Black men lay about in the marquee tents dressed in scruffy garb with flthy-looking hair. They each listened to portable radios that were all tuned to different channels and blasted out at maximum volume. Waving his hand across these men, Ron asked me if I could differentiate between the RAR soldiers and ‘turned terrorists’. I could not for they all looked the same. Nevertheless, I was astounded having never heard the term ‘turned terrorist’ before.
From the very beginning the Selous Scouts recognised the importance of having ‘turned ters’ within their pseudo groups. In so doing it was easier to gain the confidence of tribesmen who had known particular CTs before their capture. However, to gain maximum advantage, the period between capturing a genuine CT and having him in the field as a Selous Scout had to be very short—a week was considered too long. The Scouts found ‘turning’ CTs very easy. There was no need to bash heads or use threatening tactics. By nature black Rhodesians were gentle people until subjected to political misdirection as occurred with ZANLA cadre. By comparing the teachings of political commissars with reality and having being made aware that their lives were being risked for greedy politicians rather than for the people, captured CT opinions changed. Being cared for by the Scouts, rather than being shot out of hand as had been taught, made the transition from enemy to friend quick and easy.
The atmosphere, one of excitement, was very infectious. So closely had the successes of early pseudos operations been kept secret that it was wonderful to be taken into confidence and brought up to speed on what had happened and what was being planned. There was no doubt in my mind that Selous Scouts would soon be pre-empting action rather than us continuing to respond to terrorist activities or having to rely on visual recce and OP sightings. Tribesmen were the keys to CT successes, so they had also to become the key to countering them.
Expanded pseudo operations had come at a critical time considering the rate at which ZANLA’s influence was spreading south and eastwards with ever-increasing numbers of CTs and LTTs. We were gaining in our successes but not sufficiently to contain, let alone reduce, ZANLA numbers.
The American military contended that in Viet Nam it was essential to have ten fighting soldiers to counter every insurgent in the field. For us this was a joke. We felt that a ratio of five to one would be adequate but this would soon be impossible considering Rhodesia’s financial and manpower constraints. At the height of our bush war a two-to-one ratio existed within the country whereas, outside of Rhodesia, we were always greatly outnumbered and 30:1 odds against us was not unusual.
The Army’s attempts to increase force levels by forming a second RAR battalion was disallowed by right- wing politicians who refused to accept black soldiers in numbers exceeding those of white regular and territorial soldiers combined. Any idea of using armed militiamen to protect tribesmen was also discounted for the same reason. So we were stuck with existing regular force levels and placed heavy reliance on the Territorial Army for effective levels in the field. Inevitably this placed formidable burdens on commerce and industry. However, manpower alone could not provide the successes we needed in a spreading bush war against an elusive enemy fighting for personal gains carelessly promised them by uncaring, greedy politicians; but these were promises in which they truly believed. Intelligence had to be the key to getting to grips with ZANLA. Reliance on historical facts gleaned from captured CTs had to be replaced by up-to-the-minute intelligence that could only be acquired by Selous Scouts pseudo operators. That intelligence was not long in coming.
By April 1974 Selous Scouts were coming to grips with ZANLA groups but too many of their successes were wasted because so many follow-up operations were mishandled; usually the consequence of inappropriate force levels to contain CT groups that bomb-shelled outwards to escape through large gaps between thinly spread troops.
It was only in June that helicopters became regularly grouped in sufficient numbers with the RLI Commandos who soon learned how to conduct the ‘vertical envelopment’ (surrounding) operations that capitalised on Selous Scout calls. As already mentioned, the combined reaction force became known as a Fire Force. This subject is covered later.
Cordon Sanitaire
DURING 1973 A VERY EXPENSIVE undertaking codenamed ‘Operation Overload’ was put into effect in the Chiweshe Tribal Trust Land. This was to place over 60,000 tribesmen in Protected Villages. The PVs system equated to the Portuguese
In an endeavour to stem incursions across the border, a cordon sanitaire was built. It comprised a narrow minefield bounded by a double fence-line. Starting at Mukumbura, this arrangement extended eastwards along the borderline for about 400 kilometres. The cordon sanitaire concept, copied from Israel, was not only enormously expensive it was a complete ‘waste of rations’. The non-operational people who had promoted it as an effective defensive barrier were deeply criticised, and with good reason.
Every soldier knew that no military obstacle is worth a damn unless its entire length can be covered by effective fire. Some 3,000 men in 1,500 towers would have been needed to meet the need but, because this was impossible, electronic warning devices were used to compensate for the lack of manpower. But these warning systems were seldom successful because wild animals and the elements triggered too many alarm signals. When genuine CT-induced alarms were received, mostly at night, they invariably came from positions that were too far for forces to reach before the CTs had moved away into the safety of the bush.
CTs soon found a way through the Cordon Sanitaire. They simple dug a trench under the first fence then crawled along a line taken by a lead man who probed and lifted anti-personnel mines as he moved cautiously forward. A second trench under the next fence got everyone safely through the barrier. No electronic warnings occurred when this was done so a whole group of CTs could easily transit the Cordon Sanitaire before first light and be far away by the time a daylight patrol detected the breach. Many groups crossed the Cordon Sanitaire in this way both coming in and going out. No trench was used twice for fear of Rhodesian booby traps. Some crossings failed and one of these sticks in my mind.
A CT had his leg blown off just below the knee by an anti-personnel mine during an attempted crossing from Mozambique into Rhodesia. His companions, ignoring his pleas for help, high-tailed back into Mozambique leaving the stricken man to his fate. The fellow lay in the minefield all night and was only found by a routine patrol at about 10 o’clock next morning. A helicopter was called for, but it was impossible in the meanwhile for the Territorial soldiers to enter the minefield to administer first aid.
In spite of enormous blood loss, severe shock and a long cold lonely night, the CT was still conscious and able to communicate with the soldiers whilst awaiting rescue. There was then considerable danger for the Air Force technician who was lowered to the injured man by hoist, but he was placed in the small crater made by the mine that had blown the CT’s leg away. Without moving his feet the technician secured the CT, then both were lifted into the safety of the helicopter cabin and flown straight to the Selous Scouts ‘fort’ at Mtoko.
In the small hospital within the fort, the attending doctor put the CT on blood and saline drips then attended to the stump of his shattered leg. He expressed amazement that the CT had survived so long but had no doubt he would regain strength quickly. I was at Mtoko at the time and was taken into the fort to see this CT during his first evening in hospital. He was propped up in bed with blood and saline lines to both arms. His colour was a pasty grey, his face was drawn and his eyes half-closed.
I saw him again the following evening and could not believe this was the same man. Although still on drips he was sitting up in bed shirtless because the weather was hot. The man’s shiny black skin enhanced his muscular upper body. The grey was gone and his face was full of smiles. Few, if any, white men could have survived such an ordeal, let alone recovered so rapidly.
