Tu-16 bombers at Al-Taqaddum Air Base were being loaded with chemical weapons for a dawn strike. Several F- 117As were switched at the last minute to attack the base. They arrived over the field just before sunrise. The Tu- 16 bombers were fully fueled and had support vehicles grouped around them. When the GBU-lOs struck three of the Tu-16s, they exploded in huge fireballs. Three of the remaining bombers were destroyed by a conventional strike the following day.[533]
After the first disappointing HAS strike, the F-117A squadrons launched another attack on the night of January 24–25. This time the planes carried GBU-27 penetrator bombs. The night's first wave struck the Qayyarah West, Al Assad, and Kirkuk Air Bases. These targets required the F-117As be refueled by tankers flying inside Iraqi airspace — the best example possible of Coalition air supremacy. A total of twenty hits were made. The GBU-27s penetrated the HAS roofs and exploded inside. In many cases, the armored doors were blown off, and smoke and flame billowed out. It was the funeral pyre of the Iraqi air force.[534]
In the wake of the successful HAS strikes, the Iraqi air force stood down for a day. Then on January 26, Iraqi fighters began fleeing to Iran. In the days ahead, the Iraqi planes ran a gauntlet of U.S. F-15s as they sought to escape. After arriving in Iran, the planes were repainted in Iranian markings. [535]
The escape attempts put more pressure on the shelter-busting effort. The HASs had to be destroyed before all the planes 'flew the coop.' (A large Iranian air force was no more in the interest of stability than a large Iraqi air force.) To cope with the various demands, additional F-117As were flown to Tonopah East. A total of forty-two planes and nearly all the qualified pilots would see action. This enabled a total of thirty-four sorties per night to be launched, rather than twenty-eight.[536]
The airfield attacks would continue until the end of the war, but the changing situation by the start of the third week of the war had already caused a shift of F-117A activities.
On January 27, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf ordered the air force to shift all air activities except F-117As and F-111Fs to Kuwait. The ground war would soon be under way. F-111F crews began spotting tanks at night, and on February 5, the F-111Fs dropped eight GBU-12 LGBs which destroyed four Iraqi tanks and one artillery piece. The following night, a larger F-111F strike was made against Iraqi Republican Guard units. The results were spectacular, and the F-lllFs were immediately shifted out of the strategic campaign. They would concentrate on ground targets, a mission that became known as 'tank plunking.'[537]
The F-117As would now have to carry the whole weight of the strategic bombing effort. The forty-two Black Jets would cover the wide variety of targets previously assigned to the sixty-six-plane F-111F force.
The main targets for the third and fourth weeks were chemical, biological, and nuclear facilities. In contrast, the HASs accounted for only a small percent. The fourth week showed yet another shift. The number of F-117A attacks against command and control targets increased to nearly equal those directed at chemical targets. Other strikes included leadership targets and military support. The F-117As attacked fixed Scud targets, such as hide sites.[538] The Black Jets also struck SAM sites. On one occasion, sixteen Black Jets took out every SA-2 and SA-3 site from south of Baghdad to Tikrit. Later that night, twenty-four B-52s hit targets in the area without any losses. Without the F-117As to destroy the SAMs, it was probable that several of the B-52s would have been lost.[539]
Whatever the night's target, one factor that remained constant for the F-117 pilots was the ground fire. Leatherman said later, 'One thing that surprised me was that they didn't run low on ammunition.' At the end of the first week, the minimum altitude of the F-117A strikes was raised to avoid the ground fire. Although the plane could not be detected, a random hit, (called a 'Golden B.B.') was still possible. On one night, it seemed to Capt. Rich Treadway there was a 'half-price-sale' on 37mm and 57mm ammunition:
'You could tell where a bomb went off because the entire sector would be engulfed in tracers.'[540] Some of the shots came close; Colonel Whitley recalled hearing the 'pop, pop, pop' of rounds exploding nearby and feeling his plane move from the concussion.
The Iraqis tried various techniques to shoot down an F-117A. They began using 'barrage fire,' directing all the antiaircraft fire into specific parts of the sky, in hopes the Black Jets would fly into it. On one night, they held their fire, watching for the glow of the F-117A's afterburners as the planes sped away from the target area. Once it was spotted, all the guns would fire at the glowing targets. The Iraqis were very confident it would work and even alerted Jordanian reporters in advance. Colonel Whitley and Major Leatherman were over Baghdad when it was tried out. Leatherman recalled 'it was eerily quiet — even after our bombs hit.' (The F-117A does not have an afterburner, and the exhaust is shielded from the ground.) One night it seemed an F-117A had taken a hit. A postflight inspection found that RAM on part of the tail was gone. At first, it was thought to be battle damage, but the RAM actually had delaminated. Ironically, there was disappointment — the F-117A had so far escaped damage, and everyone was worried about what would happen if it was hit.[541]
As the fourth week of the Black Jet's war neared its end, the attack plan again shifted. Leadership targets became a high priority, as they had been during the first week. On the night of February 11–12, a total of thirteen strikes were made. The following night, thirty-two strikes were made. The targets included air force headquarters, the Ministry of Defense headquarters, Ba'th party headquarters, several intelligence headquarters, and radio and telephone facilities. One of the targets was the Al Firdos district bunker.
In the early morning hours of February 13, two F-117As dropped a single bomb each on the Al Firdos bunker. Both LGBs penetrated the roof and exploded inside. It was one of twenty-five bunkers that had been built as command posts, but at the start of the Gulf War, it was not in use. On February 5, trucks were observed unloading communications equipment at the bunker. Three black circles were painted on its roof, to simulate bomb hits.[542] Intelligence indicated it was being used as a communications center for one of the Iraqi intelligence agencies bombed out of its original headquarters. Within a week Al Firdos was added to the target list. What no one knew was that the upper floor of the bunker was also a civilian shelter, reserved for the families of the political elite.[543]
When the bombs exploded inside the bunker, a hundred or more women and children were killed. That morning, CNN carried grim film of the bodies being removed from what the Iraqis called 'General Shelter 25.' They claimed it was an air-raid shelter, not a command post, and t h a t it had been a deliberate attack intended to kill civilians. The Iraqis also showed Western reporters a sign (in English) identifying it as an air-raid shelter.
The United States countered the claims, noting that it had been hardened against nuclear attack, was surrounded by a chain-link fence and barbed wire, and had a camouflaged roof. Photos of the 'shelter' also showed computer cables in the wreckage. All these were inconsistent with an air-raid shelter.[544]
The dismay and controversy that followed the Al Firdos bunker bombing effectively ended the strategic air campaign against leadership targets in Baghdad. General Schwarzkopf told the air force that they could not hit any targets within Baghdad without his specific permission. For a week after Al Firdos, he was unwilling to give permission to strike any Baghdad target, for fear of civilian casualties.
With leadership targets off-limits, another approach was taken. Rather than the substance of Saddam's regime, three symbols were recommended for attack. These were Ba'th party headquarters, a sixty-feet-tall statue of Saddam, and the huge victory arches commemorating the Iran-Iraq War. The latter were moldings of Saddam's forearms, holding swords that crossed 150 feet above an avenue. Schwarzkopf approved the choices, but the targets ran into a particularly American difficulty — lawyers. The statue and the victory arches, military lawyers said, were 'cultural monuments,' which could not be bombed under international law. Although they were likened to 'Hitler's Nuremberg parade grounds' in the official history, the objection stuck and permission was withdrawn on January 25. It would not be until the eve of the war's end that targets within Baghdad were again approved.[545]
With the halt on bombing leadership targets, the F-117As were turning to other targets. Schwarzkopf directed that a seventy-two-hour bombing campaign be planned to destroy nuclear, chemical, and biological targets should a cease-fire be imminent. At the time of the Al Firdos strike, more than a dozen suspected chemical and biological bunkers remained to be hit. Priority was given to research and development sites, however, rather than storage bunkers, to prevent Iraq from having such weapons in the future.
The seventy-two-hour list was headed by the Baghdad nuclear research center. F-lI7As struck it on February
