'herring bone' shaped sites, but no missiles were fired. Vito flew back along the Baltic coast to Wiesbaden.[80]
In all, five overflights were made during the first series — one on July 4, and two each on July 5 and 9. Their photos were highly illuminating. The bomber airfields in the western USSR had been equipped with nuclear weapons loading pits, but no Mya-4 bombers were spotted. Within weeks, the bomber gap controversy was over. The U-2 photos had proven the Soviets did not have a large bomber force. The photos brought a revolution in intelligence. It was now possible to know, not to estimate, not guess, but to
On July 10, the Soviets protested the overflights, and Eisenhower decided to halt the missions for the time being. He was very impressed, however, with the photos of bomber bases and the shipyards around Leningrad.[81]
In September 1956, the second group of U-2 pilots completed training at the Ranch. The seven pilots of Detachment B were based at Incirlik, Turkey.
From there, the southern Soviet Union, as well as targets throughout the Mideast, could be covered. It was not until November that the first overflights were made from Turkey, a pair of short overflights to examine Soviet air defenses. The first was flown by Powers.
The third group, Detachment C, was established in early 1957 at Atsugi, Japan. The unit made overflights of targets in the eastern USSR, such as Vladivostok and Sakhalin Island, as well as flying missions over China, North Korea, North Vietnam, and Indonesia.[82]
The year 1957 saw a step-up in overflight activities. This represented a change in attitude toward the operation. Eisenhower had come to rely on the U-2 photos, comparing other intelligence data to them. Soon they were providing 90 percent of the intelligence on the Soviet Union. Instead of a short-term project, it had become an open-ended one. Fears about the U-2's fragile structure had eased and early problems with the B camera had also been overcome. Detachment A in Germany was closed down and combined with the Turkish-based Detachment B.
The risks were also clearer; a year after the first overflight, Bissell asked for a special estimate of the U-2's vulnerability. The Soviets had begun deployment of a new SAM, the SA-2 Guideline, in late 1956. The study concluded the SA-2 could reach the U-2's altitude, but they had been designed to hit much lower-flying B-47s and B-52s. Above 60,000 feet, the SAM's accuracy was so poor only a lucky hit could be made. The risk was not a serious one.[83]
A primary target of the overflights was Soviet ballistic missile activities.
Since World War II, the Soviets had undertaken an aggressive development program. The SS-3 and SS-4 medium range ballistic missiles, then in the final stages of testing, could threaten U.S. bases throughout Western Europe, North Africa, and Asia. It was the U-2 that provided the first good photos of the Kapustin Yar test site on the Volga River.
A new missile threat was also emerging. Development work was under way on the R-7 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). A new test site, in Soviet central Asia, was completed in late 1956. In March 1957, the prototype R-7 was undergoing checkout. The missile was fired on May 15 but exploded fifty seconds after launch. Two more launch attempts were made in the spring and summer, also ending in failure.
These activities were detected, and Eisenhower authorized a series of overflights to find the launch site. These overflights were along the main railroad lines. During one of them, the pilot spotted construction in the distance and altered course to photograph it. When the photos were developed, they showed the launch pad. Within days, the analysis was completed. The site was named 'Tyuratam,' after the rail stop at the end of the fifteen-mile spur that connected the site to the main Moscow-Tashkent line.
The string of R-7 failures ended on August 21, 1957, when the fourth attempt made a successful 3,500- nautical-mile flight. A second successful R-7 launch followed on September 7. Emboldened by the twin flights, Communist Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev authorized the launching of an earth satellite by an R-7. This was
The R-7 and
The Soviet Union was vast. Even with the use of bases in Iran, Pakistan, and Norway, many areas were out of the U-2's range. Another factor was Eisenhower's growing reluctance to authorize overflights. He feared that large numbers of such flights would provoke the Soviets, possibly starting World War III.[85]
What overflights were authorized concentrated on Soviet rail lines. Because of the SS-6's huge size, it could only be moved by rail, and any operational sites would also be located near rail lines. The problem was the U-2s were failing to bring back any photos of deployment. No ICBMs were spotted in transit, nor were any operational sites found. Despite this lack of evidence, the air force continued to insist that the Soviets would deploy large numbers of SS-6s.
Eisenhower was increasingly frustrated. From the U-2 photos, he knew Soviet nuclear forces were a pale shadow of those of the United States, but without evidence of the true SS-6 deployment rate, he was attacked as downplaying the Soviet threat in order to balance the budget. To aggravate matters, Khrushchev was using the missile gap and Soviet successes in space to promote an image of superiority. This, in turn, was used to put pressure on the West over Berlin.[86]
While the overflights were under way, the Ranch housed the headquarters squadron, called Detachment D, and the training unit for the first group of air force U-2 pilots.[87] The Ranch also served as Lockheed's U-2 flight test center. Starting in late 1956, work was under way on a program that would influence the design of every Dark Eagle to follow and that would see final success two decades later.
When the U-2 was first developed, it had been hoped that the aircraft would fly so high the Soviets would have only fragmentary tracking data and would not be sure what was going on. During training flights, this theory had been borne out: only one or two radar sites would detect the aircraft. When the overflights started, however, the Soviets were not only able to track the U-2s but vector fighters toward them. [88]
President Eisenhower was extremely disturbed by the ease with which the Soviets were detecting the U-2 overflights. He directed that work be undertaken to reduce the U-2's 'radar cross section.' Called Project Rainbow, it had the highest priority and the attention of all the Skunk Works engineers. Eisenhower threatened to end the overflight program should Rainbow fail. Johnson asked advice from two radar experts, Dr. Frank Rogers and Ed Purcell.
They suggested stringing wires of varying lengths from the nose and tail to the wings. The idea was to scatter the radar signals away from the receiver, which would weaken the radar echo. The modification worked, but with major shortcomings — the U-2's range was cut and its maximum altitude was reduced by seven thousand feet. The wires also whistled and sometimes broke, flapping against the cockpit and fuselage.
The other attempt was more elaborate. The U-2's underside was covered with a metallic grid, called a Salisbury Screen, and then overlayed with a black foam rubber called Echosorb. The grid would deflect the radar signal into the absorber. The modifications proved to have only limited usefulness.
At some radar frequencies, they did reduce the U-2's radar cross section. At others, however, the plane's radar echo was made worse. The coating also prevented the engine's heat from dissipating out the skin.
This latter problem caused the loss of Article 341, the U-2 prototype. On April 4, 1957, Lockheed test pilot Bob Sieker was making a flight at 72,000
feet. This involved flying the aircraft up and down a radar range for hours on end. The heat buildup caused the plane's engine to flame out. When this happened, cockpit pressurization was lost and Sieker's suit inflated. As it did, the clip holding the bottom of his faceplate failed and it popped open.
The suit lost pressure, and Sieker passed out within ten seconds. The U-2 went into a flat spin and
