A mock-up of the 'Reconnaissance Strike-71' (RS-71) was inspected by the air force on June 4, 1962. The concept of a strike A-12 ran into problems from two directions. Some in the air force saw it as a threat to the XB-70 program (also called the 'RS-70'). More important, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and his 'whiz kids' saw no need for manned bombers.
In the coming years, the entire B-47 force, as well as early model B-52s, would be retired, and the XB-70 program reduced to an aeronautical research program.
Accordingly, only the reconnaissance version of the RS-71 remained. (It kept the 'strike' part of the name, however.) Externally, the plane resembled the A-12, with the nose slightly less pointed and the tail cone extended to hold more fuel. The A-12 was designed for clandestine overflights, with the minimal payload of a single camera. The RS-71, in contrast, carried a larger payload. The nose was removable and could carry either a high-resolution radar or a panoramic camera. Additional cameras or reconnaissance equipment could be carried in the chines. This gave it a much greater capability, not just for poststrike reconnaissance and overflights, but also for peacetime flights along the Soviet border.[164]
On December 27–28, 1962, a contract was issued to Lockheed to build six test RS-71s. By this time, the A-12 had made its first flights and was about to begin its journey toward Mach 3. The first YF-12A, as the interceptor was now known, was also nearing completion.
The first YF-12A (Article 1001) was moved to Groom Lake in July 1963.
Final assembly was completed, and it made its first flight on August 7. The pilot was Eastham, who had written the manual and had made flight tests of the radar and missile systems in a modified B-58. During the flight, the YF-12A went supersonic. The second YF-12A (Article 1002) was flown on November 26, 1963, by Schalk. Because the A-12 had already proved the design's Mach 3 performance, the initial YF-12 flights were tests of the radar systems.[165]
Despite all that had happened — the crash of Article 123, the achievement of Mach 3, the sightings and rumors, the
And 1964 was also a presidential election year.
Lyndon B. Johnson had been briefed on the A-12 project a week after becoming president. He directed a plan be developed for an announcement in the spring of 1964.[166] The expected Republican candidate was Barry Goldwater, a right-wing senator who had long accused the Democrats of being soft on defense and communism. 'Surfacing' the A-12 was an obvious tool to counter such charges. (Although started under Eisenhower, a Republican, the plane had first flown under John F. Kennedy, a Democrat.) By the end of February 1964, the time was judged right. At a February 29 meeting of the National Security Council, the members were briefed on the A-12 by McCone and McNamara. They were then asked for approval for a public announcement.[167] Later that day, President Johnson read a statement to the press.
The United States has successfully developed an advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11, which has been tested in sustained flight at more than 2,000 miles per hour and at altitudes in excess of 70,000 feet. The performance of the A-11 far exceeds that of any other aircraft in the world today. The development of this aircraft has been made possible by major advances in aircraft technology of great significance for both military and commercial applications. Several A-11 aircraft are now being flight tested at Edwards Air Force Base in California. The existence of this program is being disclosed today to permit the orderly exploitation of this advanced technology in our military and commercial program.
The debut generated considerable press attention. The stories claimed the United States had a dozen 'A- 11s' flying (true) and that they had already made overflights (false). President Johnson's use of 'A-11' was deliberate.
This was the original designation of the Oxcart, before the antiradar modifications were made. Should A-12 become public, it would appear it was a follow-on to the A-11, rather than the original airplane.[168]
The personnel at Groom Lake knew an announcement was near but did not know the exact timing. Accordingly, they were taken by surprise. No A-12 or YF-12A had ever operated from Edwards Air Force Base, so the two YF-12s were hurriedly flown over by Schalk and Park. They taxied up and made a 180-degree turn in front of their new hangar. As they did, the hot exhaust was blown into the hangar and triggered the fire extinguisher valves. Water came flooding down.[169]
The third YF-12A (Article 1003) made its first flight on March 13, 1964, and was soon transferred to Edwards. The planes embarked on tests of its missile system. It proved successful in launching missiles at Mach 3 and intercepting the target aircraft. But this was already a dead issue — McNamara had no more interest in air defenses than he did in manned bombers.
His 'cost-effectiveness' studies concluded that the Soviet bomber force was a minimal threat. Over the next several years, McNamara withheld funding to build ninety-three improved F-12B interceptors, even though funding had been approved by Congress. The existing F-101, F-102, and F-106 air-defense squadrons, radar sites, and SAM sites were closed over the next several years. The Soviets, on the other hand, were starting an aggressive bomber-development program. This resulted in the Tu-22 Backfire and the Tu-160 Blackjack — exactly the aircraft the F-12B was designed to intercept.
Four months after the A-ll announcement, there was another. According to legend, Johnson asked an aide what the RS-71 was for. The aide responded, 'strategic reconnaissance.' Thus, when he announced the existence of a new reconnaissance aircraft, on July 24, 1964, President Johnson called it the 'SR-71.' As a result of switching the letters, twenty-five thousand drawings had to be changed.[170] The prototype SR-71 (Article 2001) was delivered to Palmdale, California, on October 29, 1964. It made its first flight on December 22, 1964, with Robert Gilliland at the controls. Unlike the secret flights from Groom Lake, the SR-71 's takeoff could be seen from the surrounding area.[171]
Later that same day, another member of the A-12 family also made its first, secret, flight.
President Johnson's announcements created an unusual security situation.
Both the YF-12A and the SR-71 were White (i.e., the fact they existed was not a secret). In contrast, the A- 12 was still Black. Its existence would remain a secret until 1981. To maintain the secret, all those involved were told of the coming A-ll announcement and warned to keep the A-12 separate.
One aspect of this effort was the A-12's paint finish. From 1963 and into 1965, they had a half bare-metal, half black finish. 'U.S. Air Force,'
'USAF,' and the serial numbers were in black. The SR-71 made its first flight in an all-black finish with white lettering. The A-12s were soon painted in an identical scheme. This improved temperature control, as the black paint radiated heat better than the bare metal. It also meant that it was nearly impossible to tell the difference between an A-12 and an SR-71 at any distance. (The two aircraft had nearly identical shapes.) On July 9, 1964, Park was involved with the second A-12 crash. He had completed a high-Mach check flight in a new aircraft, Article 133, and was on approach to the runway. At an altitude of 500 feet, the plane began a roll to the right. Park could not control it. When the plane reached a bank angle of 45 degrees and was only 200 feet above the ground, he ejected. Park separated from the seat and his parachute opened. As he swung down to the vertical, his feet touched the ground. The official history called it 'one of the narrower escapes in the perilous history of test piloting.' The A-12 hit the ground and exploded. The crash was traced to the right outboard roll and pitch control, which had frozen up. No word of the crash leaked out.[172]
In early 1964, with a limited Mach 3 capability at hand, CIA headquarters began thinking about Cuban overflight missions. For several months, Fidel Castro had been threatening to attack the U-2s making overflights of Cuba. Secretary of State Dean Rusk suggested to President Johnson that a diplomatic note be sent to the Cubans, warning against any attempt to shoot down the planes. He added that, as a further deterrent, Castro should be given the word through Black channels that the United States had taken note of the statements, interpreted them
