c. If the use of air recce (visual) is increased with the view to using this type of quick reaction tactic, ground forces will have to be made available, on a prompt force basis, at either Centenary or Mt. Darwin or both. If this was done, the type of attacks planned for 19th, 20th Feb 74 could have been handled in a similar way using jet effort as the air strike medium. Therefore, the attack would have been on the date the targets were located instead of a week later.
2. (1) No requirement for GAC or FLOT.
(2) I fully agree with the comments 1 b. above but our ability to meet this requirement is not possible at the present time on a continuous basis. No 4 Squadron has a major problem in training recce pilots and no sooner do they build up to a good standard when postings intervene and thus back to square one. As Ops Cmdr I would dearly love to have a good recce pilot of the calibre of Sqn Ldr Petter-Bowyer on permanent attachment at FAF 3 but the way I see it at the present time it is not possible, but we must work to this aim. The proof lies in the fact that during the period in which Sqn Ldr Petter-Bowyer was training Weinmann and Murdoch, the info gained led to this Air Strike plus 4 other major ter strikes, 3 of which were on occupied camps.
3) Para 1 c. refers. Ground troops within Rhodesia are available for prompt force type actions and this is how the follow up to this strike was made possible. In respect of the strikes carried out on 21, 22 and 23 and 24, these were all in Mozambique and required regrouping of ground forces. It is appreciated that it has been agreed that jet ops need not be followed up by immediate ground ops but in this respect it was agreed to do so in order to gather intelligence. In three out of four cases intelligence was gained to the benefit of the over-all operation. The delay in mounting attacks does not appear to affect the results.
(4) In respect of this strike it can be considered a first class example of joint planning and what we hope for daily. However, this situation does not present itself often. The base camp was in fact just a resting place and Sqn Ldr Petter-Bowyer is to be congratulated on his powers of observation. The more I have to do with this man the more I am convinced that he has an inborn ability so far as visual recce is concerned which is unequalled in the Force. Added to which is his never failing enthusiasm and strong belief in the concept.
(5) Results of subsequent follow up Ops accounted for 8 terr and one AFJ killed. Sitreps 46/74 Para Alpha Two (2) and 47/74 Alpha Two (1) refer.
Sqn Ldr Petter-Bowyer has undoubtedly created an awareness in the force that visual recce pays dividends and this is being actively pursued.
We have been concentrating, possibly too much, on recce outside our borders. JOC commanders must make more use of recce, based on the intelligence picture, in their area of Ops. They have been advised. A strike well executed. Good initiative displayed. Well done strike team.
The planning, concept and conduct of this operation gives great satisfaction. We pressed the possibilities of this type of operation for some time and I trust the successes recently achieved has proved the point. Jointry at its best. Our increased allocation of effort should ensure that the essence can be reaped as often as opportunities present themselves. The increased effort should also allow for greater air recce coverage.
a. Good effort on P-Bowyer’s part, specifically, and a good show by forces involved.
b. Without a doubt, we must make increasing use of air recce. (Signed) Air Vice Marshal F.W. Mussell
Comments by Commander
Noted and I concur with all the remarks. With the increased deployment we must press for exploitation of every possible opportunity. We have accepted increased flying effort so let us make full use of air recce. Good show all round.
Although this was a very small action compared to those to come, important issues were raised in the Air Strike Report. Firstly Harold Griffiths, supported by Peter Cooke, had added weight to calls by others and myself for a force that Griff refers to as ‘Prompt Force’. This, together with the Air HQ decision to put more aircraft in the field, led to the establishment of Fire Force shortly thereafter when the Army made RLI Commandos permanently available to an increasing number of deployed helicopters.
The delayed attacks that Harold Griffiths and Peter Cooke referred to were bases in Mozambique found by Mike Litson. Unfortunately this pilot was lost to 4 Squadron on posting to helicopters just when he was becoming a useful recce pilot. Brian Murdoch was not really cut out for the job, leaving Chris Weinmann and myself as the only functioning recce pilots who could seldom be spared for ops at the same time; so the greater use of recce expounded by everybody was fine in theory but impossible to implement. Hamie Dax was the only other recce pilot we could rely on but, being a busy farmer, his services were somewhat curtailed.
Selous Scouts
AT ABOUT THIS TIME I met Major Ron Reid-Daly at JOC Hurricane HQ in Bindura. He was on his way to visit his top secret Selous Scouts ‘safe house’ base and invited me to accompany him. I knew very little about Ron’s operation, still believing he was running a specialist tracker school.
We drove along a dirt road running along a rising valley south of Bindura. As we bumped along the old mine road Ron told me his work was very much an undercover operation which would rely heavily on Air Force support; hence his preparedness to expose me to what was going on at the temporary base we were visiting. The road led us to a previously abandoned mine house on a ridge way off the beaten track. Two marquee tents provided soldiers’ accommodation and an array of radio aerials rose from the ops room inside the old house.
Ron parked his car under the shade of a huge tree at the rear of the house where he was met by the scruffiest, most heavily bearded men I had ever seen off cinema screen. They seemed so out of place in the presence of their immaculately dressed CO. One of the men came over to me and greeted me in a manner that suggested he knew me well. Ron was amused by my puzzled look and helped me out by saying, “You remember Basil Moss don’t you?” Basil had lived only seven houses away from mine in the Married Quarters at Thornhill but I had not seen him for many months. It needed a closer look before I recognised the face behind the beard.
Flight Lieutenant Basil Moss, a fluent Shona linguist, had become bored with commanding the Thornhill’s General Service Unit. The GSU, mostly black servicemen commanded by white officers, provided airfield security services at Thornhill and New Sarum. Basil, a strong fit man of about forty years, needed something more challenging when there was so much action out in the countryside, but he could find no way of getting to the ‘sharp end’. Then an advertisement for Shona linguists led him to Special Branch HQ and thence to the pseudo operators, Andre Rabie and Stretch Franklin. The unfortunate loss of Andre had occurred about three months earlier.
Ron walked around the temporary Selous Scouts base with Stretch Franklin, Basil Moss and me in tow.
