movements of forces into the Vital Ground, adversely effecting Fireforce activities in which 60% of calls proved to be ‘lemons’ because bush cover was at its thickest.
In these two months only 262 CTs had been killed in Fireforce actions, according to physical body counts that is. The cost per terrorist killed translated into high expenditure in Rhodesian terms. (I do not remember the actual cost comparison but can recall that it was in the order of one tenth of the American figure for Vietnam.)
EXTERNAL:
On the other hand, according to FRELIMO radio intercepts, 103 ZANLA CTs were killed in Mozambique by jet-strikes and landmines previously laid by Special Forces. In Angola 174 ZIPRA were killed with 533 seriously wounded. Since we did not have these figures at the time, they were not included in the cost-comparison study.
Ignoring those dead and wounded CTs in Mozambique, about which we knew nothing, the cost per terrorist killed externally (according to the study) was in the order of onethird of the internal cost. Within the next ten months this would reduce to less than a quarter in spite of greatly improved internal successes.
Externally things were going to hot up and prove just how seriously political restraints had increased costs and greatly expanded CT numbers.
ZIPRA plans revealed
DURING MARCH 1979, ACTING ON intelligence from their agent in Botswana, the Selous Scouts mounted an ambush on the main Grove Road linking Botswana with Zambia. This road ran close to Rhodesia’s western border where the Scouts established their ambush position. Their targets were two wellknown, high-ranking ZIPRA officers.
One was Dumiso Dabengwa (the ‘Black Russian’), second only to Nkomo and head of ZIPRA Intelligence. The other was Elliott Sibanda (the ‘Black Swine’), ZIPRA’s senior intelligence officer for the ‘Southern Front’ whose office was in Francistown, Botswana. These two men were transferring brand-new ZIPRA vehicles, purchased in South Africa, to Zambia.
When the Selous Scouts sprung its ambush, Dumiso Dabengwa escaped unharmed but Elliott Sibanda was seriously wounded and captured. Following stomach surgery that saved his life, Elliott Sibanda willingly gave the most important information we had received to date concerning ZIPRA’s future plans and dispositions.
We knew that ZIPRA indulged in a mix of conventional and irregular training and that the larger proportion of men had been preparing for conventional war. However, until Elliott opened Pandora’s box, we thought ZIPRA’s low level of activity was largely due to our external ops. Sibanda disabused us of such comforting thoughts.
Nkomo’s Russian advisors had persuaded ZIPRA to retain a limited force of active irregulars to keep Rhodesian eyes off the main intention, which was to invade Rhodesia. When the moment was right, the irregulars were to commit defined acts of sabotage in conjunction with a full-scale invasion by regular forces, supported by armour and air, in two drives via Victoria Falls in the west and Chirundu in the north.
Beira fuel refinery
WHILST SIBANDA’S INFORMATION WAS STILL being digested, the Selous Scouts were actively attempting to assassinate the elusive Joshua Nkomo in Lusaka and the SAS embarked on a daring operation to boost the MNR’s growing image by destroying the enormous fuel storage facility in Beira.
During Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland days and continuing for three months after the imposition of economic sanctions on Rhodesia, crude oil had been pumped from Beira to the Rhodesian fuel refinery at Feruka just west of Umtali. For this, Beira’s fuel storage capacity had been increased well beyond its original requirement, which was to service central Mozambique and Malawi. In consequence the target was huge.
In happier times it had taken only three hours for Rhodesian holidaymakers to motor from Umtali to the popular seaside resorts of Beira town. The Canberra that carried the SAS commander on a night reconnaissance to check the refinery’s lighting arrangements took a mere forty minutes from Salisbury. For the SAS and MNR attack group it took many days along a very circuitous route. Nevertheless they reached their target and, in a spectacular action, ignited the fuel tanks, severed the main fuel transfer line to spill crude into the docks and cut off the main electrical power-lines serving Beira town. They had completed their noisy job before FRELIMO defences woke up to what was happening.
During a running withdrawal under heavy FRELIMO gunfire, one MNR man was killed outright but was left where he lay. His body, plus many MNR leaflets and paraphernalia deliberately scattered around, convinced FRELIMO that the attack had been a purely MNR affair. The effects of this action really frightened the FRELIMO Government, which until now had been confident that the MNR was not powerful enough to target vital installations, particularly in built-up areas. In truth they were not; the SAS was responsible for the planning and its own specialists made up more than 90% of the attack force. All the same the world was awakened to the MNR’s existence and South African fire-fighters had to come to Mozambique’s aid to put out the raging inferno.
Assassination attempts on Joshua Nkomo
BACK IN RHODESIA, DETAILED INTELLIGENCE given by Elliott Sibanda made it clear that ZIPRA’s invasion plan had to be stopped in its tracks—urgently.
A host of possibilities were discussed in COMOPS HQ. The courses to be taken were broken into four categories—assassination of key men—destruction of ZIPRA’s concentrated weapons holdings—attacks on ZIPRA regular force bases and—destruction of Zambia’s communication lines. It was clear that all of these things would have to be done, but priorities had to be established.
Consideration was given to eliminating ZIPRA’s Russian advisers who were all known in detail, including their home locations. However this was discarded as the benefits to be gained would be short-lived and the consequences to Rhodesia potentially damaging. Joshua Nkomo’s early demise made much better sense as it would cause major disruption to ZAPU’s leadership and profoundly affect morale, thereby giving us more time to produce detailed dossiers on all other targets.
Even before Elliott Sibanda’s information had come to hand, Selous Scouts had attempted to assassinate Nkomo using a car bomb. But, no matter where it was positioned, Nkomo always followed another route home; so another option was adopted. This was to kill the ZIPRA leader in his home, which necessitated having a Selous Scout in Lusaka to watch for the right moment. This was no easy matter as Nkomo spent a great deal of time on overseas and local travel. Once home however, he would remain there for the night. But, since there was no certainty he would be in his high-security house the following night, action had to be taken immediately Nkomo was known to have returned home. Three times Ron Reid-Daly received the codeword sent from Lusaka via a contact man in South Africa to say Nkomo was home, and three times the assassination group launched into Zambia.
The first group went in by helicopter for a night walk-in approach to RV with the agent. But the agent failed to turn up with transport to take them to target. This was because heavy rain had washed away a vital bridge between Lusaka and the assault group.
