western Gauleiter, after a 14-day visit to the west in November, but there was no hint of disloyalty.—BAB, NS6/135, fos. 12–17, Ley’s report to Hitler, 30.11.44; accurately summarized in TBJG, II/14, pp. 355–7 (5.12.44).
82. BAB, R55/603, fo. 513, Hauptreferat Pro.Pol. an das RPA Neustadt a.d. Weinstr. (28.11.44).
83. TBJG, II/14, pp. 309–10, 316, 344, 382 (1–3.12.44, 9.12.44); BAB, R55/601, fos. 221–2, Tatigkeitsbericht, weekly propaganda report, 14.11.44; von Oven, p. 509 (10.11.44); Das letzte halbe Jahr: Stimmungsberichte der Wehrmachtpropaganda 1944/45, ed. Wolfram Wette, Ricarda Bremer and Detlef Vogel, Essen, 2001, pp. 153, 160, 167 (21.11.44, 29.11.44, 9.12.44).
84. TBJG, II/14, p. 420 (15.12.44).
85. BAB, NS19/751, fos. 23–5, Chief of SS-Hauptamt Gottlieb Berger to Himmler, 17.11.44 (also in IfZ, Fa- 93).
86. Cited in Andreas Kunz, Wehrmacht und Niederlage: Die bewaffnete Macht in der Endphase der nationalsozialistischen Herrschaft 1944 bis 1945, Munich, 2007, p. 269.
87. BA/MA, MSg2/2697, fos. 64–7, diary entries of Lieutenant Julius Dufner (27.11–5.12.44). For the bombing of Freiburg, see Peter Zolling, ‘Was machen wir am Tag nach unserem Sieg?’ in Wolfgang Malanowski (ed.), 1945: Deutschland in der Stunde Null, Reinbek bei Hamburg, 1985, p. 121; and, especially, Friedrich, pp. 306–11.
88. BfZ, Sterz-Sammlung, U’Fw. Hermann S., 6.12.44.
89. BfZ, Sterz-Sammlung, SS-Rttf. Paul S., 5.12.44.
90. BfZ, Sterz-Sammlung, SS-Rttf. Paul S., 11.11.44. Propaganda offices reported an improvement in the mood of the civilian population in mid-November, which it partly attributed to the announcement of the V2 attacks.—BAB, R55/601, fo. 215, Tatigkeitsbericht, weekly propaganda report, 14.11.44.
91. BfZ, Sterz-Sammlung, Gefr. Michael M., 11.11.44.
92. BfZ, Sterz-Sammlung, Kanonier Felix S., 10.11.44.
93. LHC, Dempsey Papers, no. 199, pt. II, p. 5 (20.12.44), in English.
94. BA/MA, N712/15, NL Pollex, Kriegstagebuch, entry for 26.12.44. Pollex, born in 1898, had served briefly as senior quartermaster (Oberquartiermeister) with Army Group Centre in 1942 before being transferred to the Army General Staff and later in the year being promoted to the rank of colonel. In December 1944 he was sent to Doberitz to take charge of officer training courses (Regimentskommandeur-Lehrgang) then moved on 9 January 1945 to become Chief of Staff to the Chef der deutschen Wehrmachtrustung.
95. Sonke Neitzel, Abgehort: Deutsche Generale in britischer Kriegsgefangenschaft 1942– 1945, Berlin, 2005, pp. 171, 432–3 (1.1.45) (Eng. edn., Tapping Hitler’s Generals: Transcripts of Secret Conversations, 1942–45, Barnsley, 2007, p. 127).
96. Benjamin Ziemann, ‘Fluchten aus dem Konsens zum Durchhalten: Ergebnisse, Probleme und Perspektiven der Erforschung soldatischer Verweigerungsformen in der Wehrmacht 1939–1945’, in Ralf-Dieter Muller and Hans-Erich Volkmann (eds.), Die Wehrmacht: Mythos und Realitat, Munich, 1999, p. 594; Manfred Messerschmidt, ‘Die Wehrmacht in der Endphase: Realitat und Perzeption’, Aus Parlament und Zeitgeschichte, 32–3 (1989) (4.8.89), pp. 42–3. General Schorner justified his ferocious military discipline to his own subordinate leading officers in Courland by the need to combat the rapidly growing number of deserters.—BA/MA, RH19/III/727, fo. 49–49v, Schorner to all his generals, 5.12.44.
97. Kunz, p. 267.
98. BA/MA, N712/15, NL Pollex, diary entry for 8.12.44.
99. Hastings, p. 228. Major Hasso Viebig, commanding officer of the 277th Grenadier-Division, recalled in British captivity four months after the offensive the determination of the troops, exhilarated that they were advancing again.—Neitzel, Abgehort, p. 200 and p. 539 n. 158. See also Zimmermann, p. 94 for the initial boost to morale from the offensive.
100. For the course of the offensive, see DZW, 6, pp. 128–34, DRZW, 7 (Vogel), pp. 625–32; Jung, chs. 4–7; Lothar Gruchmann, Der Zweite Weltkrieg, pb. edn., Munich, 1975, pp. 310–12; Gerhard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 766–8; Stephen B. Patrick, ‘The Ardennes Offensive: An Analysis of the Battle of the Bulge’, in Nofi, pp. 206–24; and Hastings, ch. 8. Peiper’s panzer regiment was responsible for the deaths of more than 400 American and Belgian prisoners in all.— DZW, 6, p. 130. The Malmedy massacre of 84 prisoners is judiciously discussed by Michael Reynolds, The Devil’s Adjutant: Jochen Peiper, Panzer Leader, Staplehurst, 1995, pp. 88–97.
101. LHC, Dempsey Papers, no. 241, pt. II, p. 3 (30.1.45), diary entry of Lt. Behmen, 18th Volksgrenadier Division, in English.
102. LHC, Dempsey Papers, no. 217, pt. II, p. 5 (6.1.45), in English.
103. BAB, R55/793, fos. 16–18, Material for Propagandists, No. 19 (11.12.44). Such propaganda had nevertheless limited effect. Goebbels noted in mid-December that the population in the west had no fear of the Anglo-Americans and farmers were reluctant, therefore, to be evacuated.—TBJG, II/14, p. 402 (12.12.44).
104. LHC, Dempsey Papers, No. 246, pt. II, p. 3 (4.2.45), in English.
105. BfZ, Sterz-Sammlung, Gefr. W.P., 17.12.44.
106. BfZ, Sterz-Sammlung, Gefr. S.F., 17.12.44.
107. BfZ, Sterz-Sammlung, Uffz. Werner F., 19.12.44.
108. TBJG, II/14, pp. 429, 433 (17.12.44), 438–9 (18.12.44), 445 (19.12.44); von Oven, pp. 526–9 (17.12.44, 20.12.44).
109. See VB, 19.12.44, where the headline simply read, ‘German Offensive in the West’.
110. BAB, R55/601, fos. 249–50, Tatigkeitsbericht, weekly propaganda report, 19.12.44. See also Klaus- Dietmar Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands, Munich, 1995, pp. 316– 17.
111. TBJG, II/14, p. 450 (20.12.44), and, still in the same vein, p. 468 (23.12.44).
112. Das letzte halbe Jahr, p. 183, report for 18–24.12.44 (2.1.45).
113. NAL, FO898/187, summary of German media reports, fo. 315 (18–26.12.44).
114. TBJG, II/14, p. 452 (20.12.44).
115. DRZW, 7 (Vogel), p. 631.
116. IWM, Box 367/27, p. 7, Speer Ministry Interrogation Reports, deposition of Saur, 11–13.6.45. According to Goebbels’ aide Rudolf Semmler, the offensive was by 21 December ‘already seen to be a definite failure’.—Rudolf Semmler, Goebbels—the Man Next to Hitler, London, 1947, p. 171 (21.12.44).
117. Speer, p. 425.
118. Guderian, p. 381.
119. DRZW, 7 (Vogel), p. 629; Hastings, p. 261.
120. DZW, 6, p. 133, and p. 137 for the figures that follow.
121. TBJG, II/14, pp. 436–7 (29.12.44). He had acknowledged a ‘somewhat more critical’ situation six days earlier (p. 469 (23.12.44)) and a deterioration on 28.12.44 (pp. 480–81). Wehrmacht propaganda agents in Berlin also commented at this time on the confidence of soldiers returning from the front, but hinted that the enthusiasm at home had waned.—Das letzte halbe Jahr, p. 193, report for 25–31.12.44 (3.1.45).
122. TBJG, II/14, p. 500 (31.12.44).
123. BA/MA, MSg2/2697, diary of Lieutenant Julius Dufner, fo. 78 (1.1.45).
124. BAB, R55/612, Echo zur Fuhrerrede, summary report to Goebbels, fos. 22–3, 2.1.45; fos. 17–102 for replies of propaganda offices to request for information on the reception of Hitler’s speech and that of Goebbels himself, 1–2.1.45.
125. Hitler: Reden und Proklamationen 1932–1945, ed. Max Domarus, Wiesbaden, 1973, pp. 2179–85 for the text of the speech.
