17. Winston Churchill, speech in House of Commons, May 13, 1940.
18. Winston Churchill, Blood, Sweat and Tears, p. 334 (speech of July 14, 1940).
19. Hitler, My New Order, pp. 836 ff.
20. Karl Klee, Dokumente zum Unternehmen ‘Seelowe,’ pp. 441 f. For Admiral Raeder’s report—which, however, gave the navy a chance for a successful landing “only on the assumption that command of the air is achieved”—see KTB/OKW I, p. 63.
21. Speaking on June 6, 1940, to Sir Edward Spears; quoted in Michaelis and Schraepler XV, p. 261. On November 28, 1940, in a speech to the French Chamber of Deputies, Alfred Rosenberg attempted to. interpret what had happened in the same light: “The decadent successors of the French Revolution have clashed with the first troops of the great German Revolution. With that… this era of 1789 is now approaching its end. In a triumphal victory it has been… crushed when, already rotten, it still arrogantly attempted to go on dominating the destiny of Europe in the twentieth century as well.” Rosenberg, Gold und Blut, p. 7.
22. This fear of American intervention, always present, had been given renewed impetus by Roosevelt’s tough speech of July 19, 1940, which could only be interpreted as a resolute challenge; cf. the notes of Dieckhoff, the German ambassador in Washington, of July 21, 1940, in: ADAP X, pp. 213 f.; also Halder, KTB II, p. 30 (July 22, 1940). From that moment on this fear affected almost all discussions on strategy; cf., for example, Raeder, Mein Leben II, pp. 246 f.; also KTB/OKW I, pp. 88 ff. For an overall view see Friedlander, Prelude to Downfall.
23. Tagebuch Engel, November 4, 1940, quoted in Hillgruber, Strategie, p. 354n.
24. Thus at the headquarters of Army Group A (von Rundstedt’s) in Charle-ville; cf. Klee, Das Unternehmen “Seelowe,” pp. 189 f.
25. KTB/ OKW I, p. 996. There is a great deal of controversy on the question of when Hitler definitively decided to attack the Soviet Union; cf. particularly Gerhard L. Weinberg, “Der deutsche Entschluss zum Angriff auf die Sovjetunion,” in: VJHfZ 1953:2, pp. 301 ff., and the replies of H. G. Seraphim and A. Hillgruber, ibid., 1954:2, pp. 240 ff.
26. Le Testament politique de Hitler, pp. 93 ff. In conclusion Hitler also cited Germany’s dependence on deliveries of Russian goods, which Stalin could at any time use for purposes of blackmail, especially in regard to Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Hitler then continued: “It would not have been fitting for the Third Reich, as the representative and protector of Europe, to sacrifice these friendly countries on the altar of Communism. That would have dishonored us, and moreover we would have been punished for it. From the moral as well as from the strategic point of view it would therefore have been a wrong decision.” Ibid., p. 96. On June 12, 1941, Hitler gave a similar justification in speaking to Marshal Antonescu, the Rumanian Chief of State; cf. Hillgruber, Staatsmanner I, pp. 588 ff. Another indication that the war against the Soviet Union was Hitler’s “real” war may be found in his remark of July, 1940, that he must fight the war in the East before finishing the war in the West because he could “hardly ask the people to undertake a new war against Russia, given the mood that would prevail after a victory over England.” Cf. Bernhard von Lossberg, Im Wehrmachtsfuhrungsstab.
27. The men involved were chiefly Admiral Raeder, General Rommel, Baron von Weizsacker, Count von der Schulenburg, the German Ambassador in Moscow, and General Kostring, the military attache at the Embassy in Moscow. On the idea of the offensive in the Near East cf. Bullock, p. 639. Bullock believes that barely a fourth of the forces provided for the attack on the Soviet Union would probably have sufficed to deliver a fateful blow to British rule in the Near East.
28. ADAP XII, 2, p. 892.
29. Gisevius, Adolf Hitler, p. 471. On Hitler’s depressed mood during the period before the beginning of the campaign, which was in such striking contrast to the optimism of the military leaders, see, for example, Walter Schellenberg, Memoiren, pp. 179 f.
30. Thus to the British ambassador, cited in Jacobsen, Aussenpolitik, p. 377.
31. KTB/OKW I, p. 341.
32. Halder, Kriegstagebuch II, pp. 335 ff.
33. Cf. Krausnick, “Judenverfolgung,” in: Anatomie des SS-Staates II, pp. 363 ff., with further references to sources. Hitler personally edited the text of the assignment for Himmler and ordered it included in the High Command of the armed forces directive for March 13, 1941; cf. KTB/ OKW I, pp. 340 ff. Further to that assignment see Walter Warlimont, Im Hauptquartier der Wehrmacht, pp. 167 ff.
34. Cf. Nuremberg Document NOKW-1692, reprinted in Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, “Kommissarbefehl und Massenexekutionen sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener,” in: Anatomie des SS-Staates II, pp. 223 f. The “commissar order” is printed ibid., pp. 225 ff. See also the testimonies of the generals at Nuremberg, IMT XX, pp. 635, 663; IMT XXVI, pp. 406 ff., and XXXIV, pp. 252 ff., 191 ff.
35. IMT XXXVIII, pp. 86 ff. (221-L). Along the same lines Rosenberg informed the “most intimate participants in the Eastern problem” on June 20, 1941 : “From today on we are not waging a crusade against Bolshevism solely to save the poor Russians from this Bolshevism for all time to come, but rather we are doing so in order to further German world policy and to secure the German Reich.” Cf. IMT XXVI, p. 614 (1058-PS).
36. Affidavit of Otto Ohlendorf, Nuremberg Documents IV, pp. 312 if.; further data in Helmut Krausnick, “Judenverfolgung,” pp. 367 f.
37. Thus to Japanese Ambassador Oshima on July 15, 1941; cited in Hillgruber, Staatsmanner I, pp. 600 ff. For Halder’s note see his Kriegstagebuch III, p. 38.
38. See Alexander Dallin, German Rule in Russia 1941–1945, p. 62. For the shift in emphasis in the armaments program and for the planning of the return march from the Soviet Union, cf. Directive 32 b of July 14, 1941, printed in Walther Hubatsch, Hitlers Weisungen, pp. 136 ff., and KTB/ OKW I, pp. 1022 ff.
39. Hitler’s Table Talk, p. 44. For the intended fate of Leningrad and Moscow, see Halder, Kriegstagebuch III, p. 53; Tischgesprache, p. 251; Hillgruber, Staatsmanner I, p. 643; KTB/OKW I, pp. 1021, 1070; Zoller, Hitler privat, p. 143. In his speech of November 8, 1941, Hitler also declared that Leningrad would not be captured, but starved out; see Domarus, p. 1775. A detailed prognosis for the annihilation of the city was elaborated in an order issued by Admiral Kurt Fricke, naval chief of staff, dated September 29, 1941: “It is planned to surround the city in a close encirclement and level it to the ground by bombardment with artillery of all calibers and by continual bombing from the air. Pleas for surrender resulting from the city’s predicament will be rejected, since the problem of sheltering and feeding the population cannot and should not be solved by us. In this war for our existence we can have no interest in preserving even a part of this urban population.” Cited in: Michaelis and Schraepler XVII, pp. 380 ff.
40. Cf., for example, the references in various conversations in Hillgruber, Staatsmanner I, pp. 64, 594, 619, 628. According to Halder, Marshal Coulaincourt’s memoirs of the campaign of 1812 were withdrawn from circulation in the winter of 1941–42. See Dallin, German Rule in Russia, 1941–1945.
41. Halder, Kriegstagebuch III, p. 295; also Hillgruber, Strategie, pp. 551 f. The following spring Hitler once more declared that he would have “gladly waged this war against Bolshevism with the British navy and air force as partners.” See Tischgesprache, p. 244.
42. KTB/OKW IV, 2, p. 1503.
43. In conversations with Swedish Foreign Minister ScaVenius and with Croatian Foreign Minister Lorkovic. Cited in Hillgruber, Staatsmanner I, pp. 657, 661.
44. To Ambassador Oshima on July 15, 1941, cited in ibid., p. 605. For the opinion of Brauchitsch see Goebbels, Tagebucher 1942–43, p. 132. Hitler did commute General von Sponeck’s death sentence to imprisonment, but two and a half years later, after the attempted assassination of July 20, 1944, the Gestapo turned up at Germersheim Fortress and made short work of shooting
