planning to invade the South, so I think the Americans are reading far more into this situation than the evidence warrants.’
‘Noted,’ the admiral said. ‘Very well, we’ve been instructed to assist, so what assets do we have in that area?’
The captain stepped across to the large-scale drop-down chart he’d been using to show North Korean troop movements, and indicated an area towards the south of the peninsula. ‘About here, sir, off the southern tip of Japan, is the
‘Support?’
‘They have four Royal Fleet Auxiliaries in company – the tankers
‘What assets have the Americans got, apart from their troops in South Korea?’
The captain pulled down a larger-scale map and pointed to a spot in the northern Pacific Ocean. ‘The USS
The admiral made the only decision possible, his instructions from Downing Street and the CDS having been most specific. ‘Very well,’ he said. ‘Signal
‘
‘
‘The Air Group is to prepare for both offensive and defensive operations, including Combat Air Patrol and ground attack, and all ships are to ensure that they carry sufficient warshots to conduct autonomous real-world operations for a minimum period of three days, pending the arrival of the auxiliaries. Detailed tasking instructions will follow. Any questions?’
The captain shook his head. ‘No, sir.’
‘Finally,’ CINCFLEET added, addressing the assembled officers, ‘I’ve received further instructions regarding our independent nuclear deterrent. Downing Street has instructed the CDS to retask our patrolling submarine until this crisis is resolved. I will be issuing separate orders to HMS
Paul Richter closed his laptop, disconnected the power cable and tucked everything away in the leather carrying case. His small suitcase was already packed and sitting beside the door of his hotel room. Three minutes later he walked out of the building and climbed into the taxi he’d ordered. He had nearly three hours before his flight to Seoul was due to leave Moscow, which even by Russian standards should be time enough.
Commander-In-Chief Fleet exercises operational control of Britain’s Trident boats, which provide the independent nuclear deterrent. Unlike surface ships, which can both send and receive detailed messages via satellite wherever they are in the world, communicating with submarines is difficult. The deeper the boat submerges, the more difficult communications become. The standard operating procedure is for submarines to deploy a short aerial designed to receive Extremely Low Frequency signals. ELF is very slow, so it’s only possible to send a very small number of characters in a given time period – normally between two and four characters a minute. Passing a complete operational message by this means would clearly be impossible, so ELF is only used to transmit a coded warning to a submarine.
This type of message is a repeated sequence of a few characters. The acronym, when decoded, will advise the submarine that an operational message is going to be transmitted, the time it will be sent and the transmission method. At the specified time, the submarine will reduce its depth and either trail a long aerial reaching up to just below the surface, or else extend a vertical aerial above the water from the sail. The former is slow but relatively secure, while the above-surface aerial allows reception of high-speed transmissions but naturally carries a greater risk of detection.
Just over an hour after the briefing finished at Northwood, a Group Warning Signal was transmitted to HMS
Chapter Thirteen
Saturday
In some ways, the programmed troop movements were overkill, but Pak Je-San knew that they’d only have this one chance and he was determined to get it right.
Even before any reservists were called up, or a single vehicle or aircraft started its engine, the regular forces of North Korea were already able to unleash a devastating attack on their southern neighbour. Because of Seoul’s proximity to the DMZ, the South Korean capital was within range of some five hundred North Korean artillery pieces, including the 170-millimetre Koksan gun, and over two hundred 240-millimetre multiple-rocket launchers. It has been assessed by Western intelligence agencies that the North Korean forces could, without any significant troop or artillery movements, unleash a barrage of up to half a million rounds per hour against Seoul and other strategic targets in the north of the country, and could sustain that level of assault for several hours.
North Korea’s one million or so soldiers are organized into 170 brigades and divisions that include special operations groups, artillery, tank and infantry units, and about sixty of these are permanently located south of a line running between Pyongyang and Wonsan. The country has deployed well over half of its forces close to the DMZ, and about seventy per cent of its front-line troops – some 700,000 men, 2,000 tanks and 8,000 artillery pieces – are permanently based within a hundred miles of the Demilitarized Zone. Many of these units are located in underground or hardened facilities, almost a North Korean trademark, of which there are more than four thousand close to the DMZ.
And it’s not just troops on the ground. The North Korean Navy, a significant force in its own right, has positioned the majority of its surface vessels and submarines in forward bases on both coastlines of the peninsula, near to the DMZ. Forty per cent of the country’s 800 fighter aircraft are also based very close to the border. Without repositioning a single soldier, vehicle or aircraft, the DPRK is capable of launching a major attack on South Korea within a matter of hours.