Throughout the Gulf War, intelligence was a problem. Both army General Schwarzkopf and air force Gen. Charles Horner expressed dissatisfaction about the quality of intelligence reports they were given. Schwarzkopf said later that the reports were outdated, as well as 'caveated, disagreed with, footnoted, and watered down.'
There were major disagreements over the bomb damage assessments (BDA) of Iraqi forces. The BDA controversy was the result of the differing data and 'platforms' being used, as well as the mindsets of the analysts.
The air force intelligence officers in the field were using the videotapes from the strike missions. Back in Washington, the CIA and DIA were using satellite photos. Based on this, the CIA-DIA consistently reported Iraqi forces had greater strength and Coalition air strikes had lesser effectiveness than the air force estimated.[610]
An example of this was the tank-plinking effort. When an Iraqi T72 tank was hit, the ammunition and fuel would ignite. A jet of flame would erupt from the hatch, and the tank's interior and crew would be incinerated. All this was clearly visible on the strike video. But once the fire burned out, the tank would have little visible external damage — perhaps only a small entry hole. When a satellite photographed the area hours or days later, the tank would be listed as intact. In one case, a tank was declared operational, until it was pointed out that the turret had been blown a foot out of position.
Schwarzkopf complained that the guidelines for assessing damage were so stringent that a tank had to be on its back 'like a dead cockroach' before it would be counted as destroyed. In other cases, the T72 would undergo such a violent secondary explosion that it would be blown apart. Then it would be claimed that the revetment had been empty when it was bombed.
The result was widely differing figures. As the ground war was about to begin in late February 1991, the air force estimated that 40 percent of the Iraqi tanks and artillery had been destroyed. The CIA-DIA estimate was between 20 to 30 percent. Some estimates were as low as 15 percent. Not surprisingly, the air force was accused of inflating its damage estimates. In fact, 60 percent of the Iraqi tanks and artillery had been destroyed during the bombing campaign.
In the final assessment, the strike videos, which recorded events as they happened, proved more accurate than 'National Technical Means' such as satellites.[611] Clearly, tactical intelligence required continuous real-time data, which the strategic systems could not provide.
This was reinforced by the experience of UAVs in the Gulf War. Three different systems were used by U.S. forces — the Pointer, Pioneer, and Exdrone UAVs. The Pointer, built by AeroVironment and used by the marines, was simplicity itself. It was a radio-controlled model airplane, similar to the ones built by hobbyists. It was hand- launched and powered by an electric motor. The battery provided about an hour of operation. The Pointer carried a television camera that transmitted its photos back to the operator.
The Pointer was used for real-time BDA, artillery adjustment, and reconnaissance-early warning.
The Pioneer was based on an Israeli design. It was powered by a piston engine and had a twin-boom, high- wing design. The Pioneer had a flight time of five hours and a range of 100 nautical miles. In the Gulf, one Pioneer unit was aboard each of the battleships
The Pioneers undertook a range of missions. The army would fly them along the routes to be taken by Apache helicopters; the pilots would watch the live video, then climb into their helicopters and take off. The navy used them to spot targets for the 16-inch battleship guns, then correct their fire.
During one such mission, forty Iraqi soldiers were seen coming out of a bunker and waving white cloths at a Pioneer in an attempt to surrender to it.
This was the first time that humans had surrendered to a machine.
About fifty-five to sixty Exdrone UAVs were also used by the marines in the Gulf. These were television- equipped expendable drones. The marines used them to observe minefields and barriers in southern Kuwait City. When their video showed that the Iraqis had abandoned their positions, the marines moved forward a full day and a half earlier than originally planned.[612]
In each of these cases, the UAVs were able to provide real-time intelligence directly to the units that needed it. Following the Gulf War, interest within the air force grew in the development of long-range UAV systems that could keep watch on a specific area day and night. This could do much to clear up the shortcomings in reconnaissance that the war had made apparent. In the years following the Gulf War, a new trouble spot appeared that would lead to operation of such a UAV. A descendant of the Amber, it was called the GNAT-750.
Work on the GNAT-750 project had actually begun at Leading Systems in 1988. It was designed for export to friendly countries. The GNAT-750 eliminated several features that were not needed by non-U.S. users and had a simplified structure and lower cost than the Amber.[613]
The fuselage was 16.4 feet long and had sloping sides for a low RCS.
The GNAT-750's long and narrow straight wings spanned 35.3 feet. Like Amber, the GNAT-750 had an inverted V-shaped tail, the same sixty-five-horsepower engine, and took off and landed on a spindly tricycle landing gear. Mounted under the nose was a 'skyball'; a movable turret that could carry a stabilized forward-looking infrared system, a daylight television camera, and a low-light-level television camera. In all, 132 pounds of payload could be carried in the nose and 330 pounds under the wing. The GNAT-750 could fly for forty-eight hours continuously, giving it a maximum radius of 1,512 nautical miles. It could also fly out to a target area 1,080 nautical miles away, then remain on station for twelve hours before having to return. [614]
Compared to the Amber, the GNAT-750 was larger, lighter, had a heavier payload, and a ten-hour greater endurance. Despite this, when one sees the GNAT-750, the first impression is of a model airplane. (Admittedly, a
The prototype GNAT-750 made its first flight in the summer of 1989, which began a series of successful test flights. The first eight GNAT-750s were scheduled to start production in December 1989.[615] Despite this success, the confusion and technical problems with the UAV program continued.
The JPO seemed unable to bring order to the situation. Leading Systems was also on the verge of bankruptcy. In 1990, its assets were bought out by General Atomics; this included the Amber and GNAT-750 projects.
General Atomics continued development of the GNAT-750. In 1992, a prototype made a continuous flight of over forty hours at El Mirage, reaching altitudes of over 25,000 feet. General Atomics then won a contract from the Turkish government to supply it with GNAT-750s; deliveries began by the end of 1993.[616]
In the summer of 1993, world events again spurred interest in UAVs. The Joint Chiefs of Staff requested immediate development of a UAV for use over Bosnia and Serbia. Following the end of Communist rule in Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia had disintegrated into a barbaric civil war between Serbs and Moslems. It was marked by ethnic cleansing — wanton killing, torture, and starvation. The UAV was to keep track of the warring factions' troop movements, artillery emplacements, and antiaircraft weapons, in support of UN peacekeeping forces.
Pentagon acquisition chief John Deutch endorsed the recommendation and called for the development of a UAV that could fly 500 nautical miles, then remain on station for twenty-four hours or more; carry a 400- to 500- pound payload; fly at 15,000 to 25,000 feet; and be equipped with a combination electro-optical, infrared and/or radar system.[617]
It was decided to use the GNAT-750. It would be rapidly modified for the mission, then equipped with an off- the-shelf sensor package. The GNAT-750 was available for export; if one was lost, no sensitive technology would be compromised.[618] And it was designed, as the sales brochure put it, with 'sensitive' and 'high-risk missions' in mind.[619] The images would be transmitted to local UN commanders via a relay aircraft. Two GNAT-750s would be built for the program. The effort