Winds of Destruction

of c/s 75) informed me that the terrs were still chasing c/s 75. I identified c/s 75 and fired a few rockets into bushy areas immediately behind him. After a short while of orbiting around c/s 75 I was fired on by terrs using RPG 7, RPD and AK.

Using RPG 7 dust as an indicator I dropped a Mini-golf on that position. Mini-golf landed approx. 15 yds from RPG position. This had a major effect on those ters who survived and allowed c/s 75 to make good their escape. No more fire was directed at the aircraft and no movement was seen from that immediate area after the bomb went off.

I continued to orbit the area and c/s 75A informed me that I was being fired on from another position 500 yards away but only from small arms. I could not see where the firing was coming from so did not attack. I then married 75 with 75A in an LZ and provided top cover until Black section arrived below Hornet 4 to uplift the c/s back to Kotwa.

^{Shown in this picture of Lynx armament layout are: (Left rear to forward centre) Frantans, Mini-golf with proboscis, grenade launcher, 37mm Sneb rockets, .303 ammo belts, Light-series bomb carrier with four 28-pound fragmentation bombs and white-bodied practice bombs. Twin Browning machine-guns above wing ahead of and either side of rear engine air intake.}

The Mini-golfs had been in use for some time when, for safety reasons, it was decided to substitute the electrical seeker arrangement for a steel proboscis and accept a small reduction in killing range. Warrant Officer Bill Brown was one armourer who dreaded having to attend to early-model UXB Mini-golfs in the field. With live batteries and an electrical cable enmeshed in bush it was safest to simply rig up a delay charges to destroy such bombs.

ZANLA’s changing tactics

ROBERT MUGABE IN TYPICAL COMMUNIST style, declared 1978 to be ‘The Year of the People’. A few female CTs were with some groups entering the country and in the Op Repulse area there were clear indications that FRELIMO had become ever more involved.

Rhodesia saw a major change in government on 3 March 1978 following an internal political settlement signed by Ian Smith, Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Senator Chief Chirau and Reverend Ndabaningi Sithole (previously the leader of ZANU and ZANLA). The name of the country changed to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and, incredibly, the white people calmly accepted this first move towards black majority government. For one year an interim government ran the country with ministerial portfolios shared by experienced white ministers and black co-ministers who were learning the ropes. This would end when blacks and whites cast their votes for the first majority government. Mugabe and Nkomo wanted no part in this arrangement and branded the black participants as sellouts—so the war raged on.

Now, as in many preceding months, ZANLA relied on mujibas (LTTs and local youth spies) to provide them with early warning on RSF positions and the movement of Fireforces. Mujibas, often posing as common cattle herdsmen, drove cattle through likely RSF positions. Their abnormal practice of driving cattle over high features clearly identified active mujibas who we counted as CTs. When caught in the act they were either captured or killed.

In most ZANLA affected areas high features abounded. Mujibas used these to establish an early-warning system in which whistled messages were passed from one high point to the next along the line of Fireforce and troop movements. At one stage mujibas started denuding high features of all natural vegetation in an attempt to deny RSF hidden OPs (observation points) but the practice was dropped when they realised they needed the same cover for themselves.

ZANLA’s mujiba-warning system covered most of their operating areas other than half of the Op Repulse area where an extensive region of flat ground extended southwards from the Lundi River. Though crude, the warning system was very effective. A Fireforce flying at ninety knots could not hope to outpace the whistled warnings that passed ahead of their flight line at the speed of sound.

So troublesome was this warning system that selected troops moved into high points at night to kill mujibas when they took up positions at dawn. Visual recce from the air could not assist in these counter-mujiba operations because it was impossible to differentiate between RSF Op and mujiba path patterns. In spite of the mujibas, ZANLA continued to suffer greatly at the hands of the Selous Scouts pseudo teams who had learned to keep abreast of CT identification procedures. They knew what could and could not be eaten to fool the locals into believing they were bona fide ZANLA. Because of this the CTs were forced to find other ways of exposing Selous Scouts groups.

Individual CT leaders adopted a variety of short-duration identification methods. Sometimes this was to the detriment of genuine CT groups passing through or operating in adjacent areas. But, for a while, the Selous Scouts experienced setbacks. I recall one Scouts group being blown because the locals noticed that their weapons did not have barely visible scarlet thread tied to weapons’ trigger guards. Another group was blown because its members had not changed boot or shoelaces to the black ones the CTs had adopted. Switching cigarette brands was another of many ploys.

Norah Seear

DURING MARCH 1978 I WAS tasked to recce Chiweshe, Madziwa, Masembura, Msana and Chinamora Tribal Trust Lands extending in reverse order northward from Salisbury. I was pleased to do this as a break from my project work and more so because I was not encumbered with recce instruction. Whatever I located was passed on to JOC Hurricane at Bindura, but I only called for Fireforce once. On that occasion I had Norah Seear with me.

Norah was an excellent photo-interpreter with JSPIS (Joint Services Photographic Interpretation Services) based at New Sarum under command of Flight Lieutenant Bill Buckle. Two of Bill’s male interpreters as well as Norah (a grandmother) and three younger women interpreters had on occasions sought my opinion on terrorist bases they were analysing.

Visiting JSPIS was always enjoyable and I found Norah’s enthusiasm and open personality most appealing. She was especially keen to learn about visual recce. Not satisfied with all that I had told her, she asked if she could attend one of the many lectures I was called upon to give to Army personnel undertaking Air Orientation courses at New Sarum. Regrettably Norah pitched up at a particular presentation when I happened to be feeling really ill with a bad dose of flu. When the faces of the Army guys, who had been on a drinking spree in town the previous evening, showed that they were more interested in personal survival than in African toilet-path systems, I abbreviated my talk and left the room early, thereby disappointing Norah Seear. I still experience embarrassment when I recall the occasion.

Norah had obviously not been put off by my failure to teach her something new because she asked if she could accompany me on a recce of Chinamora Tribal Trust Land. I said I was more than happy to have her along for the ride but warned that the flight would be long and cold with no facility to relieve her bladder in flight. She assured me this was no problem because she had “the constitution of a camel”.

Nora’s presence in the aircraft was refreshing because of her never-ending questions which only dried up when I called Fireforce onto a group of CTs I found in a small base camp. The action that followed with RAR