where they were loaded on the C-124s.

It was important that no one know the Ranch's location, so the flights were made at night. The crew was instructed to fly to a point on the California-Nevada border, then contact 'Sage Control.' The radio voice would tell them not to acknowledge further transmissions. The C-124 would then be given new headings and altitudes. Soon the crew would be contacted by 'Delta,' who would tell them to start descending into the black desert night.

The voice would then tell the transport's crew to lower their flaps and landing gear. Yet their maps showed no civilian or military airports in the area, only empty desert. Then the runway lights would come on, and Delta would clear them to land. Following the landing, the runway lights would be turned off and a 'follow me' truck would direct them to a parking spot. The buildings were visible only as lights in the distance. A group of tight-lipped men with names like 'Smith' would unload the U-2.[71]

Once delivered to Groom Lake, the U-2s would be reassembled and test flown. The process would be reversed when the time came to send the U-2s to their overseas bases.

OVERFLIGHTS BEGIN

The need for intelligence on the Soviet Union had grown since the start of the U-2 program. The pace of Soviet nuclear testing was picking up. The Soviets had also staged mass flybys of Mya-4 and Tu-95 bombers. Estimates began to appear that the Soviets would soon have upwards of five hundred to eight hundred Mya-4s. So began the 'bomber gap' controversy.

The problem was that these estimates were based on fragmentary data; they were little better than guesses. There was no way to know.

Eisenhower made two efforts — one political, the other clandestine — to gain intelligence. At the July 1955 Geneva Summit, he made the 'Open Skies' proposal. The United States and Soviets would be allowed to overfly each others' territory as a guard against surprise attack. Eisenhower also believed such an effort would be a step toward disarmament. The Soviets, relying on secrecy to hide their military strengths and weaknesses, rejected the proposal.[72]

The other effort was the Genetrix reconnaissance balloon program. The plan, which had been in development since 1950, envisioned the launch of some twenty-five hundred Skyhook balloons, carrying camera gondolas from England, Norway, West Germany, and Turkey. The balloons would drift across the Soviet Union on the winter jet stream. The large number would cover nearly all of the Soviet land mass. The randomly drifting balloons could not cover specific targets, but this did not matter. The Soviet Union was a huge blank. Once clear of Soviet airspace, the gondolas would be cut free of the balloons by radio signals. As the gondolas descended by parachutes, they would be caught in midair by specially equipped C-119 transports.

The Genetrix launches began on January 10, 1956. For the first two weeks, the loss rate of the balloons was acceptable and the Soviets made no protest. By late January and early February, however, the balloons were no longer making it through. Soviet air defenses were able to stop the high-flying intruders. On February 6, following a Soviet protest, Eisenhower ordered the balloon launches halted. In all, only 448 balloons were launched; of these, 44 gondolas were successfully recovered. These provided 13,813 photos covering 1,116,449 square miles of the USSR and China […] percent of their total land mass). [73] This daring and desperate at-the U-2's turn.

By early April 1956, flight training of the first group of CIA pilots was completed and the new J57-31 engine had proven itself virtually immune to flameouts. The U-2s, pilots, and ground crews were sent to Lakenheath, England. The unusual looking plane soon attracted attention. The June 1, 1956, issue of Flight carried a report of a sighting over Lakenheath. It stated, 'In the sky, it looks like the war-time Horsa glider. He believes it to have one jet engine and reports a high tailplane and unswept wings of high-aspect ratio.'

The U-2's time in England was brief. At the same time the unit was being set up, a British frogman died while investigating the hull of a Soviet cruiser in an English harbor. The resulting press furor caused Prime Minister Anthony Eden to withdraw permission for the U-2 to operate from Lakenheath. Bissell and General Cabell then went to see West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer. He said, 'This is a wonderful idea. It's just what ought to be done.' He gave permission to use an old Luftwaffe base fifty miles east of Wiesbaden. The four U-2s and the seven pilots moved to the new base. The unit was called 'Detachment A.'[74]

The first public word of the U-2's existence came with a May 7, 1956, press release from the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). It announced: 'Start of a new research program [using a] new airplane, the Lockheed U-2… expected to reach 10-mile-high altitudes as a matter of routine… The availability of a new type of airplane… helps to obtain the needed data… about gust-meteorological conditions to be found at high altitude… in an economical and expeditious manner.' Specific areas of research included clear air turbulence, convective clouds, wind sheer, the jet stream, ozone, and water vapor. 'The first data, covering conditions in the Rocky Mountain area,' the press release said, 'are being obtained from flights from Watertown Strip, Nevada.'

On July 9, NACA issued a second press release titled, 'High Altitude Research Program Proves Valuable.' It stated:

Initial data about gust-meteorological conditions to be found at 10-mile altitudes which have been obtained to date by the relatively few flights of the Lockheed U-2 airplane have already proven the value of the aircraft for this purpose…

'Within recent weeks, preliminary data-gathering flights have been made from an Air Force base at Lakenheath, England… As the program continues, flights will be made in other parts of the world.'[75]

Indeed, the U-2 had been making flights that provided highly valuable data. But the data was not about the weather.

In the early summer, the CIA sought Eisenhower's agreement to begin overflights. At this point, the project was seen as a short-term, high-risk operation.[76] The U-2s were also considered too delicate to have a long-operating lifetime. The desperate need for intelligence outweighed the risks.[77]

Eisenhower initially authorized two test overflights of Eastern Europe.[78]

The first was made on June 20, 1956. Carl Overstreet was selected to be the first pilot to take the U-2 into 'denied' airspace. The route went to Warsaw, Poland, then over Berlin and Potsdam, East Germany. Following the two overflights, Eisenhower was shown a number of photo briefing boards from the missions. At the same time, the Soviets put on another mass flyby of bombers.

On July 2, Bissell sent a request to begin Soviet overflights to Eisenhower's personal assistant Gen. Andrew Goodpaster. The following day, Goodpaster sent word that Eisenhower had authorized overflights of the USSR for a ten-day period. Bissell asked if this meant ten days of good weather. Goodpaster replied, 'It means ten days from when you start.'[79]

At 6:00 A. M. on July 4, 1956, Hervey Stockman took off in U-2 Article 347. The plane carried the A camera and was in a bare-metal finish with no national markings. Stockman headed over East Berlin and northern Poland via Poznan, then crossed the Soviet border. The overflight covered a number of bomber bases in the western USSR, as far east as Minsk. The Soviets made more than twenty intercept attempts. The camera photographed MiG fighters trying to reach the U-2's altitude, only to have their engines flame out. Stockman then turned north, toward Leningrad. Once he reached the city, he turned west and flew along the Baltic coast. The U-2 landed back at Wiesbaden after an eight-hour-forty-five-minute flight.

The next overflight would go directly to Moscow. When asked to justify such a dangerous target, the mission planners told Bissell, 'Let's go for the big one straight away. We're safer the first time than we'll ever be again.'

Article 347 took off at 5:00 A.M. on July 5. The pilot was Carmen Vito.

The flight path was farther south than the first mission — over Kracow, Poland, then due east to Kiev, then north to Minsk. There was heavy cloud cover, which started to clear as Vito turned toward Moscow. Again, MiGs tried to reach the U-2. Several crashed when they were unable to recover after flaming out. Over Moscow, a new danger loomed — the SA-1 Guild surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites that ringed the capital. Vito could see several

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