station. He subsequently became a senior air force officer.[674]
From these fragments, it is possible to reconstruct the events of May 10, 1972. The MiG 17 pilot Cunningham and Driscoll shot down was, in fact, Col. Nguyen Van Coc. Despite Cunningham's doubts, several factors point in this direction. The rank, timing of his death, type of aircraft he flew, and skill level all match. More important, Colonel Coc was the North Vietnamese air force's highest scoring ace with nine kills. This would match the claim that Toon was also the top ace.[675]
The story of a North Vietnamese pilot with thirteen kills was apparently based on the photo of a MiG 21 with thirteen stars painted on its nose. The thirteen kill markings were the total for the
It is possible that Tuan was aloft during May 10, 1972, and, with the confusion of the large numbers of North Vietnamese MiGs in the air, was mistaken for the pilot Cunningham shot down. Radio intercepts are often difficult to interpret. One need only recall the decades of confusion from the intercepts made during the shooting down of Powers's U-2.
In the end, all that matters is that the two best pilots met in the sky that day. They flew their aircraft to their limits, and Cunningham won — thanks to a Black program.
With the end of the Vietnam War, U.S. MiG operations seem to have undergone some changes. The navy's Have Drill program was ended; the air force now had sole control of the MiGs. [677] Top Gun and Red Flag had their own 'Aggressor units,' which used Soviet-style tactics. Top Gun used A-4s to simulate MiG 17s, while F-5s stood in for MiG 21s. They did not need the special security of the MiGs, and the flight characteristics of the aircraft were close enough for training.
The MiGs still had a role, however. During the early 1970s, the prototypes of the F-14, F-15, and F-16 fighters made their first flights. This new generation of U.S. fighters was designed with the lessons of Vietnam in mind. They were much more agile than the F-4; they also packed a 20mm cannon — something the original F-4 lacked. The MiGs might have been used in tests of these new fighters. This would allow development of tactics for the new fighters, much as the Have Drill tests were used to develop F-4 tactics. The orientation flights for senior officers also continued.
It appeared that the U.S. MiG operation grew to squadron size. During the Vietnam War period, it appears that there were two MiG 17s and two MiG 21s (the two captured Syrian MiG 17s, the original MiG 21, and 007).
At some point, according to reports, four of the captured Algerian MiG 21s were also sent by Israel to the United States.[678] If true, this would raise the total to eight MiGs (two MiG 17s and six MiG 21s). The MiG operations were based at the former A-12 test hangars at the north end of the Groom Lake complex.
With a squadron-sized force, there was also need for a formal unit to operate them. This was the 4477th Test and Evaluation Squadron, also known as the 'Red Eagles.' Its unit patch featured a red-eagle design with a white or black star.[679] The MiGs had less flamboyant markings — the MiG 21s were in bare metal with only the U.S. star and bar insignia on the nose. [680]
Part of the attraction of working on a Black airplane project is the challenge. The U-2 and A-12 pushed the limits of aviation technology. The MiGs, in contrast, were ordinary operational fighters. Still, they posed a challenge — the challenge of keeping them flying. The simple and cheap design of the MiGs helped in this regard. It was reported that the MiG 17s were flown 255 times without a 'down.'[681]
Still, high-performance jet aircraft require regular maintenance. This means a supply of spare parts. Soviet jet engines were known for having a short operating lifetime. Tires were also a problem — they were good for only a few landings before replacement. It was reported that one of the reasons U.S. MiG operations were kept so secret was the problem of clandestine parts support (especially engines). The work done on the MiGs was described as 'first rate.'
The quality of the U.S. MiG pilots was also high. During the spring of 1977, a MiG 21 reportedly suffered a landing gear problem. The air force pilot was able to keep the skid under control and fairly straight. This limited major damage to the landing gear and the engine. The MiG was restored to operational status within a few days. Such high-quality flying and maintenance were critical. The MiGs were irreplaceable assets.
As during the Have Drill period, control of the MiGs was a source of conflict. During 1977, the air force and CIA fought over the planes. It was reported that the air force was barely able to retain custody of the planes and responsibility for their operation. It may have been that the value of the MiGs for training and evaluation outweighed any use the CIA may have had for the planes. It is worth noting that the Have Blue project was nearing its first flight. The Have Blue was tested against Soviet radar; it would be probable that the MiGs would also be used.
In 1977 there was a second leak about the existence of the U.S.-operated MiGs. The September 1977 issue
The magazine said it had been about to publish the MiG article several months before but had held off because of an 'informal' request by a 'senior
The article noted that estimates varied on the total number of MiGs the United States had. One source said it was about twenty, while another said it was about half that, 'say eight, ten, or maybe twelve.' Still another source, who said he had checked with 'someone who knows,' said that twenty 'is high by a factor of four or five' (i.e., there were only four or five MiGs). In retrospect, the lower end of the range was more accurate.
The article also estimated that about one hundred U.S. pilots had flown the MiGs, while three or four hundred pilots were given the opportunity to fly against them. The article noted that this included pilots from the navy and Marine Corps. Again, these numbers seem high. Assuming four to eight MiGs operational at a given time, six to ten pilots would be involved (one and a half pilots to one plane). The Have Drill flights were limited to Top Gun instructors, a few selected fleet pilots, and senior officers like Gen. Marion Carl. A more probable guess would be around seventy-five pilots involved with the MiG operations in one way or another by 1977.
On a more whimsical note, the article asked, 'Does USAF's secret air force explain a lot of verified, but unexplained UFO (Unidentified Flying Object) sightings?'[682]
As the 1970s neared their tumultuous end, U.S. MiG operations were undergoing another change. In the late 1960s, the MiG 17 and MiG 21F were still frontline aircraft. A decade later, they had been superseded by later- model MiG 21s and new aircraft, such as the MiG 23. Fortunately, a new source of supply was available — Egypt.
In the mid-1970s, relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union had become strained, and Soviet advisers were ordered out. The Soviets had provided the Egyptian air force with MiGs since the mid-1950s. Now, with their traditional source out of the picture, the Egyptians began looking west.
They turned to U.S. companies for parts to support their late-model MiG 21s and MiG 23s. Very soon, a deal was made.
According to one account, two MiG 23 fighter bombers were given to the United States by Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. The planes were disassembled and shipped from Egypt to Edwards Air Force Base. They were then transferred to Groom Lake for reassembly and study.[683]
The MiG 23 Flogger had a very different design philosophy than previous Soviet jet fighters. The MiG 17 and MiG 21 were small, short-range, tight-turning, point-defense fighters. The MiG 23 was more akin to multi-role Western fighters. For one thing, it used variable sweep wings. They could be pivoted forward for takeoff and
