Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis

107. TBJG, II/12, 167 (22 April 1944).

108. Kershaw, ‘Hitler Myth’, 214.

109. VB (Suddeutsche Ausgabe), 20 April 1944, printed in Hans Mommsen and Susanne Willems (eds.), Herrschaftsalltag im Dritten Reich: Studien und Texte, Dusseldorf, 1988, 88–9: ‘Niemals hat das deutsche Volk so glaubig zu seinem Fuhrer aufgeschaut wie in den Tagen und Stunden, da ihm die ganze Schwere dieses Kampfes um unser Leben bewu?t wurde…’

110. Below, 367; TBJG, II/12, 160 (21 April 1944); Irving, HW, 619.

111. Below, 367–8; TBJG, II/12, 168 (22 April 1944), 191 (27 April 1944), 194–5 (27 April 1944); Domarus, 2099.

112. Staatsmanner II, 418ff.; trans. N & P, iii.868.

113. Speer, 336–47; Sereny, Speer, 409–28.

114. Speer, 344.

115. Speer, 347–8.

116. Speer, 348–54; also Below, 368–9; and Sereny, Speer, 428–30; Fest, Speer, 282–9.

117. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944 (copy of Goring’s comments on the need to increase bomber production, at a meeting on 23 May 1944 on the Obersalzberg, attended by Speer, Milch, Koller, and others); Irving, HW, 626–8.

118. Irving, HW, 580; Irving, Goring, 410–11; Carr, Hitler, 80.

119. Speer, 372–3.

120. IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944: former Major-General Galland’s post-war testimony at Hitler’s explosion on learning that the Me262, despite Messerschmitt’s promise (as he saw it) was being produced as a fighter. For Goring’s anger — reflecting Hitler’s anger with him — at his advisers at Messerschmitt for what he took to be misleading advice (also from Messerschmitt himself to Hitler) on the practicality of producing the jet-bomber, see IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944, ‘Stenographische Niederschrift uber die Besprechung beim Reichsmarschall am 24.Mai 1944’, 1–4. The file also contains a copy (from BA, NS6/152) of a note for Bormann of 21 October 1944, relating to Hitler’s commission in the previous October to develop the Me262 as a bomber and his expectation that it would be used to repulse an invasion in the west. The note stated: ‘On account of the failure of the Luftwaffe, the type Me262, now developed as a bomber, was not ready on time.’ (‘Infolge Versagens der Luftwaffe wurde der nunmebr als Bomber entwickelte Typ Me 262 nicht recbtzeitig fertig’). Also in the file are extracts from a further meeting on construction of the Me262 on 25 May. See also Below, 370–71; Irving, HW, 628–30.

121. Speer, 357–60. Hitler agreed to the transfer on 4 June.

122. Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache vor Generalen und Offizieren am 26. Mai 1944’, Militargescbicbtlicbe Mitteilungen, 2 (1976), 123–70, here 134.

123. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 135, 167 n.74; IfZ, MA–316, Bl.2614608–46, Rede des Reichsfuhrers-SS am 24.5.44 in Sonthofen vor den Teilnehmern des politisch-weltanschaulichen Lehrgangs (Generale), quotation Bl.2614639 (and printed in Himmler: Geheimreden, 203): ‘Eine andere Frage, die ma?geblich fur die innere Sicberbeit des Reiches und Europa war, ist die Judenfrage gewesen. Sie wurde nach Befehl und standesma?iger Erkenntnis kompromi?los gelost.’

124. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 136.

125. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 146–7.

126. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 155.

127. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 156; see also 168 n.77. See also Wilhelm, ‘Wie geheim war die “Endlosung”?’, 131–48, here 134–6.

128. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 157.

129. Wilhelm, ‘Hitlers Ansprache’, 161.

130. Below, 370; Speer, 359; Monologe, 406–12. Goebbels remarked, after discussions with Albert Bormann on arrival at the Berghof on 5 June: ‘Up here only the top leadership notices something of the war; the middle and lower leadership are rather apathetic towards it’ (TBJG, 11/12, 405 (6 June 1944)).

131. TBJG, 11/12, 405 (6 June 1944); Below, 372.

132. TBJG, 11/12, 408 (6 June 1944).

133. Weisungen, 291–2.

134. TBJG, 11/12, 407 (6 June 1944).

135. Speer, 363–4; TBJG, II/12, 407 (6 June 1944).

136. Below, 373.

137. TBJG, 11/12, 410, 413 (6 June 1944).

138. TBJG, 11/12, 414–15 (6 June 1944); and see Dieter Ose, Entscheidung im Westen. Der Oberbefehlshaber west und die Abwehr der allierten Invasion, Stuttgart, 1982, 101–2.

139. Irving, HW, 884. According to the KTB Ob West H 11–10/10 (copy in IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944), page 7, the sighting of around 100 warships west of Le Havre and in the Barfleur area offered final confirmation, at 6.42a.m., that it was the beginning of the invasion.

140. German intelligence failed miserably in the build-up to the landing. Later analysis suggested that about four-fifths of reports on the coming invasion from Abwehr agents, received before 6 June, were inaccurate. The OKW seems, in addition, to have been dismissive of reports reaching it at the beginning of June and indicating an imminent invasion. (See Irving, HW, 884, and IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944, for cables of 2–3 June 1944 from the SD warning of imminent invasion on the basis of detected coded radio messages to French resistance groups.)

141. Weinberg III, 686.

142. Weinberg III, 688.

143. Irving, HW, 638, 883–4. Rundstedt had requested the release ‘for all eventualities (fur alle Falle)’ of the two reserve divisions based between the Loire and Seine at 4.45a.m. (KTB Ob West H 11–10/10 (copy in IfZ, ED 100, Irving-Sammlung, Hitler-Dokumentation, 1944), page 4. See also KTB OKW, iv.i, 311–12.)

144. Speer, 364–5.

145. This was only partially accurate. It had, in fact, been Rommel who had placed greatest stress on the possibility of a landing in Normandy, whereas Hitler, while not excluding this, had been more inclined to follow Rundstedt in presuming the landing would take place in the Pas de Calais, at the shortest sea-crossing over the Straits of Dover (Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 291).

146. Here, too, Hitler was over-optimistic. The weather on 6 June, though cloudy and windy, had improved from that of the day before (when it had been bad enough to cause ‘Operation Overlord’ to be postponed). While the German defenders thought the weather too bad for an invasion, Eisenhower had adjudged that it was just good enough. (Parker, Struggle for Survival, 197; Weinberg III, 684.)

147. TBJG, II/12, 418–19 (7 June 1944); Below, 374; Linge, ‘Kronzeuge’, Bl.42.

148. Based on Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 291–2; Parker, Struggle for Survival, 197–8; Weinberg III, 686–8; Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol.6: Triumph and Tragedy, London etc., 1954,6; Oxford Companion, 853. The accounts give differing numbers of ships engaged in the landings. Parker, Struggle for Survival, 197, has 2,727 vessels approaching, multiplying to 6,939 as the smaller landing craft left their parent ships. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 291, has 5,134 ships and vehicles (Fahrzeuge). Oxford Companion speaks of nearly 7,000 ships and landing-craft, including 1,213 naval warships. Parker’s figure for ships on approach has been used.

149. Weinberg III, 686, 688.