The Crusader

of Eastern Europe?” Reagan answered:

Well, what I meant then in my remarks at Notre Dame and what I believe now about what we’re seeing tie together. I just think it is impossible—and history reveals this—for any form of government to completely deny freedom to people and have that go on interminably. There eventually comes an end to it. And I think the things we’re seeing, not only in Poland but the reports that are coming out of Russia itself about the younger generation and its resistance to long-time government controls, is an indication that communism is an aberration. It’s not a normal way of living for human beings, and I think we are seeing the first, beginning cracks, the beginning of the end.³²

A few minutes later in the press conference, Reagan estimated: “The Poland situation is going to be very tense for quite some time now. The Soviet Union is faced with a problem of this crack in their once Iron Curtain and what happens if they let it go.”

SEPTEMBER 1981: FEARS OF SOVIET FORCE IN POLAND

As 1981 moved on, the crack crept to the surface, as Walesa and his union brothers chipped away at the Communist facade. While not a bastion of laissez-faire capitalism, Solidarity was also not Marxist. It was anti- Communist, independent of the USSR, rejected the nomenklatura, and represented the majority of Polish workers. More, it was devoutly pro-Catholic; no other institution had so consistently opposed Bolshevism as had the Roman Catholic Church.³³ Furthermore, Solidarity was not only pro-West but favored concepts like free speech, a free press, and free elections—all verboten to Communism.

All of this threatened Soviet Communism’s stranglehold on Poland, and in early September 1981, Pravda made that clear. Appealing to infallible authority, it noted that the immortal Lenin had insisted on Communist Party control of all trade unions. Indeed, as Arthur R. Rachwald explained: “The idea of an independent labor organization functioning freely is totally incompatible with the Soviet system.”³⁴ Thus, when the Polish Communist government officially recognized Solidarity, it had committed heresy in the Church of Lenin; it had signed away its oxymoronic Communist soul.³⁵ The supremacy of the Community Party, directed from Moscow, was in jeopardy.

Reagan relished the irony that Solidarity was a disgruntled workers’ group “in a so-called workers’ state,” in an alleged workers’ heaven. It was, said Reagan, “a genuine labor movement suppressed by a government of generals who claim to represent the working class.”³⁶ As the former head of SAG, he felt personally connected to Solidarity not just through its anti-Communism but also its unionism. In a speech to the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, he said, “Those of us who know what it is to belong to a union have a special bond with the workers of Poland.”³⁷ Reagan also understood Solidarity’s uniqueness at a precarious time for the USSR, noting that nothing like Solidarity had ever existed in the Eastern European bloc. The workers’ union “was contrary to anything the Soviets would want or the Communists would want.”³⁸

By summer 1981, the Kremlin had become extremely worried and wanted Solidarity destroyed. Thus, there was considerable unease in the Reagan administration over the prospect of a Soviet invasion of Poland. These concerns were amplified by a secret source: Washington had a mole in Poland, a brave figure named Colonel Ryszard Kuklinski, a highly respected, high-ranking figure in the Polish Defense Ministry. A liaison between Warsaw and Moscow, Kuklinski was tasked with the grave duty of helping to make preparations for a “hot war” with the West. Kuklinski’s real enemy, however, was Soviet Communism and its hold on the colonel’s beloved homeland. He secretly supplied a massive volume of material to the CIA, including an explosive disclosure in December 1980: on two sheets of paper inside a smuggled package, Kuklinski carefully outlined Moscow’s plans to cross the border into Poland with eighteen Soviet, East German, and Czech divisions by December 8, 1980.³⁹ The Carter White House had been aware that Soviet troops were massing along the border, but Kuklinski’s missive relayed sincerity rather than a bluff.⁴⁰ According to authors Jerrold and Leona Schecter, thanks to Kuklinski, the Carter administration knew in advance that the Soviet Union was actually preparing to invade Poland in 1980 in order to crush Solidarity, under the guise of a “peaceful exercise.”⁴¹

The Carter administration had made clear its concerns over Poland, stating that military intervention by Moscow would seriously jeopardize the U.S.–USSR relationship. NATO was placed on a higher level of readiness. Amid continuing fear of a Soviet invasion to “save Poland,” Pope John Paul II sent a letter to Chairman Brezhnev in which he boldly made an implicit parallel between a Soviet invasion and the Nazi incursion of September 1939, grimly outlining the moral contours in which he viewed the USSR.⁴²

Inheriting the work of Kuklinski, the Reagan administration picked up these fears, and also began receiving new disturbing information. Since the first weeks of the Reagan administration, a colonel from the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency had paid regular visits to the National Security Council bearing satellite photos of Warsaw Pact troop movements along the Polish border. Richard Pipes studied these pictures, and was especially concerned about the Warsaw Pact exercises that took place on Polish territory under the code name “Soiuz-81.” These maneuvers could be easily directed into an offensive. By April 1981, after once vacillating over whether an invasion was likely, Pipes thought an invasion was imminent.⁴³

Judging from newly released information, Pipes’ fears were justified: Over a roughly one-year period up through September 1981, the Soviet leadership carefully considered an invasion, aided by Eastern bloc allies like Czechoslovakia and East Germany. The plan called for a contingent of 14 to 15 divisions to help Polish authorities enforce martial law.⁴⁴ However, because General Wojciech Jaruzelski, Poland’s prime minister, believed such a scenario would produce mass bloodshed, he persuaded Moscow to allow him to take care of business internally. He saw much greater instability if Soviet soldiers were used rather than the Polish military. Moscow, desiring deniability for any role, went with his advice.⁴⁵

The Kremlin agreed with Jaruzelski and in mid-December 1981, the USSR opted not to employ military force and chose the next closest thing: martial law.

U.S. MILITARY FORCE IN POLAND

With concern over the Soviets possibly on the verge of committing military force to quell the Poland situation, Ronald Reagan entertained the notion of a U.S. military response. Suddenly, the Reagan commitment to Poland had reached a higher level than ever before—one that which, remarkably, over two-and-a-half decades later, the world still remains in the dark.⁴⁶

Unbeknownst to the world, Ronald Reagan considered plans to actually invade Polish territory if the Soviets invaded Poland. As an indication of how few people knew this fact, as well as the volatility of such a notion, when I asked Richard Pipes if U.S. force was considered in Poland to counter the Soviets, he tersely replied: “No.” He paused before raising his voice to express shock at the mere thought: “No, no. That would have unleashed World War III! And that’s not something anybody wanted. No.” He continued: “I don’t think we would have [used military force] in any case,” said Pipes. “No. We thought of diplomatic measures, of economic measures, but never thought of military intervention. I can say that quite categorically.”⁴⁷ Likewise, Richard Allen, who was national security adviser at the time, stated: “I do not believe such an option [of U.S. military force] was given any serious consideration. Generally, Ronald Reagan was against the use of force.”⁴⁸ And, indeed, Reagan was ultimately against American force in Poland.

But that does not mean he did not at least privately contemplate it; in fact, he had contemplated the option a year earlier. In December 1980, the incoming secretary of defense, Cap Weinberger, discussed with incoming president Reagan the possible use of U.S. force in Poland. Reagan himself brought up the idea after one of the preinauguration security meetings, which were held at Blair House and at the State Department in the immediate weeks after the November 1980 election.

Looking back over twenty years later, Weinberger recalled the intensity of the situation in Poland then, a full year before martial law. “There was very considerable worry,” said Weinberger, “that the Soviets, with two