pour more FRELIMO troops into the Op Repulse area were shelved. In fact many FRELIMO earmarked for Rhodesia were withdrawn to combat the MNR ‘bandits’.
Whereas there had been no question of using the MNR to fight ZANLA CTs in Mozambique, FRELIMO sought ZANLA’s assistance to combat the MNR. Had such a situation arisen two years earlier, combined Rhodesian and MNR action would have permitted our own forces to operate in depth against ZANLA and FRELIMO for as long as we chose, unencumbered by aircraft shortages and servicing cycles. Furthermore, with the MNR seeking as much credit as possible for anti-FRELIMO activities, the destruction of Mozambique’s communications networks would have been made easy and would almost certainly have resulted in ZANLA’s eviction from Mozambique.
The SAS enjoyed leading MNR and witnessed some very hairy fighting. They held back from each action to avoid compromising themselves and watched aghast when the first MNR leader, Andre, initiated ambushes and attacks by leaping to his feet, fully exposing himself with gun above head to shout the MNR slogan that triggered each action.
True or not, I cannot say, but I heard that FRELIMO soldiers were petrified of MNR. The story goes that MNR sometimes removed the heads of their victims and scattered them around to make matching them to bodies difficult. Every FRELIMO soldier hearing of this was worried that, should this happen to him, his spirit would remain trapped in his body if someone else’s head was buried with it.
The SAS personnel operating with MNR were changed over regularly without difficulties until their operations spread southward to a new sector in the region of Chipinga. Here the MNR group resisted an SAS changeover fearing that they were about to be abandoned. At Gorongoza it was normal practice for the four SAS men assigned to the MNR to move miles clear of the base area to meet the team changeover helicopter. Whilst awaiting the arrival of the replacement team, the MNR remained inside their safe haven totally surrounded by loyal tribesmen. However, even having gained the confidence and open support of the locals for miles around, the relatively small MNR group camping in hills east of Chipinga only felt safe with SAS in their midst. In consequence, we at COMOPS were faced with an unusual problem when we learned that these MNR men were holding their SAS colleagues hostage to prevent them from moving off for a changeover the MNR leader feared might not take place.
At the cost of unnecessary flying hours, the situation was resolved by deploying the four-man replacement team miles from the MNR base for a long walk to effect changeover in the presence of MNR. But then, with eight SAS men making him feel doubly safe, the MNR leader attempted, unsuccessfully, to persuade the first team to stay on.
Luso Boma
IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND Angola, South African forces were involved in a war against SWAPO (SWA Peoples’ Organisation) and to a lesser extent SAANC. As a result of their intelligence, we learned in late January 1979 that a large concentration of ZIPRA men were undergoing training under Russian and Cuban instructors at Luso Boma in Angola.
Photo-reconnaissance confirmed the site of the large base in central-east Angola, and a preliminary feasibility study was conducted to establish if we could undertake an air attack against it. Clearly the target lay at too great a range for Hunters with under-wing stores. For the Canberras it was possible but the range left no reserve of fuel for possible Inter-Tropical Convergence Zone weather problems on the day. Initially it was decided to postpone the attack until weather conditions improved in May. However when the second Viscount was shot down by ZIPRA on 12 February 1979 it created a need for another high-profile retaliatory action and Luso was the best target we had at the time.
OC 5 Squadron, Squadron Leader Chris Dixon (Green Leader), was brought in to discuss the matter. He immediately said his squadron could meet the task and advocated operating out of Victoria Falls Airport for a normal climb to 30,000 feet.
One engine would then be closed down for the cruise to target. Both engines would be used for the descent, attack and return to height where, once again, one engine would be closed down for the return to Victoria Falls.
This was all very well, but Luso Boma base was too large to be covered by the formation of only four Canberras we could be certain of having on the day, when in fact six Canberras were needed to cover the whole target. An approach was made to the South Africans who had a vested interest in the same target because some SAANC were also training at Luso Boma. If we did not attack the base, the South African Air Force would probably do the job anyway. But, since we wanted to smack ZIPRA ourselves, an opportunity existed to undertake a combined formation strike. Air Commodore Norman Walsh was in favour of using an extra Canberra to drop 1000 -pound bombs with variously set time-delay fuses to confuse and delay the enemy’s post-strike mopping up operations. In consequence, seven Canberras were used.
To launch aircraft from South West Africa and Rhodesia for link up in Angola was feasible but unwise in view of the need for joint planning and briefing of crews. So three SAAF Canberra B9s positioned at remote Fylde Air Base to keep their presence secret. After briefing, our four Canberras positioned at Victoria Falls. The SAAF aircraft, with modern engines and higher fuel capacity, had no problems with the longer range they had to fly from Fylde. Rudie Kritsinger, Roley Jones and Willie Meyer captained these bombers. Although Hunters had been discounted from the strike itself they were to be on station at height armed with Sidewinder air-to-air missiles to counter interference from the Zambian Air Force or, less likely, Cuban-operated MiG 19s and MiG 21s based at Henrique de Carvalho in Angola.
When the time came for start-up on 26 February 1979, Chris Dixon with Mike Ronnie in the lead aircraft of Green Formation could not get one engine started. Chris immediately handed the lead to Ted Brent and Jim Russell who, as was standard practice, were fully prepared for such an eventuality. The other two Canberras were crewed by Glen Pretorius with Paddy Morgan and Kevin Peinke with, I think, J.J. Strydom.
The Rhodesian formation was still climbing and had the SAAF formation visual when Chris Dixon reported being airborne five minutes behind. Ted continued with the formation of six until he was well inside Zambia. Near Mongu he went into a shallow orbit to await Chris. At this point our radiointercepting service picked up a call from Mongu reporting the presence of ‘enemy aircraft’ to the Zambian Air Force base at Mumbwa.
When Chris caught up, he instructed Ted to retain the lead and the formation continued on its way. The Non-Directional Beacon at Luso Airfield was expected to assist the formation but, typical for Africa, it was on the blink. Nevertheless the formation navigators all map-read whenever there were gaps in near continuous strata- cumulus cover along a weaving route between cumulonimbus storm clouds. Fortunately the low cloud cover ended before Luso.
When Ted spotted the airfield at Luso, he instructed the Rhodesian pilots to fire up their cold engines as he commenced a fast descent for a wide port turn to pass low over the airfield on heading for the base which was close by. A huge storm stretched right across the run-up path to target but the Canberras had come too far to be put off by this difficulty. Three Rhodesian and three SAAF bombers moved into formation for the lowlevel attack. The fourth Rhodesian Canberra levelled off at 1,500 feet above and behind the main force.
With six aircraft correctly stationed in their wide flat Vic positions, the formation entered heavy rain at full attack speed with all pilots holding heading and height on instruments.
When he judged the moment was right, Ted called “Bomb doors, go.” Almost immediately the formation
