150. Irving, Goring, 426–7; see also Parker, Struggle for Survival, 196.
151. Parker, Struggle for Survival, 198–9; Weinberg III, 687.
152. Weinberg III, 688.
153. See Speer, 366.
154. Speer, 366; Irving, HW, 641 (with slightly different figures from those of Speer); TBJG, II/12, 479 (17 June 1944).
155. Speer, 366; Holsken, V-Waffen, 132. Goring had tried to blame the initial failure of the Vi on Milch. When Hitler, changing his tune completely, now demanded increased production, Goring predictably attempted to claim the credit.
156. Weinberg III, 691.
157. Die Wehrmachtherichte 1939–1945, Cologne, 1989, iii.12.8ff.: ‘Southern England and the area of London were last night and this morning bombed (belegt) with new explosives of the heaviest caliber.’ See also Domarus, 2106; and Tb Reuth, v.2058, n.125 for Dietrich’s propaganda.
158. TBJG, II/ 12, 480 (17 June 1944), 491–2 (18 June 1944). Goebbels’s dampening of expectations is mentioned in Elke Frohlich, ‘Hitler und Goebbels im Krisenjahr 1944’, VfZ, 38 (1990), 196–224, here 217–18; and Reuth, Goebbels, 542–4. For the disappointed mood and the propaganda failure over the VI, see especially Gerald Kirwin, ‘Waiting for Retaliation. A Study in Nazi Propaganda Behaviour and German Civilian Morale’, JCH, 16 (1981), 565–83.
159. Irving, HW, 642.
160. Below, 375; Linge, ‘Kronzeuge’, Bl.42; Domarus, 2106; Speer, 366; Irving, HW, 641.
161. Hans Speidel, Invasion 1944. Ein Beitrag zu Rommels und des Reiches Schicksal, Tubingen/Stuttgart, 1949, 113–14.
162. Below, 375.
163. Speidel, 114–17.
164. Speidel, 118; Below, 375.
165. Speer, 366.
166. LB Stuttgart, 573–4; Weinberg III, 688.
167. Weinberg III, 687–9.
168. Below, 375–6.
169. TBJG, II/12, 463 (14 June 1944), 517 (22 June 1944).
170. TBJG, II/12, 516–18 (22 June 1944).
171. TBJG, II/12, 518–19 (22 June 1944).
172. TBJG, II/12, 519–21 (22 June 1944), quotation 521.
173. TBJG, II/12, 521–2, 527 (22 June 1944), quotation 522.
174. TBJG, II/12, 523–6 (22 June 1944).
175. IfZ, F19/3, Hitler’s speech, 22 June 1944 (quotations, page 7: ‘… da? das Ende im Falle des Nachgebens immer die Vernichtung ist, auf die Dauer die restlose Vernichtung’); ‘Vorsehung’, page 12, and his comment on page 47: ‘Ich babe das Leben schon im Weltkrieg als Geschenk der Vorsebung aufgefa?t. Ich konnte so oft tot sein und bin nicht tot. Das ist also schon ein Geschenk gewesen; ‘Der Jude ist weg ...’, page 39; ‘Niemals wird dieser neue Staat kapitulierern’, page 67); see also, especially, 55, 59, and 62 (‘Wir kampfen hier fur die deutsche Zukunft, um Sein oder Nichtsein’).
176. Below, 376. The speech was frequently interrupted by applause, and was followed by shouts of ‘Heil’ (IfZ, F19/3, page 70). Hitler was in much less good form when he spoke on 26 June — the military situation had worsened during the previous four days — to about 100 leading representatives of the armaments industry, to try to assuage them about Party interference in the economy. During this speech, there was barely applause, and Hitler’s vague philosophizing did not come across well. The attempt, which Speer had hoped would rouse the morale of the assembled businessmen, did not succeed. (The text is printed in von Kotze, 35–68; and see Speer, 369–71.)
177. TBJG, II/12, 524 (22 June 1944). Goebbels had been more sceptical. Heavy bombing attacks against German rear areas began on the night of 21–22 June; the main attacks commenced the following day (Glantz and House, 204).
178. DZW, vi.35–6; Glantz and House, ch.13.
179. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 252; Weinberg III, 704; David Glanz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War, London/Totowa NJ, 1989, 362–79, here 463, 467/ff.; DZW, vi.33.
180. Irving, HW, 643–4.
181. Hans-Adolf Jacobsen and Jurgen Rohwer, Entscheidungsschlachten des Zweiten Weltkrieges, Frankfurt am Main, 1960, 452.
182. TBJG, II/12, 538–9, 542 (24 June 1944).
183. Weisungen, 281–5. The principle of the twelve bastions created in the theatre of Army Group Centre, with three divisions assigned to each of the strongholds, was to suck in the Red Army, tying them down, then building the basis for a successful counter-operation. The tactic backfired drastically in the Soviet offensive of June 1944.
184. Below, 377–8.
185. See DZW, vi.34.
186. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 253.
187. Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 253; Weinberg III, 706–8; Below, 378. The Soviet offensive in the Centre, South, and North is extensively described in DZW, vi.30–52, 52–70, 70–81.
188. Wistrich, Wer war wer, 188; Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, 253; DZW, vi.41.
189. Speidel, 127; Guderian, 334; Irving, HW, 649–51.
190. Domarus, 2110.
191. Guderian, 334.
192. Below, 378; Irving, HW, 648; Wistrich, Wer war wer, 301; Domarus, 2130.
193. Below, 378.
194. Below, 379.
195. Below, 380.
196. Below, 380.
197. Domarus, 2118. See Peter Hoffmann, Stauffenberg. A Family History, 1905– 1944, Cambridge, 1995, ch.9, especially 179–80, for Stauffenberg’s involvement in the North African campaign that led to his serious injuries, sustained on 7 April 1943, and 253–4 for his presence at the briefings on 6 and 11 July 1944.
198. Domarus, 2121; Hoffmann, Stauffenberg, 256–60; Hoffmann, Widerstand, 469–75.
199. Witnesses gave differing times for the explosion, between 12.40 and 12.50p.m. (Hoffmann, Widerstand, 493, 817 n. 43).
