became extremely important to Hitler—not only as an influential industrialist but also as administrator of a political fund known as the “Ruhr Treasury.” Hitler was deeply impressed by this rough old man who had spent his life plotting against those above him and despising those below him. And Kirdorf in turn was fascinated by Hitler; he soon became one of his most valuable supporters, possibly the most valuable. Kirdorf participated as a guest of honor in the party rally in Nuremberg, and subsequently wrote to Hitler that those days had been an overwhelming experience he would never forget.
All this new assistance and new money would be translated into significant successes in the regional elections of 1929. In Saxony and Mecklenburg-Schwerin the Nazis had won nearly 5 per cent of the vote the previous spring. But their progress in the Prussian community elections was more impressive. In Coburg they elected the mayor, and in Thuringia they succeeded in voting into office the first Nazi provincial government minister, Wilhelm Frick. Frick soon made a stir by introducing Nazi prayers into the schools and came into conflict with the national government—although on the whole he tried to demonstrate that his party was quite capable of cooperating in coalitions.
In keeping with his greed for public display, Hitler set about creating a glorious backdrop for his newly won success. The setting, in turn, was to prepare the ground for future successes. Since 1925, the Munich party headquarters had been located in an unostentatious, utilitarian building on Schellingstrasse. Now, with funds supplied largely by Fritz Thyssen, Hitler bought the Barlow Palace on Briennerstrasse in Munich and renovated it to serve as the “Brown House.” Together with the architect Paul Ludwig Troost, he spent much of his time planning the interior decoration. It was as if he were returning to his youthful dreams of a fine, aristocratic mansion. He sketched furniture, doors, and designs for marquetry. A grand open stairwell led up to his office, which was furnished with a few outsized pieces, a portrait of Frederick the Great, a bust of Mussolini, and a painting of an attack by the List Regiment in Flanders. Adjoining was the so-called Senate Hall. Here, around a gigantic horseshoe-shaped table, stood sixty armchairs in red morocco, their backs displaying the party eagle. Bronze tablets to either side of the entrance listed the names of the victims of the abortive putsch of November 9, 1923. In the room itself there were busts of Bismarck and Dietrich Eckart. This hall, however, never served its ostensible purpose. It existed solely to satisfy Hitler’s theatrical needs, for he had always firmly rejected any thought of placing a senate or any other group of advisers at his side. The canteen in the cellar of the Brown House had a “Fuhrer’s seat” reserved for him under a portrait of Dietrich Eckart. Here he would sit for hours in his circle of adjutants and reverent chauffeurs, indulging in the idle chatter beloved by Vienna coffeehouse habitues.
His personal affairs also reflected the improved financial state of the party. In the course of 1929, the interest and amortization payments for his considerably swollen debts abruptly disappear from the documents concerning his personal finances. At the same time he moved into an opulent nine-room apartment at 16 Prinzregentenstrasse in one of the solidly middle-class residential districts of Munich. Frau Reichert, his former landlady from Thierschstrasse, and Frau Anny Winter did the housekeeping for him, while Frau Raubal, his half- sister, continued to run Haus Wachenfeld on the slope of Obersalzberg. His niece Geli, who had picked up her uncle’s love for the theater and was now taking singing and acting lessons, soon moved into the apartment. The gossip about this relationship bothered him somewhat, but he also rather enjoyed the aura of bohemian freedom and the suggestion of a grand and fateful passion in this liaison between uncle and niece.
The campaign against the Young Plan had barely come to its end when Hitler once more committed an act of political audacity. He dramatically broke with Hugenberg’s conservative associates, on the grounds that their half-heartedness and bourgeois weakness had been responsible for the failure of the plebiscite. The ease with which he made such ruptures, undeterred by any sense of common purpose and common struggles, once more served him well. For this sudden swerve silenced the critics within the party who had been grumbling at his alliance with “the capitalist pig Hugenberg.” Moreover, the move enabled him to disavow his own share in the defeat, so that he could once again emerge as the only vigorous force on the antirepublican Right.
Such bold gestures made all the more of an impression because they seemed entirely out of keeping with the numerical strength of the still small party. But Hitler had recognized that it was all important to keep alive that interest in the movement which he had at last succeeded in arousing. Stripping the party for more aggressive tasks, as it were, he undertook a reorganization of headquarters. Gregor Strasser was placed in charge of Organization Section I (Political Organization). Former Colonel Konstantin Hierl became head of Organization Section II (National Socialist State; the shadow government). Goebbels became propaganda chief. In a letter of February 2, 1930, Hitler predicted “with almost clairvoyant certainty” that “the victory of our movement will take place… at the most in two and a half to three years.”
After the break with Hugenberg he continued without interruption, and with virtually undiminished violence, the campaign against the republic. Only now it was the Nazi party’s own campaign. The previous year, instructions from party headquarters, signed by the then director of propaganda Heinrich Himmler, had called for a series of “propaganda operations” that represented a new departure in the art of politicking. An onslaught would be made on a single district, down to its remotest villages. In the course of a week all the party’s top speakers would be hurled in to address several hundred meetings. They would be enlisted “to the extreme limit” of their capacities. During this period every city and town would be bombarded with posters, banners, and leaflets—with Hitler himself frequently deciding the designs and slogans. “Recruiting nights” would be staged, when the SA was to show—in the words of the directive—“what it can do out of its own resources, including: athletic events, living tableaus, plays, singing of songs, lectures by SA men, showing of the movie of the Party Rally.” In the period preceding the elections for the Landtag (legislature) of Saxony in June, 1930, the party held no fewer than 1,300 such affairs.
Along with these regional actions the party continued its efforts to gain a foothold within specific social groups, and in particular to win over some of the white-color workers and the rural population. In a series of vigorous thrusts the party conquered leading positions in co-operatives, craft unions, and professional organizations. In some rural areas conditions of acute distress prevailed: a peasant protest movement in Schleswig-Holstein, for example, marched under black banners. The party responded with the elusive slogan of “land reform” and by blaming matters on the Jews—tapping the springs of latent peasant anti-Semitism, which, as the party training directive put it, “must be incited to the point of furious rage.” A young
Hitler kept whipping the party on; but these successes were not entirely the result of his drive or of his talent for addressing himself to the confused and emotional thinking of the traditionally splintered Right. Rather, the incipient world-wide Depression came to his aid. Signs of crisis became apparent in Germany by the beginning of 1929, when the number of unemployed for the first time passed the 3 million mark. In the course of the spring the number of business failures began to increase alarmingly. By the first five days of November, in Berlin alone, fifty-five bankruptcies were recorded and from 500 to 700 persons daily were taking the debtor’s oath that they were unable to satisfy their creditors. These figures partly reflected the economic and psychological consequences of October 24, 1929, the famous Black Friday on which prices on the New York Stock Exchange collapsed.
In Germany, especially, the devastating effects were felt almost immediately. The foreign loans, mostly short-term, that had underwritten the country’s economic revival and countenanced a certain recklessness on the part of some municipalities, were withdrawn by the anxious creditors. The abrupt recession in world trade simultaneously destroyed all prospects of making up for the losses, at least temporarily, by increased exports. As world market prices dropped, agriculture was drawn into the crisis; soon farms could be kept going only by subsidies which in turn increased the burden on the general public. One disaster fed the next in a classic chain reaction. In Germany, too, stock prices tumbled, unemployment grew by leaps and bounds, factories closed their doors, and new pawnshops opened theirs. Long columns in the newspapers announced forced auction sales. The political effects soon followed. Ever since the election of 1928 the country had been governed by a broad coalition
