recalled his heart racing as the MiGs drew closer on radar. Finally, at about three and a half miles, they were spotted visually.
The first step was for the MiGs to pull alongside the F-4s so the instructors could get a good look at them. The MiGs were not much to look at; there were bumps and rivets that would never have been on an American plane.
The F-4 would then follow along behind as the MiG 17's good low-speed and poor high-speed maneuverability was demonstrated. The tendency of the MiG 21 to lose speed in turns was also shown. The flights were very helpful in a number of areas. Ironically, although the instructors were combat veterans, few had ever seen a MiG. A close- up view of the MiGs lessened the surprise. The radar intercept officers (RIOs — the rear seat crewmen who operated the F-4's radar) also got the chance to study the MiG's radar return. Finally, the instructors were able to actually try out the techniques they had been developing with the 'real thing.'
By 1970, the Have Drill program was expanded; a few selected fleet F-4 crews were given the chance to fight the MiGs. Eventually, for the vast majority who could not go to Top Gun or participate in Have Drill, a thirty-minute film called
The Have Drill dogfights were by invitation only. The other pilots based at Nellis Air Force Base were not to know about the U.S.-operated MiGs.
To prevent any sightings, the airspace above the Groom Lake range was closed. On aeronautical maps, the exercise area was marked in red ink. The forbidden zone became known as 'Red Square.'[658]
Although much of the MiG operations were connected with such training, tests were also being conducted. Several MiG 17 flights were made to test fire the plane's twin 23mm and single 37mm cannons. (When the two MiG 17s landed in Israel, their cannons were fully loaded.) A special dogfight test was conducted with navy and air force F-4 crews. The navy RIOs were specially trained for their task; in contrast, the air force used pilots for the position. The tests showed that the navy's pilot-RIO team worked better than using two pilots. The navy crews were able to detect the target at longer ranges and go over to the offense faster. The air force crews scored fewer simulated kills. Soon after, the air force started specialized training.[659]
The MiGs were also used for familiarization flights by high-ranking naval officers. At the 1969 Tailhook Convention in Las Vegas, Foster convinced several admirals to go with him to Groom Lake to fly the MiGs.
Once special permission had been granted, Foster loaded them into a transport and flew them out to Groom Lake. The admirals were carefully briefed, then strapped into the MiGs. The Have Drill personnel were worried about the high-ranking pilots flying the irreplaceable MiGs. At one point, Teague, who was flying chase, thought that an admiral was flying a MiG 17 too hard. He radioed, 'Goddamnit, Admiral, put it on the ground.'[660]
Another senior officer to fly the MiG 17 was Marine Corps Gen. Marion Carl. He had become the first marine ace over Guadalcanal in the dark early days of World War II. On August 25, 1947, he set a world speed record of 650.6 mph (Mach 0.82) in the Douglas D-558-I Skystreak. On August 21, 1953, he set a world altitude record of 83,235 feet in the Douglas D-552-II Skyrocket. He had also served as commander of the first marine jet fighter squadron and flew secret reconnaissance missions over Communist China.
He was a living link between the days of propeller fighters and the missile-armed, supersonic fighters of the 1960s.
General Carl was flown to 'a secret desert site' in a T-33 trainer. He flew two missions in the MiG 17, totaling 1.7 hours of flight time. (He was not allowed to log the time, of course.) The first was a simulated dogfight with several F-8s, while the second was with A-4s. Carl was very impressed with the MiG 17's maneuverability. It could be stalled flying straight up and allowed to fall off but would be under full control within 1,500 to 2,000 feet.
The only drawback he noted was the cockpit size — pilots over six feet tall were cramped.
While at Groom Lake, General Carl ran into one of the security precau-tions surrounding the MiGs. About midday, the ground crews began pulling the MiGs into the hangars. Carl asked about this and was told a Soviet reconnaissance satellite would soon pass overhead. It was a clear day, so the MiGs were being hidden to prevent any photos being taken of them by the satellite.[661]
In spite of the valuable lessons learned from the MiG program and from Top Gun, the future of both programs was by no means assured. High-level support was needed. Air-combat training was dangerous, and several aircraft had been lost in accidents. In one simulated dogfight with a MiG 17, a brand-new F-4 was lost when it went into a flat spin. The crew ejected at the last moment. The Vietnam War was also winding down — there had been only one MiG 21 shot down since the bombing halt in 1968.
Top Gun and Have Drill had produced a small group of navy pilots skilled in the art of air combat, but they had yet to prove the value of their training. Just after midnight on March 30, 1972, the North Vietnamese Army launched the Easter Offensive. On May 8, President Richard Nixon ordered the mining of North Vietnam's ports and the start of the Linebacker I bombing campaign.
Two days later would come the greatest dogfight in the history of jet aviation.
On May 10, 1972, the F-4J crew of Lt. Randall H. 'Duke' Cunningham and Lt. (jg) William R. 'Willie' Driscoll was assigned to an air strike on the railyards at Hai Duong, located halfway between Hanoi and Haiphong.
Cunningham and Driscoll had already shot down two MiGs — a MiG 21 on January 19 and a MiG 17 on May 8. As the strike force neared the target, twenty-two MiG 17s, MiG 19s, and MiG 21s rose to challenge the navy planes.[662]
Cunningham and his wingman, Lt. Brad Grant, dropped their cluster bombs on a storage building. As Cunningham looked to his right at the building, two MiG 17s were coming in from the left. Grant saw them and radioed a warning, 'Duke, you have MiG 17s at your seven o'clock, shooting.' Driscoll also saw the MiGs as two black dots approaching fast and yelled, 'Break port.' Cunningham could see the muzzle flash from the lead MiG. The MiG 17s were moving fast, so he knew the controls would be hard to move. He turned toward the lead MiG, and it overshot the F-4.
Cunningham recalled later, 'The MiG driver just didn't have the muscle to move that stick.' While Grant chased off the second MiG 17, Cunningham reversed and fired a Sidewinder. The MiG 17 was within the missile's minimum range at launch, but due to the MiG's high speed, the distance had opened to 2,500 feet when the Sidewinder hit. The MiG 17 was blown apart. The whole engagement lasted only fifteen seconds.[663]
Cunningham evaded a MiG that attempted to follow him by using his afterburner to accelerate to 600 knots. Cunningham and his wingman then climbed to 15,000 feet. Below them were eight MiG 17s in a defensive circle with three F-4s mixed in. Cunningham later wrote, 'The scene below was straight out of
As they did, one of the F-4s broke from the circle and nearly collided with Cunningham's plane. It was flown by Comdr. Dwight Timm, the second in command of VF-96. Following behind his plane were a MiG 17 about 2,000 feet away; a MiG 21, 3,000 feet behind; and, unseen by Timm or his RIO, Jim Fox, a MiG 17 in his blind spot below and to the outside of the plane.
As Cunningham closed on the three MiGs, Driscoll warned him, 'Duke, we have four MiG 17s at our seven o'clock.' They had broken out of the circle and were pursuing his F-4. For the moment, they were out of range, but Timm's arcing turn was allowing them to close the distance. Then Driscoll gave another warning, 'Duke, look at two o'clock high.' Cunningham looked up and saw two bright flashes — two MiG 19s beginning a diving firing pass on the F-4. Cunningham reversed and the two MiG 19s flew past.
Cunningham was in a lag pursuit with the MiG 17 on Timm's wing, but one of the MiG 17s was now within firing range of Cunningham's F-4. Flying at 550 knots, he could outrun the MiG, but he had to turn to stay behind Timm. This allowed the MiG 17 chasing Cunningham to close the range with his plane. Cunningham told Driscoll to watch the MiG 17 following them. When it opened fire, Cunningham straightened out to open the range.
He then turned back toward Timm's F-4 and yelled for him to break right.
