together with the controller’s responses. Fresh in memory was ZIPRA’s downing of the first Air Rhodesia Viscount sixteen days earlier, so news of the action against Nkomo’s forces came as a much-needed tonic for waning morale, and ‘Green Leader’ became a national hero though few knew that he was Squadron Leader Chris Dixon.
Mulungushi and Mboroma
MOUNTAIN GUTU, THE LOGISTICS OFFICER from Mkushi, turned out to be a vital man because he personally knew all the top rankers in ZAPU and ZIPRA as well as the location of ZIPRA’s headquarters units, their camps and logistics sites. He was also able to confirm that most of ZIPRA’s activities were geared to preparing for conventional warfare, though he could not give the reason for this. To us the Russian influence on ZIPRA was obvious.
A location that immediately drew special attention was ZIPRA’s prison camp at Mboroma deep inside Zambia. Apart from ZIPRA dissidents and alleged spies, Gutu claimed that a number of Security Force personnel who had been abducted in Rhodesia were also held there. He willingly offered evidence and provided details of the ZIPRA personalities in charge of the prison camp. He not only gave the names and places in Rhodesia from which they originated but, in the typically African way, described their physical peculiarities. Whereas they were probably pretty average people, Gutu’s descriptions made them appear to be a bunch of oddballs. Here are extracts of his written descriptions:
Camp Commander—Samson Dube. He originates from Kezi.
Has a large scar on forehead as result of a knobkerrie blow prior to training. Approximately 35 years old.
Camp Commissar—Hobo Maqula. Originates from the Plumtree area. Approximately 42 years old and limps on left leg.
Chief of Staff—Takarayi Mbvizi. Has a very high-pitched voice and originates from Sinoia. Approximately 37 years old.
Medical officer—Kenni Malungu. After faction fight in Mozambique deserted and proceeded to Zambia. Is cross-eyed. Originates from Chipinga and approximately 31 years.
Logistics—Ndwini Sibanda. Subject is five foot five inches and bow-legged. Approximately 28 years old.
The Selous Scouts were given the task of moving on Mboroma with the prime objective of bringing all the prisoners back to Rhodesia. A close-in recce of the camp, conducted from high ground right next to its southern boundary, confirmed the presence of prisoners and established routines within the camp. Ron Reid-Daly wanted to conduct a pure ground action to simultaneously ensure the safety of prisoners and to allow the right moment to be selected before launching the operation. It would have been a simple enough matter to parachute the entire force into the remote countryside for an approach on foot to the target to meet Ron’s objectives, but COMOPS disallowed this.
Instead, Scouts paratroopers enveloped the prison camp following a limited Hunter airstrike, but it resulted in the timing of the action being wrong—just as Ron had feared. Most of the prisoners were away on various foraging tasks, well away from target. In consequence only a quarter of the prisoners, thirty-odd, were flown back to Rhodesia a couple of days before Christmas 1978; so the Dakota effort allocated to uplifting troops and prisoners from a nearby Zambian airfield way exceeded demand.
The press had a royal time learning about the horrors of ZIPRA torture, starvation and general maltreatment of their unfortunate prisoners. Arising from this rescue mission, Selous Scouts, always maligned by the world press, were hailed as heroes and spirits were raised on that hot sunny Christmas Day.
Mountain Gutu had also confirmed that a main ZIPRA base for conventional forces existed in the old Federal Cadets Training Centre (later the Zambian National Service Training Centre) on the west bank of the Mulungushi Dam situated north of Lusaka. Selous Scout recce specialists, Schulie Schulenburg and his African partner, made a detailed closein reconnaissance of the base to confirm what Gutu had said. This was done during the lead-up to the Mboroma rescue operation.
By the time he was uplifted back to Rhodesia, Schulie had set a record by being in hostile territory for two weeks without resupply. He reported that there were over two hundred men in camp who did not seem to have any concerns following the attacks on FC Camp, Mkushi and CGT 2 because they were so well dug in. Because of this, it was decided not to pursue the joint-force approach again, as we were likely to suffer unacceptably high casualties. Instead a Canberra formation attack was launched at the same moment that the Hunters were striking Mboroma on 22 December 1978. Results were pleasing.
Moatize hangar
EVER SINCE BUSH COVER STARTED receding in July the success rate of Fireforce actions had been mounting. It was in one of these in late November 1978 that a CT was captured by RLI troopies of the Mtoko Fireforce. Those who nabbed him did not know that ZANLA’s High Command had made a big error in sending their high-ranking Secretary for the Tete Province on a staff visit to the Takawira Sector in Rhodesia.
SB was delighted to have this man alive considering that most of the CTs in the contact had been killed. Included in the wealth of information gleaned from him, SB learned of huge ZANLA weapons and explosives holdings in an aircraft hangar at the Moatize Airfield near Tete town. The information was passed to the SAS who came to the conclusion this was a job best suited to Air Force.
Five Hunters piloted by Squadron Leader Vic Wightman, Ginger Baldwin, Jim Stagman, Tony Oakley and Dave Bourhill were tasked to take this and other targets out in a single sortie. Though ZANLA’s primary weapons holdings constituted the main target, a long ZANLA barrack building in Tete town was assigned for attention by Golf bombs after which vehicles and AA gun sites were to be destroyed.
On 8 December, four Golf bombs flattened the barrack block completely. Firing at the hangar had to be conducted from long range to avoid the chaos that tons of explosives detonating spontaneously would spew into the path of an attacking jet. It was the second pilot to fire at this target who had the satisfaction of seeing it mushroom in a truly massive explosion that necessitated a maximum ‘G’ turn to avoid flying through the cone of rising debris. When they had taken out assigned targets and had run out of ammunition, the aircraft climbed to 30,000. There the pilots looked back with satisfaction at the vertical pillar of smoke and dust rising more than 10,000 feet above Moatize Airfield where the hangar’s shattered girders and cladding lay widely scattered.
Following this, the SAS moved in to blow up the Mecito bridge to ensure that ZANLA would not easily replenish their lost stocks or continue to move men to Tete by rail. This they timed to occur as a train passed over it on 15 December. Only five days later, with the railway line now out of action, ZANLA attempted to move ammunition up to Tete along their alternate route which was the main road running northwards from Chimoio along the low ground fairly close to the Rhodesian border. News of this impending movement was intercepted on the FRELIMO radio network.
An SAS ambush party struck the lead vehicles, forcing following ones to high-tail back the way they had come. Two pairs of Hunters flown by Vic Wightman, Jim Stagman, Ginger Baldwin and Brian Gordon destroyed the vehicles found hidden in an orchard by Cocky Benecke who had called for and directed their strikes. Following
