Foxbat

routines, but nothing Fort Meade has deciphered so far indicates that this is more than just an exercise.

‘Despite that, we’re very concerned on two counts. First, most North Korean military exercises we’ve been made aware of in the past have been paper or tabletop routines. But this time the satellite imagery shows deployments of major forces along a very broad front, all ultimately heading towards the Demilitarized Zone. These movements include large numbers of troops as well as armoured divisions. We’ve also detected increased activity at various airfields in the south of the country and at missile launch sites. That might be explained as part of the exercise, but only if we accept a fundamental change in the way the North Koreans normally do things. We could easily discuss the implications of these movements all day without reaching a consensus.

‘The second factor is more compelling. Why have the North Koreans secretly acquired at least ten MiG-25s? We’re concerned that they’ve obtained these Foxbats to counter the more advanced aircraft employed in the South Korean Air Force.’

‘That won’t wash, Mr Hicks,’ the general interrupted again. ‘The Foxbat is an obsolete design. Yes it’s fast, but it’s not agile. The MiG-25 is old technology and there’s no way it could survive in air combat against modern warbirds like the F-15 or F-16.’

‘That’s your field of expertise, General, not mine,’ Hicks replied equably, ‘and I don’t entirely disagree with you. But there is another possibility that’s more worrying. The British SIS has obtained information from the Russians that the Foxbat was specifically designed to intercept ICBMs in the terminal stages of flight. So maybe the North Koreans want them as a last-ditch defence against a missile attack.’

This statement was followed by a long silence. The possibility that the MiG-25 was anything more than just an old, fast interceptor had clearly not occurred to the assembled officers.

‘A missile attack from where?’

‘From us. From a Minuteman in a silo in Montana, or from one of our boomers. As I understand it, our nearest surface group is at least two or three days’ sailing time away from the peninsula, so if North Korean forces do head south, across the Demilitarized Zone, the only viable counter to such an invasion might be the missiles in our silos or submarines.’

‘The President would never authorize a first strike against North Korea, Mr Hicks,’ another general pointed out, ‘and there would be no need for us to take the nuclear option. We’ve got bombers at Andersen Air Base on Guam as a deterrent against exactly this kind of incursion. They’re B1-Bs, B-2s and B-52s, and they’re more than capable of flattening any advance the North Koreans could achieve. And whether it took us a few days or even a few weeks, we could easily land enough forces on the peninsula to push them back using conventional weapons and tactics.’

‘I know,’ Hicks nodded. ‘What concerns the Agency is the other side of the coin, if you like. We may not resort to the use of nuclear weapons, but the fact that the North Koreans have obtained these aircraft suggests to us that they might be intending to do so. We believe they could be planning a blitzkrieg assault across the DMZ, and then would attempt to stop any counter- attack by threatening to target their nuclear arsenal on any assets we might send in support. As a viable threat, that would stalemate the situation. And knowing the regime in Pyongyang, we shouldn’t doubt they would carry out this threat if they had to. If this operation goes the way we think it might, we could easily lose South Korea totally.’

The Gold Room, the Pentagon, Washington, DC

Despite its official name, the Emergency Conference Room had not been designed for conferences, only briefings, so as soon as Walter Hicks had finished delivering the Agency’s assessment of the current situation, the Joint Chiefs left the ECR and moved along the corridor into the ‘Gold Room’ conference suite, also on the third floor of the Pentagon.

Thirty minutes after Hicks had departed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided that the situation in North Korea was sufficiently serious to merit an upgrade in the alert status of US forces worldwide, and the most senior general present recommended this precaution to the President in a lengthy telephone conference call that included the Secretary of Defense.

Fifteen minutes after that, the American alert state was upgraded to DEFCON Four, and alerting signals were dispatched to all units and formations, worldwide. At the same time, most specific orders were flashed to the USS Enterprise in the North Pacific Ocean, but for the eyes of the captain only.

The President then instructed the Secretary of Defense and his National Security Adviser to contact Pyongyang to obtain clarification of North Korea’s intentions, and to request an emergency session of the United Nations Security Council to discuss the ongoing situation. That, the President said, would probably turn out to be just another goddamned waste of everyone’s time, but after the Iraq fiasco he thought they should at the very least go through the motions.

Base Communication Center, RAF Mildenhall, Suffolk

In a scene repeated in communications centres around the world, the warning bell, to indicate receipt of a signal classified ‘Secret’ or above, sounded as the teleprinter began clattering. The Duty Communications Officer walked briskly over and scanned the lines of text as they were printed out.

FLASH OVERRIDE

FROM: JCS WASHINGTON DC/ /J3 NMCC/ /

TO: AIG 931

SECRET (S)

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAS DECLARED STEP UP IN DEFENSE READINESS CONDITIONS (DEFCON) FROM DEFCON 5 FOR US FORCES WORLDWIDE TO DEFCON 4. COMMANDERS WILL TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTIONS TO ASSURE INCREASED READINESS.

‘Oh, fuck,’ he muttered, tore the signal out of the machine, rapidly entered the Date-Time Group and the originator in the log, then left the Center at a run.

The Gold Room, the Pentagon, Washington, DC

Two hours later, highly detailed orders, classified Top Secret and prepared on the specific instructions of the President, were sent with Military Flash precedence from the Pentagon to the United States Strategic Command (USStratCom) Center at Offutt Air Force Base in Omaha, Nebraska.

Office of Commander-In-Chief Fleet (CINCFLEET), Northwood, Middlesex

The briefing had been arranged with under thirty minutes’ notice for all participants, and was classified Top Secret. The lowest-ranking officer inside the locked room was a Royal Navy commander, and he was there only to change the hastily prepared vu-graphs and slides, and point at things on the screen.

A four-ring captain stood beside the podium. He’d already run through the substance of the raft of signals they’d received from both the Americans and the Chief of the Defence Staff in London, and he’d just finished the operational appreciation and tactical situation.

‘In your opinion, how much of this is pure speculation on the Americans’ part?’ CINCFLEET demanded.

‘Frankly, sir, I think most of it. All they know for sure is that there are troop movements taking place north of the Korean Demilitarized Zone that could be interpreted as the prelude to an invasion, though they’re also consistent with the pre-planned exercise designated “Silver Spring”. They also know that the North Koreans have obtained a minimum of ten MiG-25 interceptors. But in the overall scheme of things, I don’t believe a dozen Foxbats will make any significant difference, bearing in mind that our intelligence suggests that the North Koreans can already field over eight hundred combat aircraft.’

‘What’s your analysis of the Americans’ suggestion that those MiG-25s are intended to intercept incoming ballistic missiles?’

‘I believe it’s fanciful at best, sir. I understand the Russians have confirmed it was specially designed for that tasking, but I personally doubt if any aircraft would be capable of achieving this. The speeds involved would be just too great, and the intercept calculations too complex. I also don’t myself believe that the North Koreans are