and tail. In the end, Johnson rejected them all.[113]
The failure of Sun Tan seems to have had an effect on Johnson's view of the high-speed reconnaissance aircraft. Since the exotic technology of liquid hydrogen had proven impractical, he understood that this new aircraft would have to be based on solid technology.
Johnson began a series of design studies on April 21, 1958. The first was designated 'A-1.' The U-2 had been called the Angel by Skunk Works engineers. These new designs would fly far faster and higher, so, accordingly, the
In late November 1958, the Land Panel decided that it was possible to build the aircraft. Their report concluded: 'The successor reconnaissance aircraft would have to achieve a substantial increase in altitude and speed; be of reduced radar detectability; suffer no loss in range to that of the U-2; and be of minimum size and weight.'[114] They further recommended that President Eisenhower approve funding for additional studies and tests. Both Eisenhower and his scientific adviser, Dr. James Killian, had already been briefed on the project. Eisenhower approved the recommendation, and funding was provided to Lockheed and Convair to prepare definitive studies.
The effort was code-named 'Gusto.'
By the spring of 1959, Johnson and his Skunk Works engineers had worked their way up to the A-10, but success seemed elusive. President Eisenhower was intent on a plane with a zero radar cross section. He did not want the Soviets to even know it was there. Kelly Johnson told the CIA that there was no way to accomplish this.
Work continued on reducing the radar cross section. One idea involved adding wedge-shaped chines made of radar absorbing material to the A-10's cylindrical fuselage. Tests of a small model were successful, and by May 1959 the chines had been incorporated into the A-ll design. This showed a reduction of a full 90 percent in radar cross section. Although not invisible, success was now within reach. In July, a final revised design of the A-ll was prepared. It made full use of the chines, as well as elements from the previous designs, and was the sum of fifteen months of work.
After a day and a half of work, the final drawing was completed. The long sheet of paper was presented to Johnson. Ben Rich, one of the engineers who worked on it told him, 'Kelly, everything is now exactly where it should be — the engines, the inlets, the twin tails. This is probably as close to the best we can come up with.' Johnson took the design and made repeated trips to CIA headquarters.[115]
On July 20, 1959, President Eisenhower was again briefed on Gusto. At the meeting were Allen Dulles and Bissell from the CIA, Defense Secretary Neil McElroy, scientific advisers Dr. Killian and Dr. George Kistiakowsky, Gens. Thomas D. White and C. P. Cabell, and National Security Adviser Gordon Gray. The meeting lasted nearly an hour. Eisenhower gave approval for development to begin.[116]
The Convair and Lockheed designs were submitted to a joint DOD-USAF-CIA selection board on August 20, 1959. The Convair design, called 'Kingfisher,' was a large delta-wing aircraft 79.5 feet long, with a wingspan of 56 feet and weighing 101,700 pounds. It was to be powered by two J65 jet engines and two Marquardt RJ59 ramjets. The jets would be used for takeoff and climb. Once up to speed, the ramjets would ignite and accelerate the plane to Mach 3.2. During flight, the Kingfisher would climb from an initial altitude of 85,000 up to 94,000 feet. The Convair aircraft had a range of 4,000 nautical miles.
The final Lockheed design, the A-ll, was a single-seat aircraft. It had a long fuselage with a delta wing at the rear. The two J58 engines were midway out on the wings. The A-ll was 102 feet long and had a wingspan of
The Lockheed A-ll was selected on September 3. The Gusto code name was replaced by 'Oxcart.' Given the plane's extreme speed, the code name seemed to be 'inspired perversity,' as the official history put it. There was a subtle symbolism, however. Lockheed aircraft had long carried 'star' or astronomical names — Orion, Vega, Sirius, Altair, Electra, Constellation, Starfire, Starfighter, and JetStar. In Europe, the constellation of the Big Dipper is often called a wagon — or an oxcart.
Once Lockheed was selected, the CIA gave approval for a four-month series of aerodynamic and structural tests, engineering design, and construction of a full-scale A-ll mock-up.[118] The mock-up was needed to test the aircraft's radar cross section. Due to the complexity of the problem, it was not possible to use subscale models. It was completed in November 1959, then was packed in a huge box and moved by road from Burbank to Groom Lake. The mock-up was then reassembled and mounted on a pylon. For the next eighteen months the mock-up was scanned by radar, while adjustments and modifications were made. This early work was successful, and the CIA gave approval on January 30, 1960, for production of twelve aircraft.[119]
Extreme security measures, tighter even than for the U-2, were used to hide the program. Because knowledge of Lockheed's involvement would create speculation, money to subcontractors was paid through 'front' companies. Once the parts were completed, they would be shipped to warehouses, also rented to front companies. The parts would then be sent to Burbank. Few, if any, of the subcontractors knew what the parts were for.
Ironically, some drawings were deliberately not classified; the assumption was that if they were stamped 'Secret,' people would take an interest.
Just over three months after the Oxcart program started, Powers's U-2 was shot down. It was clear to Eisenhower that the United States would never again be able to make overflights of the Soviet Union. This also brought into question the future of Oxcart. The president seemed undecided, saying at one point that he was not sure if it would be best to end development, or if so much had been invested that the United States should capitalize on the effort by carrying it through. In the latter case, the program should be continued, although at a low priority, for use by the air force rather than the CIA. He asked CIA director Dulles to meet with Defense Secretary Thomas S. Gates and Maurice Stans, director of the Bureau of the Budget, to make a recommendation.[120]
A new challenger appeared in the late summer. On August 19, the recovery capsule from the
Ultimately, Oxcart was seen as needed and was continued under CIA control. Satellites would be restricted to coverage of the Soviet Union for the foreseeable future. It would also be many years before a satellite camera had the resolution of the U-2's B camera. If the USSR was off limits for the U-2, it could still provide coverage of Communist China, Cuba, Vietnam, or the Mideast. In a few years, however, these areas could no longer be overflown with impunity. The Chinese already had SA-2 SAMs, and other countries would have them by the early and mid-1960s. The Oxcart would soon be needed to conduct overflights of even Third-World countries.
Once the future of Oxcart was resolved, the initial development work continued. Temperature affected every aspect of the Oxcart's design. Even though the plane would be flying at the edge of space, friction would raise the skin temperature to over 500 degrees F. The
Stainless steel honeycomb was being used in the Mach 3 XB-70, then under development, but Johnson rejected this when he saw the production problems it entailed. The honeycomb had to be produced in a clean room, under sterile conditions. The Skunk Works motto was 'KISS' (Keep It Simple, Stupid). Stainless steel was too complicated and was likely to cause problems.
Johnson decided to use heat-treated B-120 titanium alloy. This was still a major step into the unknown.
