Maasdorp with gunner Flight Sergeant Henry Jarvie, came in with another load of troops. Just before touchdown they came under heavy fire and Henry Jarvie was killed. Norman and one soldier were wounded, and the aircraft was severely damaged necessitating a forced landing close to the CTs. The only remaining G-Car flown by Air Lieutenant Thorogood uplifted everyone from the downed helicopter and flew them off to Mtoko, leaving the two K-Cars and a Lynx, flown by Group Captain John Mussell, over the scene. By nightfall the only serviceable GCar had brought in the last of the stops from the first scene, and Francois arranged all the callsigns into over-night ambush positions. One of these positions was attacked by about 20 CTs during the night and a soldier was killed.
During the frustrating and somewhat confused day-action the CTs had the advantage of unusually thick bush cover and, apparently, only lost two killed. We, on the other hand, had lost three killed and three wounded with two helicopters needing expensive repairs.
I had just returned to Air HQ from weapons testing at Kutanga Range and walked into the Ops Room as news came through about Henry Jarvie and Ian Flemming. News of this shocking loss stunned everyone, but none so badly as me. I suffered an assault on all my emotions, such as never before and remember asking aloud, “Oh my God, why should such a terrible thing happen?”
The mainstay of our force undoubtedly lay with our technical men. As their OC on 4 Squadron, Henry Jarvie, the loveable clown, and Ian Flemming, the quiet good-natured armourer, had been two vitally important individuals. Following their transfer to helicopters, their personalities and talents benefited 7 Squadron greatly. But, that these two superb young men should die in the same Fireforce action was impossible to comprehend or accept. 12 January had been a very Black Friday for the Air Force.
Mini-golf bombs
I WAS SO AFFECTED BY THE loss of Henry and Flamo that I flew to Mtoko to talk to all the Fireforce participants. The problems they revealed were not new ones. Theirs had been the ongoing rainy season issue of not being able to see CTs, even when they had a fair idea of the general source of ground fire. I flew with Francois du Toit to view the contact area and whilst he was giving me a running commentary of the events, I came up with an idea that I guessed would turn similar situations to our advantage.
Had a pair of Hunters been immediately available to deliver four Golf bombs along the line of bush in which the CTs were known to be, the shock effect on survivors would undoubtedly have been significant. However, considering the time needed to bring in the jets from Thornhill, the casualties would already have occurred and the location of the stop groups would have disallowed the use of Golf bombs anyway.
John Mussell’s Lynx flying in support of the Fireforce action had been of little value even though he was immediately available all the time. This made me wonder if my project team could produce a weapon for the Lynx that would, in similar circumstances, provide severe shock effects with meaningful lethal range against CTs whose precise positions were not known.
By the time I reached Salisbury, I had decided what was needed and a new project was born to exploit existing Golf-bomb technology. My intention was to provide Lynx with a sizeable punch in the form of a ‘mini-Golf bomb’.
As always, the project team engineers and Ron Dyer responded enthusiastically, and the requirement was discussed at length before we launched into Project Juliet. At the conclusion of this project, the weapon we produced was not nicknamed the Juliet bomb but became known by the term I had first used—the ‘Mini-golf’ bomb.
The Mini-golf took a great deal of time to develop because of numerous safety features that had to be built into the design to cater for low level release from the relatively slow-flying Lynx. It turned out to be an ugly tail- less beast that was designed for release at the end of a standard front-guns attack. The ANFO charge was contained in a thin-skinned steel cylinder surrounded by thousands of steel slugs entrapped by a 6mm steel outer- casing. Upon release, the bomb deployed a large parachute from its rear. The parachute’s function was to retard the bomb sharply and pitch it to the vertical before it reached ground.
Simultaneous with the parachute deployment, an electric-switch device, housed in the sphere of an Alpha bomb outer casing, was released from its anchors in the nose cone. We named this device ‘the seeker’. Para- retardation on the bomb forced the seeker to fly forward of the bomb, drawing out a five-metre electric cable. When this cable was fully extended, batteries were brought into alignment to complete a link between the electrical switch in the seeker and the bomb’s detonator.
Early trials from 150 feet were frustrating because the speed and trajectory of the seeker was faster, and therefore shallower, than that of the retarding bomb until the electric cable was fully extended. This had the effect of bringing the seeker level with the bomb, until the bomb itself was facing vertically downwards. Only then did the seeker start to move forward of the bomb. This problem was overcome by simply increasing the release height to 300 feet to allow time for the seeker to reach its correct position before it contacted ground. On impact with the ground, the seeker’s circuit closed to fire the bomb five metres above it.
The Mini-golf’s high airburst was necessary to cater for CTs lying in ground depressions,
Flight Lieutenant Spook Geraty used the first Mini-golf in action on 18 June. Two days later Cocky Benecke used four in a single action that accounted for seven CTs dead. Thereafter Mini-golfs were used frequently.
After one of the earliest Mini-golf deliveries into a bush area from which ground fire had come, but no CTs had been seen, troops located four dead terrorists and one who, though only slightly wounded by shrapnel, was found lying unconscious. He revived when an RAR soldier shook his shoulder. This particular CT was at the edge of the Mini-golf’s effective range and had been well screened by trees standing between him and the point of detonation. When questioned by SB, the CT said he did not hear the bomb explode but was “suddenly overcome by a need to sleep”. The ground troops who were more than 100 metres from the Mini-golf explosion reported being totally taken aback by the huge blast and shock wave.
This shock effect paid off in many actions according to KCar pilot ASRs that reported two advantages accruing from Mini-golfs. One was that surviving CTs tended to remain where they were making it easier for ground forces to account for them and, more importantly, firing at aircraft either ceased or was substantially reduced.
Mini-golf was particularly useful against large enemy forces pursuing troops engaged on over border operations. In the first such action, east of the border village of Nyamapanda, Cocky Benecke (Hornet 20) was the pilot.
Cocky’s ASR reads:
Hornet 20 was tasked to assist c/s 75 (4 man RLI callsign) who was being chased by over 50 CTs and called for assistance. On arrival overhead c/s 75, s position c/s 75A who was on an OP (about 5 kms to the West
