went 'Whew… I survived that one!' But on the way back, I really thought that we had lost some guys due to the heavy volume of bullets and missiles that were thrown up in the air.'[519]
At Tonopah East, the ground crews awaited the planes' return. The first wave landed at night, while the second and third came back after sunrise.
One by one, the returning planes were counted.
Every one returned.
As the tapes of the strikes were reviewed, it became clear that something remarkable had occurred. In World War II, the RAF had sent huge armadas of bombers on night raids against Germany. Despite years of bombing and the loss of thousands of aircraft and crews, the RAF was never able to knock Germany out of the war, or even win air superiority.
Now, a handful of planes had faced an air-defense network that dwarfed that of Berlin in 1943-44, struck at the heart of the enemy capital, and emerged without a scratch. Each plane's load was a fraction of that carried by a Lancaster bomber, but the results far surpassed all the years of area bombing the RAF had carried out at so heavy a price.[520]
The Iraqi air-defense system died that night; with the headquarters hit and the IOCs and SOCs damaged and out of action, the individual antiaircraft guns and SAM sites were isolated. The operators were unable to operate their tracking and fire control radar, for fear a HARM missile would destroy them. Units in the field had limited communications with each other and with higher command. Electrical power was out in Baghdad. The three F-117A waves, the Tomahawk attacks, and the decoy raid, tightly interre-lated in time and space, had left the Iraqis unable to inflict significant losses on Coalition air operations.[521]
The ultimate result of that night of thunder was this: in every war, there comes the time when it becomes clear who will win and who will lose. In the Civil War, it was the Battle of Gettysburg; in the Pacific in World War II, it was the Battle of Midway; in the Gulf War, that was the moment.
The ground fire that greeted the F-117As on the second night was described as perhaps the most intense of the Gulf War. Lieutenant Colonel Miles Pound said, 'They knew we were at war that second night and they had every gun manned. And they were more than willing to use them.' The last ten minutes before the target commanded the pilots' full attention. They could not afford to think about the lethal fireworks outside. Pound explained later, 'My own technique was to run the seat down, so I wasn't distracted by what was going on outside. The lower you get in the cockpit, the less you can see outside. I would reduce the amount of distraction to the absolute lowest level and just concentrate on my target.'[522]
The targets on the second night included the lOCs and SOCs. Again, the goal was to disrupt Iraqi air defenses. The chemical and biological weapons bunkers not hit on the first night were also targeted. Also destroyed was an Adnan-2 early warning aircraft. In all, two waves were launched. One plane from the first wave had to abort due to system problems. Still a total of nineteen bombs were dropped, with thirteen hits.[523]
On January 19, the weather front stalled over Iraq, and visibility was poor. The F-117As were able to score only six hits. The planes were unable to hit their primary targets in Baghdad, and few alternative targets were open. One of the planned targets was Hawk SAMs in Kuwait. These U.S.-built missiles had been captured during the invasion. The following night, January 20, saw improving weather, and seventeen hits were scored on lOCs and SOCs, ammunition storage sites, an ELINT ground station, bridges, telephone exchanges, and chemical warfare targets.[524]
Although January 19 had been a disappointment for the F-117 pilots, other events that day would have a major impact on their operations. Beginning on the third day, it was planned to send large 'packages' of F-16s to Baghdad during daylight. They would attack large targets such as oil refineries and headquarters. The round-the- clock missions — F-117As by night and F-16s by day — would serve notice that Iraq could not defend itself.
The first of these daylight attacks was 'Package Q' — seventy F-16s, as well as support aircraft. The strike was directed against the Daura petroleum refinery and the Baghdad nuclear research center. Bad weather, heavy ground fire, and smoke screens resulted in a failure. Almost no damage was inflicted on the reactors, and two F-16s were shot down.[525] It was clear the skies of Baghdad were too dangerous for conventional attacks. After Package Q, plans were dropped for similar raids. All attacks on Baghdad would be made by F-117As or Tomahawks.[526]
This posed a daunting task. The Baghdad nuclear research center was huge, with four reactors and large numbers of support buildings — about one hundred structures in all. Each target would require individual F-117A strikes. The Black Jets would have to destroy Saddam's war machine one aim point at a time.
Eight F-117As attacked the nuclear research center on January 21. Two reactors were destroyed, another was severely damaged, and research buildings were also hit. The Iraqis did not know the attack was under way until the bombs exploded.
The F-117A strike was quite a contrast with Package Q. The eight planes had been supported by just two KC-135 tankers. The Package Q attack on the facility had consisted of thirty-two F-16 bombers, sixteen F-15Cs as air escorts, four EF-lllAs and eight F-4Gs to suppress the defenses, and fifteen tankers. For the next week, F-117As would make additional attacks on the site.
The second wave of the night was equally successful. The fourteen planes had twenty-six hits and only two misses on a number of Baghdad targets, including a biological weapons plant that was claimed to be a 'baby milk factory,' with signs conveniently printed in English.[527]
The F-117A strikes were twofold. On the tactical level, the goal was to prevent air defenses from functioning, and chemical or biological weapons from being used against Coalition troops. The strategic goal was long- term.
Attacks on the Baghdad nuclear research center and chemical and biological weapons facilities were intended to prevent Iraq from emerging from the war with the ability to produce such weapons in the future. Bombing such targets as the Ba'th party headquarters and the secret police headquarters was intended to break Saddam's political hold on the country.[528]
As the Black Jet's first week at war ended, there was a shift in activities; airfields were targeted as the F- 117As tried to dig the Iraqi air force out of its hiding places.
SHELTER BUSTING
The Iraqi air force showed no more success in countering Coalition air strikes than ground fire. Mirage Fls, MiG 21s, MiG 25s, and MiG 29s fell to U.S. missiles during the first three days. [529] In several cases, Iraqi pilots flew into the ground during dogfights. Rather than face sure destruction, the Iraqi air force tried to ride out the attacks in their hardened aircraft shelters (HAS). These were built to withstand the blast from a nuclear explosion.
Iraq's air force represented both an immediate and future threat. It was feared that the Iraqis might launch an 'Air Tet' — a sudden, massive, and suicidal air raid, possibly using chemical weapons, meant for maximum propaganda and destructive effect. Like the Viet Cong's Tet Offensive in January 1968, the goal would be to turn the war against the Coalition, in a symbolic and psychological sense.[530] Such fears were not limited to senior military and political leaders. One U.S. Army reservist recalled having his 'head on a swivel' watching for Iraqi planes. His special concern was understandable; he drove a large,
In the long-term, the Iraqi air force represented a potential threat to the whole Mideast. Its destruction would reduce Saddam's future role as a regional troublemaker. In either case, Iraq's air force would have to be sought out and killed.[532]
The F-lllFs began the 'shelter busting' campaign on January 21. They were joined the following night by the F-117As, when fourteen Black Jets attacked the Balad Southeast Air Base. One plane was forced to divert to an alternate target, but the others scored twenty-one hits on the HASs. The success was not what it seemed, however. The GBU-lOs penetrated the outer layer of concrete but were deflected by the second layer of dirt and rock. The inner concrete shell and the planes inside were unharmed. The Iraqis concluded that the HASs worked, and more planes were hidden away.
On the eighth night of the war, intelligence was received that Air Tet was at hand. It was reported that eight
