was under no pressure to say the ‘right thing’, repeated what he had said in Maputo.
When relating to the return of his medals in a book he wrote about his time with ZANLA, Thomas Wigglesworth records that “truth is certainly stranger than fiction…”
Returning to Op Snoopy. On Day Three of this operation all forces returned to Rhodesia. The Air Force was quite unable to sustain a longer stay and sufficient death, destruction and disruption had been imposed on ZANLA, for the time being.
World reaction to our external operations was nothing like as damaging to Rhodesia as had been expected, and for the most part FRELIMO had not become involved. The benefits of going external, so long delayed, were proving to be much more cost-effective and infinitely more disruptive to both ZANLA and ZIPRA than internal operations. For the moment ZANLA was on the back foot, so attention switched back to ZIPRA.
Operation Gatling
BEFORE OCTOBER 1978, OPERATIONS INSIDE Zambia had not involved Air Force in anything more than a supporting role. The SAS had conducted superbly executed disruptive operations that succeeded in forcing ZIPRA to move away from the Zambezi River and ever deeper into Zambia. In the meanwhile Selous Scouts-controlled spies and SB agents had been very active inside Zambia gaining intelligence on ZIPRA because this was more difficult to gain than from ZANLA through scores of captured CTs. A clearer picture had emerged and Canberras were able to photograph defined positions for photo-interpreters to study.
With specific targets confirmed, and considering the experience gained in joint-force operations in Mozambique, it was time for the Air Force to become directly involved against ZIPRA in Zambia. It was payback time for the first Viscount disaster, which had occurred seven weeks earlier.
On 19 October, the Air Force engaged in three separate operations in Zambia, the first of which did not include any troops. This was because the target, previously white-owned Westlands Farm, was too close to the Zambian capital Lusaka. Lying just sixteen kilometres to the northeast of the city centre, this farm had become ZIPRA’s military headquarters and training base. ZIPRA called it Freedom Camp (FC Camp). Being so close to Lusaka, ZIPRA considered the location to be immune to attack. However, with senior ZIPRA staff there and 4,000- odd CTs undergoing training in a relatively compact area, FC Camp made an obvious and very inviting target for airstrikes.
One thing that had to be taken into account was the possibility of Zambian Air Force fighters interfering with Rhodesian aircraft. There were also the matters of British Rapier missiles known to be somewhere in Zambia and civilian air traffic movements in and out of Lusaka Airport. To deal with the former issue, it was decided that the lead Canberra would forewarn Lusaka Airport by passing a message through the duty Air Traffic Controller to the Station Commander at the Zambian Air Force base, Mumbwa. This was to let him know that Hunters were over his base with orders to shoot down any Zambian fighters that attempted to take off.
Timings were crucial because Canberras, Hunters and K-Cars allocated to the FC raid had to turn around after their strikes and link into a combined operation with the SAS against ZIPRA’s Mkushi Camp. The third target, known to us as CGT 2, was to be handled by Vampires, Lynx, four K-cars, G-Cars and RLI paratroopers. CGT 2 was one of at least four ZIPRA bases established in rough country south of the Great East Road that ran eastward from Lusaka to Malawi. Not knowing ZIPRA names for these bases, they were named Communist Guerrilla Training (CGT) bases with identification numerals 1–4.
Diverting for a moment back to my JPS days. During the late 1960s South African, Portuguese and Rhodesian teams had been established for the Alcora Planning groups to consider mutual support in both regular and counter-insurgency warfare. Whereas I had been a member of the mapping committee, I was in the picture on most of the other committees’ work. One of these dealt specifically with plans for strategic airfields. These plans involved the upgrading of existing air bases and the building of new ones suitably sited in South West Africa, Rhodesia, Mozambique and South Africa.
Each air base was to incorporate underground hangars and immediate-readiness fighter pens with intricate taxiways leading to two primary runways. The design allowed two whole squadrons of sixteen fighters to scramble simultaneously. However, the costs involved were so great that it was necessary to build the bases in stages. The first stage was to build one half of a total base with the end-plan taxiway serving as the first operational runway.
In Rhodesia, Thornhill and New Sarum needed no work as they both exceeded the needs of Phase 1, but three other sites had been selected. These were Wankie National Park, Fylde Farm near Hartley and Buffalo Range at Chiredzi. Buffalo Range already existed as an active airfield, needing only limited work to get it to Phase 1 status. Fylde had become operational before Op Gatling was mounted on 19 October and served as the base for Hunters and Vampires during this operation. At this stage work at Wankie was still in progress.
Green Formation of four Canberras left New Sarum a little after four K-Cars had taken off from Mana Pools on the Zambezi River. A total of six Hunters were involved. Two with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles headed directly for the Zambian Air Force base at Mumbwa and the other four followed a prescribed route to FC camp.
Squadron Leader Chris Dixon with Mike Ronnie as his navigator led Green Formation. Ted Brent with Jim Russell, Greg Todd with Doug Pasea, and Glen Pretorius with Paddy Morgan followed. The Canberras, flying low under Zambian radar, were loaded with a total of 1,200 Alpha bombs. The four Hunters of Blue Formation, led by Squadron Leader Vic Wightman with wingmen John Blythe-Wood, Ginger Baldwin and Tony Oakley, were also approaching target at low level and were some way behind the slower Canberra formation when they crossed the Zambezi River. Their speed would place them ahead for first strikes.
White Section, the Hunters orbiting Mumbwa, were flown by Rick Culpan and Alf Wild, who listened in to the attacking force transmissions whilst hoping the MiG 19 fighters would take to the air. In this they were to be disappointed because nothing stirred. Orbiting at height near the Zambezi River in the Command Dakota were General Peter Walls, Group Captain Norman Walsh and their communications staff who would remain airborne throughout the day to cover all three operations.
The Hunters struck dead on 08:30 taking out the FC headquarters buildings. The huge Golf bombs’ plumes were not needed as markers to give Chris Dixon’s bomb-aimer final confirmation of his line-up because Mike Ronnie could see the target during the formation’s acceleration to attack-speed.
Chris’s radio system was linked to a tape recorder in the cockpit for possible post-strike public relations purposes. On playback of the tape, we all heard the deep breathing of the crew building up during run to target and their comments about the precision of Hunter strikes. This was followed by excited shouting between Chris and Mike when they saw hundreds of CTs running in the treed and open areas through which the Canberra formation’s bomb loads would run. On completion of their strike, Chris and Mike continued to communicate excitedly as, in the background, the calm voices of the Hunter pilots could be heard as they called, “turning in live” for their restrikes.
When the Hunters cleared, the voice of Pink Formation leader, Squadron Leader Graham Cronshaw, showed that the K-Cars had arrived over FC camp. They were lucky that none of the anti-aircraft guns were manned as they set about attacking scattered survivors.
Chris Dixon had been instructed to contact Lusaka Tower before his strike, but something had gone amiss with frequency selection. He only made this call to a remarkably calm African controller whilst the K-Cars were active over FC camp. This was Chris’s prepared message:
