typical Black Shield mission would involve an aerial refueling south of Okinawa soon after takeoff, one or two photo passes, and a second refueling over Thailand before the return to Kadena. Due to the plane's huge turning radius, some mission profiles required the A-12 to enter Chinese airspace. On a single-pass mission, the A-12 would spend only twelve and a half minutes over North Vietnam. If two passes were made, the A-12 would spend twenty-one and a half minutes in hostile airspace. Once back at Kadena, the exposed film would be unloaded and placed aboard a special plane for shipment to the processing facility. For the first overflights, this was the Eastman Kodak plant in Rochester, New York. By late summer, an air force processing center had been set up in Japan. The data would be in the hands of U.S. commanders within twenty-four hours of an overflight.
Despite the speed and altitude of the A-12, the risks of overflights were clear. On September 17, a SAM site tracked an A-12 with its acquisition radar. The Fan Song guidance radar was unable to gain a lock on the plane, however. On October 28, a North Vietnamese SAM site fired a single SA-2 at an A-12 flown by Sullivan. The plane's camera photographed the smoke from the site, then the missile's contrail. The ECM equipment worked well and the SAM missed.[192]
Sullivan's next overflight, on October 30, 1967, resulted in a 'hit.' On his first pass, Sullivan noted the plane was being tracked, with two SAM sites preparing to fire. On the second pass, as he flew toward Hanoi from the east, the North Vietnamese were ready — at least six SA-2s were fired at the A-12. This was the first of many concerted efforts to bring down an A-12/SR-71. Sullivan saw contrails and the detonation of three missiles.[193]
The bursts appeared, then seemed to collapse instantly as the A-12 sped away.[194] Unlike a tactical fighter, the A-12 could not evade a missile by maneuvering. The pilot had to continue on his course and trust the ECM equipment would protect him.[195]
When Sullivan landed back at Kadena, a postflight inspection discovered a piece of metal had hit the lower right-wing fillet area and become lodged against the wing tank support structure. The fragment was not a warhead pellet, but a very small piece of the brass fuze from one of the missiles.
This was the only hit scored on an A-12 or SR-71 in over one thousand overflights. Sullivan kept the fragment as a souvenir of the mission.
The new year brought new crises, and the A-12 was in the midst of them.
On January 23, 1968, the U.S.S.
There were fears that this was the prelude to full-scale military action, and an A-12 overflight of North Korea was authorized. On January 25, the first attempt was made by Weeks, but a problem caused an abort shortly after takeoff. The next day, January 26, Murray took off. The mission was to locate the ship and then determine if an invasion of South Korea was about to occur. Murray made his first pass down the east coast of Korea: 'As I approached Wonsan I could see the
Murray made a total of four passes over North Korea, from the DMZ to the Yalu River, covering the entire country. The A-12 was tracked by the Chinese, but no missiles were fired. When the photos were analyzed, they showed no evidence that a ground attack was imminent.[196]
A second overflight of North Korea was requested, but the State Department was reluctant, fearing political problems should the A-12 be shot down. Secretary of State Dean Rusk was briefed on the mission: the plane would spend only seven minutes over North Korea, and even if a problem occurred, it was highly unlikely the A-12 would land inside China or North Korea. Even so, Rusk suggested changes in the flight path before giving his approval. Rusk thus became the A-12's highest-ranking flight planner. (This was not unique; President Eisenhower had made changes in U-2 overflights.) The mission was flown by Layton on May 8, 1968.
Between January 1 and March 31, 1968, four North Vietnamese overflights and one North Korean overflight were made (out of fifteen alerted).
Between April 1 and June 9, 1968, two North Korean overflights were alerted; only the May 8 mission was flown. May 8 also was the last A-12 overflight. In all, the A-12 made twenty-six overflights of North Vietnam and two of North Korea. No overflights of China were made (although several flights did enter Chinese airspace during turns). No Skylark missions over Cuba were flown, as the U-2 proved adequate. Now, the A-12 Oxcart was to pass from the scene.[197]
Starting in November 1965, even as the A-12 was declared operational, doubts were expressed about the cost of operating the two separate groups of A-12s and SR-71s. After a year or more of debate, it was decided on January 10, 1967, to phase out the A-12 program. The first four A-12s were to be put in storage in July 1967, another two by December, and the final two by the end of January 1968. At the same time, the SR-71s would be phased into operation. This, it should be noted, was before the A-12 had undertaken a single overflight.
Once the overflights began, the A-12 demonstrated an exceptional technical capability. As the scheduled phaseout date neared, concerns were expressed by high officials. Walt Rostow, the president's special assistant, members of the president's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the president's Scientific Advisory Committee, and several congressmen all expressed doubts about the phaseout.
In the meantime, SR-71s began arriving at Kadena, starting in early March 1968. The first SR-71 overflight of North Vietnam was made on March 21, 1968. By gradual stages, they took over the Black Shield mission, until the A-12 became the backup to the SR-71. After the final North Korean overflight on May 8, the unit was told to prepare to return home.
Eight days after the final A-12 overflight, Defense Secretary Clark Clifford reaffirmed the phaseout decision. On May 21, President Johnson agreed that the A-12s would be put into storage. The aircraft at Groom Lake would be placed in storage at Palmdale by June 7. The A-12s at Kadena would be restricted to flight safety and pilot proficiency missions; June 8 was selected as the date they would return to the United States.[198]
Virtually on the eve of the return, the A-12 program suffered its final loss. On June 4, 1968, Jack Weeks took off in Article 129 to make a check flight. An engine had been changed, and it had to be tested before the redeployment. Weeks was last heard from when the plane was 520 miles east of Manila. Then all contact was lost. No debris was found, nor was a cause ever determined. An air force press release identified the plane as an SR- 71.
A few days later, the final two A-12s returned to Groom Lake. The final A-12 flight was made on June 21, 1968, when Article 131 took off from the Ranch. Frank Murray landed it thirty-five minutes later at Palmdale. The first A-12 to make an overflight, and the last to fly, had its fuel and oil drained. It was then placed in storage. The Oxcart story had ended.[199]
On June 26, 1968, an awards ceremony was held at Groom Lake. Vice Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, deputy director of Central Intelligence, presented the CIA's Intelligence Star for courageous action to Kenneth S. Collins, Ronald J. Layton, Francis J. Murray, Dennis B. Sullivan, Mel Vojvodich, and, posthumously, to Jack C. Weeks, for their roles in the Black Shield missions. Weeks's widow accepted his award. Colonel Hugh C. Slater, commander of the Kadena detachment, and his deputy, Col. Maynard N. Amundson, received the Air Force Legion of Merit. The 1129th Special Activities Squadron and its support units received the U.S. Air Force Out-standing Unit Award. The wives of the pilots were also present and learned for the first time just what their husbands had been doing for the past several years.[200]
Although the Oxcart was gone, its descendant, the SR-71, would continue to fly intelligence missions for the next twenty-two years. It covered trouble spots such as North Vietnam, North Korea, the Mideast, Libya, kept watch on Eastern European borders, and tracked Soviet submarines. Finally, in 1990, the SR-71 was retired. Like the A-12, the reason was cost. The surviving A-12s and SR-71s were originally to be scrapped, but the air force relented, and they were sent to museums.
The A-12 was the most exotic Dark Eagle ever built. No other Black airplane has posed so great an aerodynamic and engineering challenge. The A-12 was the final expression of a trend that had been under way since World War I — aircraft trying to evade air defenses by going higher and faster. This was true of the B-17s and B-29s of World War II. As the Cold War began, B-47s, B-52s, and British V-bombers flew at 50,000 feet and near supersonic speeds. The B-58 raised this to supersonic speeds, while the U-2 could reach altitudes of 70,000-plus feet.
It was the Soviet SA-2 SAM that brought this era to a close. Bombers would now have to attack at low
