landing, then swept back for high-speed flight. The aircraft was larger and heavier than earlier MiGs. It was also faster, had a longer range (some three times the MiG 17's range and half again that of the MiG 21), and a heavier weapons load (four air-to-air missiles versus two for the MiG 21). The MiG 23 could function both as a fighter and a bomber.[684]
Unlike earlier Soviet fighters, the MiG 23 had a high-wing loading and thus poor maneuverability. In fact, the F-4 was more maneuverable than the MiG 23. The U.S. fighter closest in performance was the F-104. (Both planes went like a bullet and turned like one.) Like the F-104, the MiG 23 was a demanding aircraft; it had a high accident rate in Soviet and Warsaw Pact service. On the plus side, the MiG 23 had a radar comparable to that in the F-4E. (Radars had been a weak spot in earlier MiGs.)[685]
According to some reports, the U.S. MiGs also received special designations. There was the practical problem of what to call the aircraft. This was solved by giving them numbers in the century series. The MiG 21s were called the 'YF-110' (the original designation for the air force F-4C), while the MiG 23s were called the 'YF-113.'[686]
With the MiG 23s, operations expanded. Up to 1978, North Base at Edwards Air Force Base was largely inactive. The hangars were used for storage by NASA. Soon after, new security arrangements were put into place. It now appears they were in support of the MiG operations. It also appears that the MiG squadron was reorganized. The 4477th TES was replaced by the 413th Test Squadron (Special Operations) at some point in the late 1970s- early 1980s. The unit patch showed a Russian bear wearing a red hat, six red stars, and the slogans 'Red Hats' and 'More With Less.'[687]
The would-be U.S. MiG 23 pilot underwent a three-phase training program. Phase I involved both ground training and six flights. Ground training covered review of the flight manual (general aircraft information, engine fuel system, electrical system, auxiliary equipment, operating limitations, flight characteristics, stall-spin characteristics, system operations, normal and emergency procedures, and performance data). The pilot then underwent ejection seat training, three hours of cockpit training, and briefings on the local area traffic patterns, restricted areas, and navigation aids. The U.S. MiG 23 pilot would then undergo written proficiency and emergency exams and an oral emergency exam.
In preparation for flying the MiG 23, the pilot would make a supervised engine start and then a high-speed taxi. The six flights were broken down into familiarization (TR-1, 2, and 3), MiG systems (TR-4, and 5), and a qualification check (TR-6).
Phase II was mission qualification training. The pilot would have to demonstrate his knowledge of flight test techniques and effective aircraft-systems handling. This demonstration could be made during or after the TR-6 flight.
Phase III was continuation training, in which the pilot was required to demonstrate mission qualification events, approach, and a normal landing.
This phase underlined the low flight rates of the U.S.-operated MiGs. Only one flight every forty-five days was required. Clearly, the MiG program was more akin to the flight rates of the X-planes, rather than the day-in, day-out operations of a regular fighter unit. If a pilot did not make the minimum of one flight in forty-five days, he would have to be recertified. Depending on the time elapsed, this would vary from reviewing the exams and procedures, then making a flight, up to undergoing nearly the complete training cycle, A U.S. MiG 23 pilot could also be upgraded to instructor following a single flight to demonstrate mission qualifications, instructional capability, and situational awareness. All the pilots had to complete open- and closed-book exams and make an annual qualification check flight.[688]
Coinciding with the arrival of the Egyptian MiGs, there were several leaks about both the MiGs and Groom Lake. In September 1978, a man named John Lear took a panoramic photograph of the Groom Lake facility from public land at the north end of the lake bed. When enlarged, it showed a MiG 21 on the parking apron. It appears to be one of the later model MiG 21s, with a broader tail and larger dorsal hump than the MiG 21F. (The photo was not published until 1991.)[689]
The following year came the notorious
At the same time, the U.S. MiG squadron grew considerably. According to one account, there were about twenty MiG 21s and four MiG 23s in service by the mid-1980s. They operated not only from Groom Lake and North Base at Edwards, but also from the Tonopah Test Range,[692] during this same time as the first F-117As were becoming operational at TTR. Over all, U.S.
Black airplane activities in the early 1980s rivaled those of the 1960s. Not only the MiGs, but also the F-117A, HALSOL, and possibly another Black airplane were undergoing flight tests. The MiGs operated by the United States during this time were 'new' aircraft. The original group of MiGs had been retired. The two MiG 17s and 007 had been returned to Israel in the mid-1970s. One of the MiG 17s and 007 were placed on display at the Israeli Air Force Museum. The other U.S.-operated MiG 21s were apparently retired, stored, stripped of useful parts, or scrapped. One of the MiG 21s was later used by the navy as an RCS test article.[693]
Despite the leaks, only minimal attention had been drawn to U.S. MiG operations. Then, in the spring of 1984, a crash would make it front-page news.
At 10:18 A.M. on April 26, 1984, a plane crashed on the Nellis Air Force Base range. Witnesses at a cafe in nearby Lathrop Wells reported hearing an explosion and seeing smoke in the area of Little Skull Mountain.[694] A few hours later, the Air Force Systems Command at Andrews Air Force Base outside Washington, D.C., issued a brief statement: 'Lt. Gen. Robert M. Bond, vice commander, Air Force Systems Command, was killed today in an accident while flying in an Air Force specially modified test aircraft.'[695]
General Bond was a thirty-three-year veteran of the air force, had flown in both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, and had more than five thousand hours of flight time. He was alone in the aircraft when it crashed.
Three-star generals do not generally fly test missions, so Bond's death attracted press interest. The fact that the air force also refused to identify the type of plane also raised questions. Early reports claimed he had been flying 'a super-secret Stealth fighter prototype.'
Within a week, stories were published that it actually was a MiG 23. It was said that the MiG 23 was used to test the Stealth fighter in simulated combat and that Bond might have been involved in such tests at the time of the crash.[696] Still later, it would be claimed that the crash was caused by a loss of control at high speed.[697]
The flight was the second of two orientation flights for General Bond.
The mission was planned to include a high-speed run, followed by a systems-radar familiarization. Bond's aircraft was accompanied by a T-38 trainer as chase plane. Engine start, taxi, and takeoff were normal. The two planes climbed to 40,000 feet while ground control reported they had about fifteen minutes of airspace time. Ground control gave them the distance to the turn point. Reaching it, they turned right. The T-38 pilot told Bond to check his fuel and calibration. They had descended slightly to about 37,000 feet, and Bond climbed back to 40,000 feet.
Bond increased the throttle and began the speed run. Bond then reported to ground control that he had reached the planned speed without problems.
The much slower T-38 was now some distance behind. Ground control radioed Bond that he was four miles from the next turn. At 10:17:50 A.M. Bond asked, 'How far to the turn?' Ground control responded at 10:17:53 A.M. with 'Turn now, right 020.' Bond responded with two clicks of the radio.
At 10:18:02 A.M. Bond radioed, 'I'm out of control. I'm out o f…'
Ground control informed the T-38 pilot that Bond was twenty-two miles away. At 10:18:23 A.M. Bond radioed, 'I've got to get out, I'm out of control.' Ground control warned the T-38 pilot that Bond's plane was nearly at the edge of the airspace. Soon after, radar contact was lost.
