Hitler. 1936-1945: Nemesis

western powers were anxious to avoid war at all costs, while the east-European neighbours of Czechoslovakia were keen to profit from any war but unwilling to take risks. Diplomatic activity, increasingly feverish as the summer wore on, in any case appeared less and less likely to bear dividends — not least since the greatest warmonger other than Hitler himself was his Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop.

Messages, often doom-laden, sometimes conflicting, and invariably treated with differing degrees of belief and scepticism, were passed from those close to oppositional sources within Germany.²⁶⁷ Soundings were taken by unorthodox routes. Goring put out feelers through a number of informal links. He let it be known that he would be interested in coming to London himself to carry out discussions about Anglo-German relations at the highest level. Goring was instrumental in the invitation extended by the British government to Fritz Wiedemann, Hitler’s adjutant, to come to London.²⁶⁸

The ostensible purpose was to discuss the possibility of a future visit by Goring himself. Becoming increasingly estranged from Hitler over the high-risk foreign policy, Wiedemann was particularly anxious to bypass Ribbentrop when he met Lord Halifax in London in mid-July. He had been given his instructions not by Hitler, but by Goring. Hitler had approved the visit, though given Wiedemann no message to convey to London. Wiedemann, connected with Beck, Goring, and others anxious to avoid military conflict, tried to assure the British that Germany wanted a peaceful solution to the Czech crisis. But he himself knew differently. He had been present at Hitler’s explicit briefing on 28 May.²⁶⁹ In any case, Hitler was uninterested in Wiedemann’s ‘mission’. On his adjutant’s return to Berlin, Hitler accorded him a mere five minutes to report, and ruled out any visit by Goring.²⁷⁰ Ribbentrop’s wrath at being bypassed helped discredit Wiedemann in Hitler’s eyes, leading to the former adjutant’s ‘exile’ as Consul General in San Francisco.²⁷¹

By midsummer, the German Foreign Minister regarded the die as cast. He told his State Secretary, Ernst von Weizsacker, ‘that the Fuhrer was firmly resolved to settle the Czech affair by force of arms’. Mid-October was the latest possible date because of flying conditions. ‘The other powers would definitely not do anything about it and if they did we would take them on as well and win.’²⁷² Weizsacker, whose efforts remained urgently concentrated on a diplomatic solution which would concede the Sudeten territory to Germany and at the same time further the ‘chemical dissolution process’ (‘chemischer Auflosungsproze?’) of Czechoslovakia, would temporarily find solace in the pact among the leading powers which would be concluded in Munich.²⁷³ But he only gradually realized what he was up against in his own ministry, let alone with Hitler. In post-war reflections on his own behaviour at the time, he candidly admitted: ‘I too much wanted to apply the art of the possible and underestimated the value of the irrational.’²⁷⁴

Hitler himself spent much of the summer at the Berghof. Despite the Sudeten crisis, his daily routine differed little from previous years: he got up late, went for walks, watched films, and relaxed in the company of his regular entourage and favoured visitors like Albert Speer. Whether on the basis of newspaper reports, or through information fed to him by those able to gain access, he also intervened — sometimes quirkily — in an array of minutiae: punishment for traffic offences, altering the base of a statue, considerations of whether all cigarettes should be made nicotine-free, or the type of holes to be put into flagpoles. He also interfered directly in the course of justice, ordering the death penalty for the perpetrator of a series of highway robberies, and the speediest possible conviction for the alleged serial killer of a number of women.²⁷⁵

But the Czechoslovakian crisis was never far away. Hitler was preoccupied with the operational planning for ‘Green’. His confidence in his generals dwindled as his anger at their scepticism towards his plans mounted.²⁷⁶ He also involved himself in the smallest detail of the building of the Westwall — a key component in his plans to overrun the Czechs without French intervention and the bluff to discourage Germany’s western neighbours from even attempting to cross the Rhine. He was still expecting the fortifications to be complete by the autumn — by the onset of frost, as he told Goebbels — at which point he reckoned Germany would be unassailable from the west.²⁷⁷ But the sluggish progress made by the army made him furious. When General Adam claimed that the extra 12,000 bunkers he had ordered were an impossibility, Hitler flew into a rage, declaring that for Todt the word ‘impossible’ did not exist.²⁷⁸ He felt driven to dictate a lengthy memorandum, drawing on his own wartime experiences, laying down his notions of the nature of the fortifications to be erected, down to sleeping, eating, drinking, and lavatory arrangements in the bunkers — since new recruits in their first battle often suffered from diarrhoea, he claimed to recall.²⁷⁹ The Westwall had priority over all other major building projects. By the end of August, 148,000 workers and 50,000 army sappers were stationed at the fortifications. Autobahn and housing construction had been temporarily halted to make use of the workers.²⁸⁰

At the end of August, Hitler paid an inspection visit to the western front. General Adam had the unenviable task of informing him that by the end of October no more than around a third of the requirements would be in place — and this only if the promised raw materials arrived. Adam could see that Hitler was close to an explosion. This came when the general remarked that the western powers would, in his view, certainly intervene in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia. Hitler fumed: ‘We have no time to listen any longer to this stuff. You don’t understand that. We produce in Germany 23 million tons of steel a year, the French only 6 millions and the English only 16 millions. The English have no reserves and the French have the greatest internal difficulties. They’ll beware of declaring war on us.’ More dubious ‘facts’ followed. Hitler’s technique of throwing out a torrent of statistics — correct, fabricated, or embellished — to support an argument made countering it extremely difficult. Adam, struck — so he later claimed — by Hitler’s ‘lack of education (Unbildung)’, inability to confront reality, and readiness to resort to lies to get his way, retorted provocatively that if that was the case, there was little point in worrying any longer about the western front. After a tense few moments, during which those present braced themselves for a further violent outburst, Hitler calmed himself, and the inspection continued without further incident.²⁸¹

By this time, the end of August, the crisis was beginning to move towards its climacteric phase. The question of Czechoslovakia now dominated all conversation at midday meals in the Reich Chancellery.²⁸² ‘In the country there is serious unrest on account of the situation,’ noted Goebbels. ‘Everywhere there’s talk of war… The hot topic: war and Prague. These questions weigh heavily at present on all.’²⁸³ The Propaganda Minister, unlike some of his immediate subordinates in his ministry, still felt confident that when it came to it Britain, which held the key, would do no more than protest.²⁸⁴ Hitler, too, when Goebbels saw him on the Obersalzberg on the last day of August, was in a determined and optimistic mood: he did not think Britain would intervene. ‘He knows what he wants and goes straight towards his goal,’ remarked Goebbels. By this time, Goebbels too knew that the planned time for action was October.²⁸⁵

Ordinary people were, of course, wholly unaware of the planned aggression. The weeks of anti-Czech propaganda, often near-hysterical in tone, had shaped the impression that the issue was about the despicable persecution of the German minority, not the military destruction of Czechoslovakia. But whether or not the Sudeten Germans came ‘home into the Reich’ was, for the overwhelming majority of the population, less important than avoiding the war which Hitler was determined to have. Beck had emphasized the widespread popular opposition to war in his July memoranda.²⁸⁶ ‘In Berlin the best opinion is that Hitler has made up his mind for war if it is necessary to get back his Sudetens,’ wrote the American journalist William Shirer in early September. ‘I doubt it for two reasons: first, the German army is not ready; secondly, the people are dead against war.’²⁸⁷ ‘The war psychosis is growing,’ noted Goebbels. ‘A gloomy mood lies over the land. Everyone awaits what is coming.’²⁸⁸ Reports on popular opinion compiled by the SD and other agencies uniformly registered similar sentiments.²⁸⁹ Looking for diversions from their worries, many people acted as if there were no tomorrow. ‘The theatres are well patronized, the cinemas full, the cafes overcrowded, with music and dancing till the early hours,’ ran one report in early September. ‘Sunday excursion traffic is setting record figures.’ But the mood was depressed. ‘There exists in the broadest sections of the population the earnest concern that in the long or short run a war will put an end to the economic prosperity and have a terrible end for Germany.’²⁹⁰

IV

During August, the British had indirectly exerted pressure on the Czechs to comply with Sudeten German