would have changed. The Allies would not have altered their aims, abandoning their demand for unconditional surrender, nor would they have modified the decision made later at Yalta to occupy and divide Germany. It is also unlikely that the myth that Germany had been sabotaged from within would yet again have arisen, as many feared it would. There is little reason to share Goerdeler’s optimism that, if he and his colleagues had gained access to the radio waves “for just twenty-four hours” and freely proclaimed the truth about the Nazis, a wave of indignation would have swept the Reich. Even less justified was his hope that Hitler could then have been deposed without violence. There is, however, at least a grain of truth to Goerdeler’s version of events: although many individuals have published defenses of their activities during the Hitler years, no significant attempt has ever been made to exculpate the Third Reich itself. Public horror over the depth and extent of its crimes-the thing Goerdeler always counted on-has not permitted such forgiveness. The Nazi regime, like totalitarian governments everywhere, proved unable to generate a sustaining mythology, except among the few diehards whose fate was linked to Hitler.
In the final analysis, the German resistance cannot be measured by the futility of its efforts or by its unfulfilled hopes. Although it had very little influence on the course of history, it nevertheless radically changed how we view those years. History consists not only of those dates and great events we commemorate but also, and perhaps more tellingly, of deeds motivated by self-respect and moral commitment. Beck, Schulenburg, Goerdeler, and others believed that the issue of whether the Nazi regime was ultimately brought down from without or overthrown from within would have an enormous effect on Germany’s reputation and reacceptance into the ranks of civilized nations.35 On a moral plane, failing in the attempt is as worthy as succeeding.
The importance of the resistance cannot seriously be challenged. Opinions continue to vary on almost every facet of it: its alliances, its view of society, its illusions, its passivity, and the resolve it finally mustered. The main questions about it, though, were raised early on. The day after the attack on Hitler, Emmi Bonhoeffer returned to Berlin to find her husband, Klaus, and her brother, Justus Delbruck, clearing the wreckage of a neighbor’s house. When they sat down to rest amid the ruins, she asked whether the two men could draw any lesson at all from the failure of the plot. There was a momentary pause while they weighed their answer. Finally Delbruck responded in a way that captured the pathos and paradox of the resistance: “I think it was good that it happened, and good too, perhaps, that it did not succeed.”36
NOTES
Preface
1. Among the major titles discussed here are Hans Bernd Gisevius,
2. Alexander Stahlberg,
3. Karl Dietrich Bracher,
4. Peter Hoffmann lists a large number of these organizations in
1. The Resistance That Never Was
1. Walter Frank, “Zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus,”
2. Count Harry Kessler,
3. Wilhelm Hoegner,
4. Goebbels’s introduction to Hitler’s speech in the Berlin Sportpalast on Feb. 10, I933; rpt. in
5. See Heinz Hohne,
6. Fritz Stern, “Der Nationalsozialismus als Versuchung,”
7. Qtd. in Dorothea Beck,
8. Hoegner,
9. Letter to her parents, Jan. 30, 1933; qtd. in Ger van Roon, “Widerstand und Krieg,”
10. Martin H. Sommerfeldt,
11. See Peter Hoffmann,
12. Qtd. in Andre Francois-Poncet,
13. Heinrich Bruning,
14. Julius Leber, qtd. in Hagen Schulze,
15. Breitscheid qtd. in Fabian von Schlabrendorff,
16.
17. Qtd. in Count Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk,
18. See Erich Mathias and Rudolf Morsey, eds.,
19. Mathias and Morsey,
20. Mathias and Morsey,
21. The term is Gunther Weisenborn’s.
22. Karl Otmar von Aretin, qtd. in Ulrich Cartarius,
23. Konrad Heiden,