However, to give dog handlers airborne combat experience was an impossibility that threw the whole radio tracker dog concept out of the window. My own very biased opinion is that had I spent another year on helicopters back in 1969 this situation would have been foreseen and many successes might have resulted. The obvious solution was to train Air Force dogs to be handled by combat-experienced helicopter technicians or soldiers.
More enemy reversals
ZIPRA HAD BEEN PRETTY INEFFECTIVE inside the country because sporadic RSF actions had disallowed them from establishing themselves in the N’debele tribal areas as effectively as their ZANLA opponents had done in the east. So troubled were ZAPU’s leaders about their waning image that they even resorted to claiming one of ZANLA’s notable successes. This was an attack against the large fuel storage depot in Salisbury’s industrial sites.
During the night of 11 December 1978, a small ZANLA sabotage unit fired RPG 7 rockets into three fuel- storage tanks, setting them alight. Such surprise was achieved that the CTs were gone before the Police protection detachment realised what had happened. The resulting fires radiated such intense heat that the tanks partially collapsed, spilling fuel in a chain reaction that destroyed twenty-two of the twenty-eight tanks in the complex. This attack dealt Rhodesia a near-crippling blow and it took three long months before the country’s precious fuel reserves were restored.
In the meantime, ZIPRA agents and operatives in Rhodesia, obviously following ZANLA’s lead, had been very busy recruiting in Matabeleland causing JOC Tangent great concern for the sudden high outflow of youngsters to Botswana. Most were being taken out at gunpoint! Nevertheless ZIPRA was still considered to be in a state of disarray following earlier SAS activities in Zambia. So, for the time being, ZANLA remained our primary concern.
During the latter quarter of 1977, the SAS was moved into the Gaza Province in an attempt to subdue that region in the manner they had tamed Tete. Unfortunately SAS was too small a unit to handle both provinces at the same time and the replacement troops sent to Tete did not operate in the same effective manner as SAS, simply because they were not trained for such specialised work. Consequently FRELIMO and ZANLA in Tete Province were let off the hook. Instead of being the hunted, they became the hunters again, which allowing CTs to pour into the Op Hurricane areas virtually unchecked.
In Gaza the SAS had good successes but they also had a very hard time. The FRELIMO Government had given greatest priority to assisting ZANLA with its main thrust into the southeast of Rhodesia. Because the Selous Scouts, SAS and air operations into Gaza had not been sustained on an ongoing basis, FRELIMO had been given the breathing space needed to build up substantial force levels to maintain the infiltration line for ZANLA.
Just before SAS was temporarily withdrawn from Gaza for the Op Dingo attacks on Chimoio and Tembue, a larger than normal SAS team dropped into Gaza Province on 1st November 1977. In an endeavour to mislead FRELIMO about the purpose of the para-Dakota’s presence, the Dakota crew descended to low level to hand- launch Alpha bombs through the open cargo door along the general line of the railway. A very bad moment was experience when the Dakota inadvertently passed directly over heavily defended but blacked-out Mapai. The pilot bunted the aircraft in his endeavour to escape enemy 12,7mm, 14,5mm and 23mm fire that was ripping through his aircraft. In so doing, loose Alpha bombs and bodies floated in the air until forcibly dumped onto the floor when the aircraft levelled-off sharply too close to the ground for comfort.
Two days later, on 3 November, the SAS team brought a large convoy of FRELIMO vehicles to a halt when the lead vehicle struck the land mine SAS had laid as an initiator to their planned ambush. However, a series of explosions from ordnance on this vehicle made it impossible for the rest of the column to continue forward. Fearing air attack, the convoy backtracked a short distance and moved off the road.
The SAS had inadvertently hooked a much larger fish than the ZANLA convoy they had been expecting. They backed off immediately because the FRELIMO force was much too large and angry to engage. Through Giles Porter, (callsign C4) flying a Lynx with the SAS airborne liaison officer, Captain Bob MacKenzie, Air Force Hunters were called in for a dawn attack to destroy the vehicles, now hidden in the cover of dense trees and out of sight of the SAS men on the ground.
Vic Wightman and Dave Bourhill came in as Red Section. John Annan and Spook Geraty followed later as White Section. The term ‘Bingo’ in Vic Wightman’s ASR means ‘minimum fuel remaining’.
Vic’s ASR reads:
Red Section arrived in the target area at approx. 0540B. C4 pointed out the burning vehicle which was about one kilometre up the road from where the hidden vehicles were believed to be. As no vehicles were visible either to C4 or Red Section, C4 suggested that Red Section descend to low level and have a look. Red Lead declined the offer on the grounds of fuel consumption and poor spotting capability at low level, whereupon C4, with a commendable display of moral fibre, descended to 50 feet and flew up the road from South to North. When he reached the assessed position of the hidden convoy a large number of twinkles from intense enemy fire appeared from the bush to his left with airbursts assessed to have come from 37mm. As he broke away to the right Red Section turned in and fired long bursts of 30mm into the AA positions. After Red Section’s first attack something (possibly a vehicle) was seen to be burning.
During the dive for the second attack, Strela smoke was seen heading northeastward. Another Strela was fired at Red Lead as he pulled up to perch for the third attack and the airburst was seen some way behind the aircraft. Red 2 also had a Strela fired at him as he pulled up. This is not the first time Red Lead has had Strela fired at him and there is no difficulty in identification.
Red Lead’s third attack was guns only at the Strela site—Red 2 used 24 Matra. Since all 30mm ammo was used up and, at most, one vehicle was burning, Red climbed to FL 200 and called for another pair. While in the holding pattern several glints were seen which might have been reflections off windscreens. The position of one of these was noted. Red 2 ran short of fuel before White Section arrived but Red Lead was able to place 6 Matra at the position at about 0645B just as fuel reached Bingo for Buffalo Range. It was a lucky guess for the unseen vehicle burst into flames and started exploding.
At 0615B White Section was airborne. En route they were briefed by Red Lead and C4 on the situation and the AA. As they arrived overhead they observed Red Lead’s final strike. C4 asked White Lead to strike along the left of the road in a northerly direction and White 2 along the right. Both used Matra and 30mm and were on target as observed by C4 who was by this time overhead at FL 120. As White 2 was pulling out of his attack he saw a group of vehicles just to the left of and about 2/3 along his line of strikes. He attempted to get White Lead’s eyes onto target by clock reference from the burning vehicle.
White 2 observed White Lead’s second strike to be at the left of the assessed position of the (unseen) group of vehicles and while pulling out White Lead also noticed them. Both he and White 2 attempted another strike but only saw the vehicles after ceasefire though White 2’s second and third attacks appeared to rake through them. His subsequent attacks were to no avail as a 7.62 round had severed his armament circuits. White Lead was also having difficulty with intermittent firing. At this stage C4 assessed the targets as severely damaged and he recommended that no further Hunters be called for. White Lead was streaming fuel from his port 230 tank so diverted to Buffalo Range. White 2 returned to base.
As can be seen from the ASR, the Hunter pilots did not fully realise what damage they had inflicted. Giles Porter and Bob MacKenzie had been extremely lucky to survive the low pass in which unbelievably heavy fire, including flak and missiles, was directed at them; but this brave action had succeeded in finding the convoy. The SAS on the ground said the Lynx passed through the heaviest fire they had ever witnessed, making it all the more amazing that the Lynx suffered no hits.
During the night two days after the attack, a close-in reconnaissance revealed that the SAS had halted a mobile brigade including Russians who were aiming to establish this brigade’s HQ in Mapai. Thirteen brand-new transporters and specialist vehicles had been destroyed along with spares for Russian tanks that were already in
