divisions inside Poland, that had been there since the end of the war [World War II], and the constant military exercises and threatening moves around the borders of Poland, that they might very well decide to wander in there without any fear of adverse results or reprisals.” Reagan wanted no signals to the Kremlin that such action would be acceptable. “The president was very firm about that,” said Weinberger.49 The two men talked about a U.S. invasion of Poland. Weinberger remembered:
I talked to him after one meeting in a session before he was inaugurated. I said, “You know, Mr. President, this talk about [U.S.] military force against the Soviet Union if it went into Poland is all well and good… but you must know that we do not have the military strength capable of doing that now. We don’t have the ability to project our power that far and we could not, without very substantial help, successfully come to the aid of the Poles if they were invaded.”
And he said to me, “Stop.” He turned to me and said, “Yes, I know that Cap. But we must never again be in this position. We must never again not take action that we think is essential because we’re not strong enough to do it.”50
And that simply reemphasized to me [the need] to get additional military spending that would get us out of that position….
He certainly considered all ways. But he didn’t argue for a moment with my assessment that we weren’t able to do that [employ U.S. military force in Poland] at the time. We didn’t have all that many divisions and the divisions that we had were under strength. We didn’t have adequate spare parts or supplies and couldn’t do adequate training. The military that we took over needed an enormous amount.51
Weinberger added that Reagan was aware of the risk that the Soviets could build on their two divisions in Poland and could use that troop presence “to intimidate Poland from carrying out any of the things that Walesa and others were talking about at that time.” This bothered Reagan greatly, and he very much wanted to reverse that situation. Again, however, want and can were quite different.52
Though a year had passed without any military action in Poland, by either side, Reagan’s thinking remained open to the consideration of force, particularly as tensions rose in Poland during December 1981. According to Weinberger:
Force may have been considered. There were some people in the White House and on the NSC staff… who were always proposing all kinds of military actions without, I think, having any awareness of the capability of the military to carry them out…. People didn’t realize that our military strength had been very substantially eroded [in the 1970s]…. He [Reagan] very reluctantly accepted that idea and he certainly wasn’t going to launch two or three divisions into a battle that would be almost a certain loss.53
Taken together, Weinberger’s remarks at least suggest that Reagan might have thought more aggressively if he had the defense power behind him. However, the strongest statements on this issue come from Bill Clark, the future national security adviser, who knew Reagan’s thoughts on Poland better than anyone. In a November 1999 interview, Clark stated:
We [the Reagan administration and Vatican] also worked together to generate strong diplomatic pressure upon the Soviet Union, to convince the leaders in the Kremlin that they must refrain from invading Poland—from doing what the Soviet Union had done to crush the earlier freedom movements in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. We in the Reagan administration were prepared to recommend the use of force if necessary to stop such an invasion (emphasis added) following the imposition of martial law.54
Five months later in a March 2000 speech in San Francisco, Clark added: “The Soviets and their proxies in Poland declared martial law and started in the summer moving troops up to the border, which looked like another situation as had occurred in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The President said this just simply cannot happen, even if it means meeting force with force.”55
In a 2001 interview, Clark, a man who has always been cautious with his words, was careful in discussing the force matter. Still, his words were powerful:
Measures were discussed. Some might call them extreme, but they might have been necessary. The instructions were that we cannot allow a [repeat of the] Hungary or Czechoslovakia invasion…. And it was touch and go. The Soviets did move the troops up to the line. We decided that, effectively, force would be met with force.56
But the question remained, was the administration willing to use force, if necessary? “Well, that certainly was inferred,” said Bill Clark. Importantly, however, Clark stressed that, “Anyone familiar with decision-making processes understands that you consider a full gamut of options. That was one that was considered. But I don’t want it to seem or sound more dramatic than it was.”
In July 2003, I posed the question to Clark yet again; he was consistent with previous statements: “I’m confident that if the Soviets had crossed the line—if it [the situation] had come to reasonable necessity to use force—he [Reagan] was ready to do it; he was prepared. He wouldn’t want to [use military force] but he was prepared.” By Soviets crossing the line, Clark said he meant a Red Army invasion of Poland: “He [Reagan] would not tolerate a repeat of the Hungarian or Czechoslovakian incidents.”57
Judging from some of these accounts, certainly Clark’s, Reagan may have been willing, if need be, under the worst circumstances, to go toe-to-toe with the Soviets on Polish territory, meaning the use of real military force—and assuming he had sufficient firepower.58 On the other hand, others have no memory of such a Reagan consideration, and reject it entirely. Ed Meese, a close adviser, stated: “I have no recollection of that at all. I think that even the word ‘considered’ [the use of force] is too strong based on my recollection of our policy. I don’t remember any time when that was proposed as even an option.” Yet, Meese continued, “That doesn’t mean it didn’t happen at any time. Maybe it was recommended by lower-level staff in the NSC. I just don’t recall it.” Meese adds this caution: “It [the idea to use force] doesn’t make much sense to me. Of all the things Ronald Reagan did, he didn’t want a major war in Europe, or a nuclear war, or a third world war. He could be tough but he didn’t want to be overly provocative. And that would’ve been very provocative.”59
Provocative, indeed. In the end, Reagan obviously never pursued the force option, precisely for all the right reasons—as listed by Pipes and Meese in particular. It would have been too dangerous. Also, of course, the Red Army never invaded Poland, sparing him the decision. Still, this was an extremely volatile, high-stakes notion that Reagan once thought through and discussed with his closest advisers. Moreover, it drives home the gravity of the Poland situation in the 1980s.
DECEMBER 14, 1981—REAGAN’S RESPONSE TO MARTIAL LAW
While military force was out, Reagan did have a number of other options to counter the declaration of martial law. One of his first responses was to call Pope John Paul II on December 14 to discuss the situation. In addition to expressing his outrage, he told the pope: “Our country was inspired when you visited Poland, and to see their commitment to religion and belief in God. It was an inspiration…. All of us were very thrilled.” Reagan said he looked forward to a time when the two men could meet in person, and the two began seeking ways to cooperate in these immediate days following martial law.60
Reagan’s anger toward the Soviets flowed over into two separate letters sent to the pope on December 17 and 29, 1981, neither of which was declassified until July 2000.61 In the December 17 dispatch, Reagan asked the pope to urge General Jaruzelski to hold a meeting with Walesa and Archbishop Glemp. In the second letter, he explained the countermeasures his administration was taking against the USSR, while asking the pope to use his influence with the Polish Church to lift martial law, gain the release of detainees, and resume a dialogue with Solidarity. In addition, he requested that John Paul II press other Western countries to join the
