cabinet, remarking that he was no more than ‘a girl telephone switchboard operator’.⁸⁶ At this point, the military preparations in Germany were continuing, ‘but march in still uncertain’, recorded Goebbels. Plans were discussed for making Hitler Federal President, to be acclaimed by popular vote, ‘and then eventually (dann so nach und nach) to complete the Anschlu?’.⁸⁷ In the immediate future, the ‘coordination’ (Gleichschaltung) of Austria, not the complete Anschlu?, was what was envisaged.⁸⁸

Then news came through that only part of the second ultimatum had been accepted. Schuschnigg’s desperate plea for British help had solicited a telegram from Lord Halifax, baldly stating: ‘His Majesty’s Government are unable to guarantee protection.’⁸⁹ About 3.30p.m. Schuschnigg resigned.⁹⁰ But President Wilhelm Miklas was refusing to appoint Sey?-Inquart as Chancellor.⁹¹ A further ultimatum was sent to Vienna, expiring at 7.30p.m.⁹² By now Goring was in full swing. Returning to the Reich Chancellery in the early evening, Nicolaus von Below found him ‘in his element’, constantly on the phone to Vienna, the complete ‘master of the situation’.⁹³ Just before 8.00 that evening, Schuschnigg made an emotional speech on the radio, describing the ultimatum. Austria, he said, had yielded to force. To spare bloodshed, the troops would offer no resistance.⁹⁴

By now, Nazi mobs were rampaging through Austrian cities, occupying provincial government buildings. Local Nazi leaders were hoping for Gleichschaltung through a seizure of power from within to forestall an invasion from Germany.⁹⁵ Goring pressed Sey?-Inquart to send a prearranged telegram, dictated from Berlin, asking the German government for help to ‘restore order’ in the Austrian cities, ‘so that we have legitimation’, as Goebbels frankly admitted.⁹⁶ Keppler rang at 8.48p.m. to inform Goring that Sey? was refusing to send the telegram. Goring replied that the telegram need not be sent; all Sey? needed do was to say ‘agreed’.⁹⁷ Eventually, Keppler sent the telegram, at 9.10p.m. It was irrelevant. Twenty-five minutes earlier, persuaded by Goring that he would lose face by not acting after putting the ultimatum, Hitler had already given the Wehrmacht the order to march.⁹⁸ Brauchitsch had left the Reich Chancellery, the invasion order in his pocket, depressed and worried about the response abroad.⁹⁹ Just before 10.30p.m. Hitler heard the news he had been impatiently awaiting: Mussolini was prepared to accept German intervention. ‘Please tell Mussolini I will never forget him for it, never, never, never, come what may,’ a hugely relieved Hitler gushed over the telephone to Philipp of Hesse. ‘If he should ever need any help or be in any danger, he can be sure that do or die I shall stick by him, come what may, even if the whole world rises against him,’ he added, carried away by his elation.¹⁰⁰

At midnight, President Miklas gave in. Sey?-Inquart was appointed Federal Chancellor.¹⁰¹ All German demands had now been met. But the invasion went ahead. As the American journalist William Shirer, observing the scenes in Vienna, cynically commented: with the invasion Hitler broke the terms of his own ultimatum.¹⁰² A last attempt by Sey?-Inquart, at 2.30a.m., to have the invasion stopped was brusquely rejected by Hitler: the military intervention could no longer be halted.¹⁰³ Keitel did not dare pass on a plea he received at 4a.m. from General Max von Viebahn, in the Wehrmacht Head Office, imploring him to intervene with the Fuhrer to desist from the invasion. Had Hitler known of the request, Keitel claimed, he would have been utterly contemptuous of the army leadership.¹⁰⁴ That, in Keitel’s eyes, had to be avoided at all costs in the light of the events of the previous weeks. The ‘friendly visit’ of German troops began at 5.30a.m.¹⁰⁵

Later that morning, Hitler, accompanied by Keitel, landed in Munich, en route for his triumphal entry into Austria, leaving Goring to serve as his deputy in the Reich.¹⁰⁶ By midday, the cavalcade of grey Mercedes, with open tops despite the freezing weather, had reached Muhldorf am Inn, close to the Austrian border. General Fedor von Bock, Commander-in-Chief of the newly formed 8th Army, hastily put together in two days out of troop units in Bavaria, reported to Hitler. The motorized Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler had joined them from Berlin. Bock could tell Hitler that the German troops had been received with flowers and jubilation since crossing the border two hours earlier. Hitler listened to the report of reactions abroad by Reich Press Chief Otto Dietrich. He did not expect either military or political complications, and gave the order to drive on to Linz.¹⁰⁷

Back in Berlin, Frick was drafting a set of laws to accommodate the German takeover in Austria. A full Anschlu? — the complete incorporation of Austria, marking its disappearance as a country — was still not envisaged; at any rate, not in the immediate future. Elections were prescribed for 10 April, with Austria ‘under Germany’s protection’. Hitler was to be Federal President, determining the constitution. ‘We can then push along the development as we want,’ commented Goebbels.¹⁰⁸ Hitler himself had not hinted at an Anschlu? in his proclamation, read out at midday by Goebbels on German and Austrian radio, stating only that there would be a ‘true plebiscite’ on Austria’s future and fate within a short time.¹⁰⁹

Shortly before 4p.m. that afternoon, Hitler crossed the Austrian border over the narrow bridge at his birthplace, Braunau am Inn. The church-bells were ringing. Tens of thousands of people (most of them from outside Braunau), in ecstasies of joy, lined the streets of the small town. But Hitler did not linger. Propaganda value, not sentiment, had dictated his visit. Braunau played its brief symbolic part. That sufficed. The cavalcade passed on its triumphal progression to Linz.

Progress was much slower than expected because of the jubilant crowds packing the roadsides. It was in darkness, four hours later, that Hitler eventually reached the Upper Austrian capital. Sey?-Inquart and Glaise-